Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition |
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Topics: Toyota Corolla
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Frank S. Borris, II
General Services Administration
May 14, 2015
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 93 (Thursday, May 14, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 27835-27844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-11632]
[[Page 27835]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.
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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for denying a petition
(DP14-003) submitted to NHTSA 49 U.S.C. 30162, 49 CFR part 552,
requesting that the agency open ``an investigation into low-speed
surging in the 2006-2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i, in
which the brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to prevent a crash.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stephen McHenry, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-4883. Email
stephen.mchenry@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1.0 Introduction
Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a
properly filed petition the agency conducts a technical review of the
petition, material submitted with the petition, and any additional
information. 49 U.S.C. 30162(c); 49 CFR 552.6. After considering the
technical review and taking into account appropriate factors, which may
include, among others, allocation of agency resources, agency
priorities, and the likelihood of success in litigation that might
arise from a determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to
motor vehicle safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. 49
U.S.C. 30162(d); 49 CFR 552.8.
2.0 Petition Background Information
In a letter dated September 11, 2014, Mr. Robert Ruginis requested
that NHTSA open ``an investigation into low-speed surging in the 2006-
2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i, in which the brakes fail to
stop the vehicle in time to prevent a crash.'' Mr. Ruginis based his
request upon multiple low-speed ``surge events'' allegedly experienced
by his wife in their model year (MY) 2010 Toyota Corolla, the latest of
which resulting in a crash into a parked vehicle on June 8, 2014. Mr.
Ruginis makes the following claims in support of his petition: (1) The
Event Data Recorder (EDR) readout of his wife's crash supports her
account of vehicle acceleration after she applied the brake; (2) NHTSA
has never investigated surges in low-speed crashes in Toyota vehicles;
(3) a software expert has identified vulnerabilities in Toyota's ETCS-i
source code; (4) there are other similar incidents of ``surge at low
speed or no speed'' in Toyota Corolla vehicles in NHTSA's consumer
complaint database; and (5) surges in low-speed parking scenarios are a
safety problem.
NHTSA has reviewed the material cited by the petitioner. The
results of this review and our analysis of the petition's merits are
set forth in the DP14-003 Petition Analysis Report, published in its
entirety as an appendix to this notice.
For the reasons presented in the petition analysis report after a
thorough assessment of the potential risks to safety, it is unlikely
that an order concerning the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect would be issued as a result of granting Mr. Ruginis's
petition. After full consideration of the potential for finding a
safety related defect in the vehicle and in view of the need to
allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources to best accomplish
the agency's mission, the petition is respectfully denied.
Appendix--Petition Analysis--DP14-003
1.0 Introduction
On September 12, 2014, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) received a September 11, 2014, letter from Mr.
Robert Ruginis petitioning the agency ``for an investigation into low-
speed surging in the 2006-2010 Toyota Corolla [vehicles] with ETCS-i,
in which the brakes fail to stop the vehicle in time to prevent a
crash.'' The letter provides the following basis for the request:
This request is based on first-hand experience in which multiple
low-speed surge events that occurred while driving our 2010 Corolla.
The latest incident resulted in a crash on June 8, 2014. In addition
to the evidence from our crash incident, we are providing evidence
that many other Corolla owners are experiencing similarly unsafe
scenarios that are leading to crashes.
The petition letter provides information regarding the June 8,
2014, crash incident, including the petitioner's interpretation of pre-
crash data downloaded from the vehicle Event Data Recorder (EDR) by
Toyota field inspectors:
The EDR investigation report clearly showed that at the moment
the airbag module made the decision whether to deploy (about the
time of impact), the voltage to the accelerator pedal was .78 (at
idle), the brake was engaged, yet both the speed of the vehicle and
engine RPM's had doubled in less than 2 seconds.
Mr. Ruginis provided copies of the police report for the accident,
the EDR report, and a list of ODI complaints (VOQs) that he considered
similar to his wife's experience in the crash and in prior driving
experience. He provided the following five reasons supporting an ODI
investigation of the alleged defect in the MY 2006 through 2010 Toyota
Corolla vehicles:
1. The EDR results suggest that unsafe and unexpected surges can
occur even when the driver's action is to apply the brake;
2. NHTSA has never investigated surges in low-speed crashes in
Toyotas;
3. The observations of software expert Michael Barr suggest that
Toyota's electronic architecture has many vulnerabilities;
4. Unintended surges in low-speed parking scenarios are common; and
5. Surges in low-speed parking scenarios are a safety problem.
In evaluating the petitioner's allegations and preparing a
response, ODI:
Reviewed the petition request and submitted appendices,
interviewed the petitioner and his wife--who was the primary driver and
who was driving when the crash occurred.
Provided the 163 VOQs submitted by the petitioner to
Toyota, formally requested Toyota to provide full warranty claim
histories for throttle and braking systems on the subject vehicles, as
well as copies of all reports made to Toyota by the complainants or by
dealership or Toyota technical personnel related to the complaints,
field inspection data, and all related EDR download data obtained by
Toyota collected from vehicles identified in incidents reported in the
subject vehicle VOQs.
Requested technical and engineering information from
Toyota related to the alleged defect as submitted by the petitioner.
Analyzed the information provided by Toyota in response to
our specific requests for information.
Reviewed previous analysis and investigative work into
unintended acceleration done by NHTSA, the National Aeronautics and
Space
[[Page 27836]]
Administration, and the National Academy of Sciences as well as papers
from the Society of Automotive Engineers related to EDR download data
interpretation and limitations.
Interviewed complainants who had submitted the 163 VOQs
noted by the petitioner. Gathered, when possible, law enforcement crash
reports, insurance reports, repair facility invoices, photographs of
crash sites, security camera surveillance video, and any other relevant
information related to the reported incidents.
Acquired the petitioner's vehicle and transported it to
the Vehicle Research Test Center (VRTC) in East Liberty, Ohio, for
evaluation.
2.0 Background
2.1 Definitions
The term ``unintended acceleration'' (UA) is often used to
generally describe any unintended speed increase in a motor vehicle.
This is an extremely broad definition that includes some aspects of
normal vehicle performance (e.g., idle speed control and transmission
control), as well as many forms of abnormal performance of those
systems that represent little to no hazards to highway safety (i.e.,
issues generally described as ``driveability'' issues).\1\ Within the
universe of unintended acceleration issues that do involve potentially
serious safety hazards, ``sudden acceleration'' (SA) incidents are the
most common and are defined as allegations of ``unintended, unexpected,
high-power acceleration from a stationary position or a very low
initial speed accompanied by an apparent loss of braking
effectiveness.'' \2\ This definition was developed in the 1980's, when
ODI first began investigating the subject in a large cross-section of
passenger car makes and models sold in the U.S., including Audi 5000
sedans.
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\1\ ODI's analysis of warranty data for MY 2002-2010 Toyota
Camry vehicles submitted by Toyota as part of RQ10-003, determined
that approximately 80 percent of the claims were related to engine
or transmission recalibrations to address a number of vehicle
driveability concerns (e.g., improving shift feel) as described in a
series of technical service bulletins, each related to separate
conditions and vehicle subpopulations. Claim rates were negligible
(less than 0.03%) in vehicles with no such TSB's (e.g., MY 2002-2006
Camry L4 with 2AZ-FE engines).
\2\ The definition has been broadened in recent years to include
incidents occurring in certain on-road driving maneuvers that
require braking, such as approaching controlled intersections or
highway exit ramps, but the majority of incidents continue to be
reported in low-speed parking maneuvers.
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The foregoing definition purposefully excludes ``stuck throttle''
type incident symptoms, which involve failure of the throttle to return
to idle when the accelerator pedal is released by the driver. Stuck
throttle defects generally follow patterns including relatively high
initiation speeds, large accelerator pedal applications and other
driving conditions specific to each defect condition. For example,
floor mat entrapments tend to occur after the driver has intentionally
pressed the accelerator pedal to the floor to pass vehicles on the
highway, merge with highway traffic or accelerate up hills. Unintended
accelerations resulting from pedal entrapment involve maximum engine
power and often include degraded brake effectiveness if the driver
pumps out the reserve vacuum in the brake booster, resulting in loss of
power assist to the brakes. If the driver is unable to bring the
vehicle to a complete stop within the first couple of miles, the brakes
will continue to lose effectiveness due to brake fade or heat
degradation of the friction materials.
2.2 Sudden Acceleration Background
ODI's first investigation of sudden acceleration, EA78-110, opened
almost 40 years ago, covered approximately 60 million MY 1973 through
1986 General Motors passenger cars. That investigation established that
sustained, unintended, ``high-power acceleration'' could only be caused
by failure mechanisms that produced large throttle openings. This
finding reduced the potential failure modes to defects affecting
throttle linkages and cruise control components. Ninety percent of the
accident vehicles in EA78-110 were not equipped with cruise control,
thus eliminating the only potential electronic mechanism capable of
opening the throttle in that investigation.\3\ The investigation was
closed in 1986 after eight years of testing and studies, concluding
that:
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\3\ Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing Report,
EA78-110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (11).
Inadvertent and unknowing driver application of the accelerator
pedal when the driver intended to apply the brake [``pedal
misapplication''] appears to be the cause of many of the reported
sudden acceleration related accidents, even though many of the
drivers continue to believe that they had been pushing on the brake
pedal.\4\
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\4\ Reinhart, W. 1996. Engineering Analysis Closing Report,
EA78-110. Washington, DC: NHTSA, (18).
In October 1987, a little over a year after EA78-110 was closed;
NHTSA's Administrator ordered an independent review of SA (the
``Study''). While the phenomena affected all automatic transmission-
equipped cars sold in the U.S., some had notably higher occurrence
rates, raising questions about vehicle design factors that may be
contributing to the problem. The Study re-examined potential causes of
SA, as well as design factors that may contribute to higher rates of
pedal misapplication. The results of the Study were released in March
1989, in a report titled ``An Examination of Sudden Acceleration.'' \5\
With respect to the cause of SA incidents, the Study concluded that,
absent evidence of a throttle, cruise control or brake malfunction,
``the inescapable conclusion is that these definitely involve the
driver inadvertently pressing the accelerator instead of, or in
addition to, the brake pedal.''
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\5\ Pollard, J., and E.D. Sussman. 1989. An Examination of
Sudden Acceleration. Report DOT-HS-807-367. Transportation Systems
Center, U.S. Department of Transportation.
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Because the majority of incidents were associated with
accelerations that began after the vehicle was started and shifted from
Park to Drive or Reverse gear, the most effective countermeasure for
pedal error related SA incidents was the incorporation of brake-shift
interlocks to prevent shifting from Park when the brake pedal is not
depressed. Shift interlocks were voluntarily implemented by most
manufacturers in the late-1980's and early-1990's and early studies
showed reductions in the number of SA complaints during this time
period, with the trend driven by the drop in events occurring
immediately after shift from Park.\6\ Brake shift interlocks have no
effect on mitigating pedal errors later in the drive cycle (e.g.,
parking).
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\6\ Reinhart, W. 1994. The Effect of Countermeasures to Reduce
the Incidence of Unintended Acceleration Accidents. Paper 94 S5 O
07. Proc., 14th International Technical Conference on Enhanced
Safety of Vehicles, Washington, DC, Vol. 1, (821-845).
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2.3 Toyota Investigations and NHTSA/NASA Study
From 2003 through 2009, ODI examined unintended acceleration issues
in Toyota vehicles equipped with ETCS-i in 3 defect investigations and
5 defect petition evaluations. These activities prompted 4 safety
recalls addressing floor mat entrapment, a ``sticky pedal'' condition,
and an accelerator pedal interference condition. Publicity surrounding
a fatal crash in August 2009, that was determined to have been caused
by floor mat entrapment, the ensuing floor mat recall by Toyota and the
``sticky pedal'' recall led to intense media coverage of Toyota
unintended acceleration issues and possible electronic defects.
Much of the interest focused on low-speed SA incidents in Toyotas
not included in the floor mat recalls or in recalled vehicles that had
clearly not
[[Page 27837]]
experienced either mat entrapment or ``sticking accelerator pedals.''
NHTSA responded by conducting an in-depth examination of Toyota's
electronic throttle control systems in partnership with NASA's
Engineering and Safety Center. NHTSA and NASA released reports
detailing the results of this study in early 2011, concluding that
incidents alleging low-speed surges during brake application were most
likely related to driver pedal misapplication and were not associated
with an electronic or software defect in Toyota's ETCS-i system.
2.4 National Research Council Special Report 308
In 2012, the National Academy of Sciences released a report that
included a review of NHTSA's defects investigations of low-speed
surging in Toyota vehicles and the results of the joint study with
NASA. The report, titled ``The Safety Promise and Challenge of
Automotive Electronics, Insights from Unintended Acceleration,''
concluded that NHTSA's decision to close its investigations of Toyota's
ETC were justified based on the initial investigations, complaint
analyses, field investigations using EDR data and NASA's examination of
the Toyota ETC. With regard to allegations of low-speed surging with
ineffective brakes, the report stated:
Reports of braking ineffectiveness in controlling a vehicle
experiencing the onset of unintended acceleration from a stopped
position or when moving slowly require an explanation for the
ineffectiveness, such as physical evidence of damage to the brake
system. Under these circumstances, investigating for phenomena other
than pedal misapplication absent an explanation for the
ineffectiveness of the brakes, which are independent of the throttle
control system and are designed to dominate engine torque, is not
likely to be useful.\7\
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\7\ NRC. 2011. TRB Special Report 308: The Safety Challenge and
Promise of Automotive Electronics: Insights from Unintended
Acceleration. Washington, DC: National Academies Press, (164).
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3.0 Petition Analysis
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN14MY15.008
3.1 Petitioner's Vehicle
3.1.1 Petitioner's Accident
The petition was prompted by a collision with a parked vehicle
during an attempted curbside parking maneuver in a residential
neighborhood on June 8, 2014. In the police report, the driver states
that she stopped at an intersection with the intention of turning right
and parking along the curb behind a parked vehicle.
Figure 1. Pre-Crash Data for Petitioner's Accident (Image From Bosch
CDR Report)
During a subsequent vehicle inspection on June 24, 2014, Toyota
downloaded data from the vehicle EDR (Figure 1).
3.1.2 EDR Data Analysis
Although the EDR data shown in Figure 1 appears to show that engine
speed doubled on or about the same time that the brake switch shows
brake pedal application, examination of this data as well as the ways
in which the EDR collects, transmits and records it, does not support
the petitioner's conclusion that the vehicle accelerated when the brake
was applied. Interpretation of EDR pre-crash data should be done within
the context of the incident reconstruction, including a detailed
statement from the driver, and must take into account the limitations
of the system as documented on the Bosch Crash Data Retrieval (CDR)
report. The limitations include the resolution of each data element,
the asynchronous refresh rates of the data elements, and the rate at
which the EDR samples and records the data. Toyota provided the
following EDR design information for the 2010 Corolla in response to a
formal request by ODI:
The Vehicle Speed is based on the front wheel speed sensors and
recorded in 2 kph increments and nominally updated every 500 ms. The
Brake Switch, based on the stop lamp switch status, is either ON or
OFF, and is updated instantly. The service brake pedal must be
depressed minimally for the stop lamp to activate. The accelerator
pedal position is recorded in 0.039 volt increments, and the value
is nominally updated every 524 ms. This measurement is taken
directly at the operator's accelerator pedal. The Engine RPM is
measured in 400 RPM increments and is nominally updated every 524
ms.\8\
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\8\ As indicated in the Bosch CDR report, the Vehicle Speed and
Engine RPM values are both rounded down in the given increments.
ODI interviewed the driver to obtain her description of the
incident. She indicated that her normal braking style when parking is
to apply light, gradual pressure to the brake pedal, rather than a
sudden, hard stop. She indicated that as she applied the brakes during
the incident, the car responded by accelerating. She stated that it did
not slow down, and it continued to increase in speed until it hit the
back of the parked vehicle. The petitioner provided a similar
description in a call to Toyota's customer relations department three
days after the incident, alleging simultaneous failures of both the
engine/accelerator and brakes that resulted in full throttle
acceleration into a parked vehicle.
The EDR data for the petitioner's incident shows no recorded
service brake application until the airbag module trigger point (t =
0s).\9\ This indicates that the brake switch was ON immediately after
impact, but does not indicate the degree or duration of brake
application. The fact that the EDR showed a nominal 3.8 mph increase in
vehicle speed in the last 1.8 seconds of recording, and subsequent
vehicle testing found the brakes to be fully functional, indicates that
no meaningful braking occurred prior to impact. Based on the vehicle
speeds recorded just prior to impact (t = -0.8 s), the Corolla was less
than a car length from the parked vehicle and traveling 7 to 9 feet per
second with no indication of service brake application. Based on the
vehicle
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speed and the driver's stated braking habits, initiation of braking
would be expected when the vehicle is about a full car length or more
from the intended stopping point. Based upon all of these factors, ODI
does not believe that the brake switch data recorded by the EDR is
consistent with the petitioner's statement that the vehicle accelerated
with the brake applied and vehicle testing demonstrated that
acceleration would not occur if the brake pedal had been applied with
any meaningful force.
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\9\ Airbag deployment software is triggered within 1ms of the
airbag module sensing a longitudinal deceleration of about 2 g's
(``algorithm enable''). The time interval between impact and airbag
algorithm enable is very short, with the precise time depending upon
specific crash dynamics.
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In addition, although the EDR does not show any increase in
accelerator pedal voltage in the final 2.8 seconds prior to impact,
this does not mean that the accelerator pedal was not depressed during
that time period. According to Toyota, ``The increase in the vehicle
speed and engine speed prior to impact is consistent with an
accelerator pedal being depressed between the recorded data points but
not recorded by the EDR.'' VRTC testing confirmed that a short and
rapid application of the accelerator could: (1) Fail to be recorded by
the EDR based on the asynchronous update rates of the CAN bus signals
and the relatively slow sampling rate used by the EDR; and (2) produce
the engine and vehicle speed changes recorded by the EDR at t = 0.0 s.
3.1.3 VRTC Vehicle Evaluation/Testing
Following detailed instructions provided by the petitioner
regarding the conditions of the surging during the parking maneuvers,
VRTC performed over 2,000 miles of test driving while evaluating the
petitioner's accident and the vehicle itself. The testing did not
produce any unusual performance of the throttle or transmission
systems. In addition, testing of the incident vehicle brake system
found that it functioned normally and could hold the vehicle stationary
with the engine at 2,000 RPM with less than 15 lb of pedal pressure
applied to the brakes. The brakes could also hold the vehicle
stationary at full throttle with less than 20 lb of force applied to
the brake pedal. Testing also showed the vehicle's brakes could bring
it to a full stop in less than three feet at the speeds provided in the
petitioner's account of the crash.
The petitioner also alleged that uncommanded, short-duration
throttle surges occurred in the Corolla during certain decelerations
from highway speed. VRTC also conducted testing to try to reproduce
this phenomenon but did not observe any unusual performance or symptoms
associated with harsh downshifting or changes in torque converter
clutch status. Drivers that use light braking during coasting
decelerations are likely to be more sensitive to certain transmission
shift transients that are triggered by brake application (e.g., torque
converter un-lock), that may not be noticed by drivers who use more
brake pedal force. However, such transients have very brief durations,
involve minor changes in vehicle deceleration and are normal operating
characteristics of automatic transmission vehicles that do not
represent an unreasonable risk to motor vehicle safety. Furthermore,
ODI does not consider the coast down condition reported by the
petitioner to be related to the surging alleged in the accident, which
did not involve transmission shifting.
3.2 NHTSA Investigations of Low-Speed Surges
The petitioner claims that NHTSA has never investigated low-speed
surges in Toyota vehicles. This is incorrect. NHTSA has investigated
complaints alleging low-speed surges in Toyota vehicles equipped with
ETCS-i for over 10 years, starting with a defect petition (DP03-003) in
2003. Altogether, ODI completed 5 defect petition evaluations and 1
investigation (PE04-021) related to allegations of low-speed surging in
Toyota vehicles equipped with ETCS-i prior to the joint study of the
issue initiated by NHTSA and NASA in 2010.\10\
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\10\ DP03-003, DP04-003, PE04-021, DP05-002, DP06-003 and DP08-
001 all included examination of alleged vehicle accelerations from
low-speeds.
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Low-speed surges were the primary focus of the study by NHTSA and
NASA in 2010. As clearly stated in the Executive Summary of NHTSA's
February 2011 report from this study:
Both [NHTSA and NASA] also noted that the vast majority of
complaints involved incidents that originated when the vehicle was
stationary or at very low speeds and contained allegations of very
wide throttle openings, often with allegations that brakes were not
effective. NHTSA's analysis indicated that these types of complaints
generally do not appear to involve vehicle-based causes and that,
where the complaint included allegations that the brakes were not
effective or that the incident began with a brake application, the
most likely cause of the acceleration was actually pedal
misapplication (i.e., the driver's unintended application of the
accelerator rather than, or in addition to, the brake.)
The results of NHTSA's field inspections of vehicles involved in
alleged UA incidents during 2010 supported this analysis. Those
vehicle inspections, which included objective evidence from event
data recorders, indicated that drivers were applying the accelerator
and not applying the brake (or not applying it until the last second
or so).'' \11\
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\11\ NHTSA. 2011. Technical Assessment of Toyota Electronic
Throttle Control (ETC) Systems. (viii). http://www.nhtsa.gov/PR/DOT-16-11.
A review of the NHTSA and NASA reports from the Toyota ETCS-i study
show that the petitioner's incident and the other similar incidents
presented by the petitioner fall within the scope of the prior work,
which concluded that allegations of sudden acceleration from a stop or
low-speed with ineffective brakes are most likely caused by pedal error
by the driver and not indicative of a vehicle-based defect (unless
potential faults are identified in pedal design or in shift-interlock
safeguards--for incidents occurring after a shift from Park).
3.3 Software Theories
The petition states that ``the observations of software expert
Michael Barr suggest that Toyota's electronic architecture has many
vulnerabilities'' and concludes that these observations suggest that
``floor mats and sticky accelerator pedals are not the only causes of
unintended low-speed surges in Toyota vehicles.''
Before responding to the petitioner's statement regarding recent
software theories, ODI first notes that floor mats and sticky pedals
have never been considered likely ``causes of unintended low-speed
surges in Toyota vehicles.'' Incidents of pedal entrapment by improper
or out-of-position floor mats are a severe form of a stuck throttle
condition, as they occur after the pedal has intentionally been fully
depressed to wide-open throttle (WOT) by the driver, generally during
attempted passing maneuvers, accelerations on highway entrance ramps to
merge with highway traffic or attempts to maintain speed or accelerate
up hills. When the driver releases pressure from the accelerator, the
pedal remains stuck at WOT resulting in an incident of high-speed
unintended acceleration.
The ``sticky pedal'' condition was associated with excessive
friction in the accelerator pedal assembly which could develop after
the vehicle had been parked overnight in certain environmental
conditions (e.g., high relative humidity and cool ambient temperature).
A pedal with excessive friction may be slow to return to idle when
released by the driver and, in some cases, may stick after being held
at a constant position for an extended period of time. This would
typically occur during steady-state highway driving (i.e., pedal held
at constant position for some period of time)
[[Page 27839]]
following a morning cold-start and the pedal could ordinarily be
returned to idle simply by tapping the accelerator pedal to free the
sticking condition. Although ODI is not aware of any crashes or
injuries resulting from sticking pedals, the condition has been
mistaken for evidence of electronic UA in at least one instance.\12\
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\12\ Testing conducted by Toyota and observed by NHTSA engineers
reproduced the sticking pedal condition in the pedal assembly
removed from a MY 2007 Toyota Avalon involved in an incident in
January 2010 that was reported by some as evidence of electronic UA
(VOQ 10300210).
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With regard to Mr. Barr, ODI is aware that he and other consultants
have raised certain software design and electrical architecture issues
in the course of civil litigation regarding Toyota ETCS-i vehicles. The
petition does not cite, and ODI is unaware of, any instance where Barr
or any other consultant postulating that the ETCS-i software is
defective has reproduced unintended acceleration in a Toyota ETCS-i
vehicle under real-world driving conditions.
The petitioner submitted a presentation prepared by Barr regarding
his analysis of the software in a 2005 Toyota Camry and cites several
opinions contained in that document, but does not identify any specific
condition or theory that could result in SA in the subject
vehicles.\13\ The Barr presentation summarizes his review of Toyota's
ETCS-i source code and a case review of a defect theory he developed as
part of a lawsuit relating to a fatal accident in a 2005 Toyota Camry
with a 4-cylinder engine. Barr's defect theory involved the suspension
of a specific operating system task that performs multiple throttle
control and failsafe functions in the Toyota ETCS-i source code (Task X
death). Task X death would result in the throttle remaining stuck at
the last computed throttle command, but would be terminated by any
transition in brake switch status.\14\
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\13\ For example, the petitioner cited Barr's opinions that
``Toyota's ETCS source code is of unreasonable quality'' and
``Toyota's source code is defective and contains bugs, including
bugs that can cause unintended acceleration.''
\14\ Any transition in brake switch status would result in a
discrepancy between brake status recognized by the Main CPU, which
would be frozen by the task death, and the Sub-CPU which would
continue to receive actual brake status voltage from the stop lamp
switch (``brake echo check''). This would trigger failsafe operation
with throttle opening limited to less than 10 degrees and set a
fault code.
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We note that the Corolla vehicles that are the subject of this
petition are equipped with engine control modules (ECM's) supplied by
Delphi, while Barr's task death theory applies to Toyota Camry vehicles
equipped with Denso modules. The Delphi modules contain different
source code with different task and stack monitoring functionality than
the Denso modules and, hence, do not contain substantially similar
software. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the theories and
mechanisms advanced by Mr. Barr in regard to the software employed in
the Denso throttle controls are inapplicable to the petitioner's
vehicle.
Nonetheless, since the low-speed surge incidents that are the
subject of the petition are similar to the SA crash incidents reported
in other Toyota vehicles, regardless of throttle control technology or
ECM supplier, ODI offers the following assessment of the Barr task
death theory submitted by the petitioner:
No specific defect identified--Barr identifies a number of
issues with Toyota's ETCS-i software and electrical architecture,
including several potential failure mechanisms that he speculates could
result in task death.\15\ However, as stated in his ``Case Specific
Opinions'' slide [54], he ``cannot identify with 100% certainty the
specific software defects'' responsible for the UA incident. ODI sees
no factual basis for assigning any level of probability to his
theories.
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\15\ For example, Barr speculated that memory corruptions
resulting from stack overflow or unidentified software bugs could
result in task death and other negative effects.
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Not reproduced--Barr does not identify any specific
software states or vehicle operating conditions necessary for any of
the failure mechanisms to occur and has not reproduced a task death or
any other software failure resulting in SA in real world driving
conditions.\16\
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\16\ Barr's only testing of Task X death involved a fault
injection method, performed with Toyota's assistance, to
artificially induce task deaths to study system and failsafe
performance. There is no evidence of any scenario in which the
``brake echo check'' failed to cut power to the throttle after brake
switch transition during this testing.
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Untestable--Rather than identifying the specific
conditions necessary for theoretical software failures to occur, Barr
and other proponents of the theory have suggested that such failures
cannot be reproduced because ``the test space is effectively infinite''
resulting in ``too many possible tests.'' \17\ This precludes any
scientific evaluation of the validity of such theories.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ In ODI's investigations of defects involving embedded
control system faults, either VRTC, the manufacturer, or the
supplier have been able to: (1) Identify the specific operating
conditions necessary to produce the fault through field data
analysis, system review and testing; and (2) reproduce the
conditions to duplicate the faults in vehicle testing.
\18\ Theories of electromagnetic interference (EMI) effects on
ETC or cruise control systems as causes of SA incidents have
included similar claims regarding testability. No EMI theories have
ever been duplicated in a vehicle and no specific source or path for
the interference has been identified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fault injection did not produce SA--When Task X deaths
were reproduced by fault injection, they did not result in sudden
increases in throttle opening or any loss of brake effectiveness.
Incidents that begin when the brake is not applied result in loss of
power to the throttle when the brake is applied and incidents that
begin with the brake already applied would, necessarily, involve low
severity because the engine would be frozen at idle.\19\ Table 1
describes throttle and brake responses for each of the initial
condition pedal state scenarios associated with Task X death. The risk
of uncontrolled acceleration, crash or injury would be low and
complaints associated with such incidents would be more likely to cite
loss of power or stalling than uncontrolled engine power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ With regard to the potential for more severe failure modes
associated with Task X death, Barr further speculates that one
memory corruption event ``can cause task death and open [the]
throttle'' and that the brake echo check may not always cut power to
the throttle. He states that ``memory corruptions are like
ricocheting bullets'' that may result in more severe effects.
However, these theories have never been demonstrated in any testing
nor were they observed during fault injection tests conducted to
observe system performance with artificially induced task death.
Table 1--Task X Death Scenarios
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial conditions Throttle and brake symptoms
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Foot on the accelerator pedal.......... Throttle stuck at last
computed throttle command.
Brake application cuts
power to the throttle.
Foot on the brake pedal................ Throttle is initially
stuck at idle.
Normal braking (brake
release cuts power to the
throttle).
Foot on neither pedal.................. Throttle is initially
stuck at idle.
[[Page 27840]]
Brake application cuts
power to the throttle.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No evidence in field data--The fault injection testing did
not reproduce an SA, but it did demonstrate that failures related to
Task X death would result in a very specific set of symptoms that can
be used to identify potentially relevant incidents in field data, such
as: (1) Allegations of unresponsive accelerator pedals that do not
increase or decrease engine power when the driver presses or releases
the pedal; (2) allegations of vehicles suddenly losing power when the
brake is applied; and (3) fault codes associated with ``brake echo
check'' failsafe operation. ODI's analyses of complaints and warranty
data have not revealed any sign of these symptoms in any Toyota ETCS-i
vehicles.
Not consistent with reported SA--Incidents of sudden
acceleration also involve very specific symptom patterns, including:
(1) Primarily occurring in low-speed driving maneuvers in parking lots
and driveways, as well as other driving maneuvers associated with
required brake application (see Table 3); (2) reports of sudden
increases in engine power allegedly initiated by application of the
brake; and (3) the allegations of brake ineffectiveness in the same
complaints. None of the software task death theories postulated by Barr
fit or otherwise explain these patterns. The same patterns and vehicle
dynamics are evident in the large volume of crashes in which pedal
misapplication has been identified as the undisputed cause (see section
3.5, Low-speed surge hazards). ODI has observed these patterns in SA
complaints in investigations and research covering nearly 40 years and
involving vehicles with all forms of throttle control, both mechanical
and electronic.
Brake effectiveness--None of the electronic theories
reviewed by ODI explain how pressing on the ``brake'' would result in a
sudden increase in engine power as alleged in SA complaints, nor do
they explain why the brakes would suddenly lose effectiveness at the
same time as the engine power surge.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Pressing the brake pedal with a nominal force of 40 lbs or
less would produce sufficient braking torque to overcome full/
maximum drivetrain torque in all vehicles that have been evaluated
by ODI to date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Different software--As noted above, the Corolla vehicles
at issue in this petition are equipped with ECM's supplied by Delphi,
while Barr's task death theory applies to certain Toyota Camry vehicles
equipped with Denso modules. The Delphi modules contain different
system monitoring functionality than the Denso modules and, hence, do
not contain substantially similar software.
Pedal error not excluded--As Barr indicated in a slide
titled ``Other Similar Incident Criteria [55],'' evidence contradicting
correct use of pedals is one factor that would exclude his theories
from consideration. As outlined in Section 3.4 of this report, Other
Similar Incidents, the available EDR data for the subject vehicles does
provide evidence contradicting the correct use of pedals.
3.4 Other Similar Incidents
The petitioner states: ``I reviewed the complaints made to NHTSA by
owners of 2006-2010 Toyota Corollas [and] found 163 reports in which
the driver experienced a surge at low speed or no speed; 99 drivers
mentioned that the brakes were already depressed when the surge
occurred or the surge occurred when the brakes were depressed; 83
incidents resulted in crashes.'' ODI provided copies of the 163 VOQs
noted by the petitioner to Toyota and requested complaint, warranty,
inspection and EDR information about each vehicle (``subject
vehicles'').
Using information supplied by Toyota, the VOQ text, and any
supporting or additional information (e.g., law enforcement crash
reports, repair orders from dealers or independent repair facilities,
photographs, interviews with complainants and/or complainants'
families,\21\ witness statements, letters to elected representatives,
letters to NHTSA, etc.) ODI analyzed the petitioner's incident and the
163 VOQs reporting similar incidents as alleged by the petitioner. Six
of the VOQs are duplicate submissions, resulting in a total of 158
unique vehicles. ODI's analysis of these complaints is summarized in
Table 2, which groups the complaints in three major categories.\22\ The
categories are based on ODI's analysis of all available information and
not solely on the initial VOQ complaint text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Three complainants were now deceased and in some cases the
complainant was not the driver at the time of the incident.
\22\ An itemization of VOQ number by Category is provided in the
closing resume for this investigation, which can be obtained at
www.safercar.gov.
Table 2--ODI Analysis of Petitioner Selected VOQ's
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supported by
Category Description of category Number of VOQs Number of EDR pre-crash
crashes data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A.................................. There is an alleged 105 93 17
increase in engine power
in which the brakes are
allegedly unable to
control: Incidents are
caused by pedal
misapplication or by a
late braking effort of the
driver.
B.................................. Dual pedal application: The 28 2 0
driver inadvertently
applied both the brake and
the accelerator
simultaneously during the
event.
C.................................. Incidents that do not fit 25 10 0
the alleged defect of
``engine surge in which
the brakes fail to stop
the vehicle in time to
prevent a crash.''.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category A: Category A complaints are those alleging simultaneous
failures of the vehicle's braking ability and a sudden increase in
engine power that the driver did not request by pressing on the
accelerator pedal, with no evidence
[[Page 27841]]
of brake system malfunction observed in post-incident inspections/
testing. These complaints fit the definition of ``sudden acceleration''
incident allegations as described in the background section of this
report and fall within the scope of the petitioner's allegations. As
discussed in previously in this report, these incidents fit the profile
of pedal misapplications. Again quoting from the from the 2012 TRB
report reviewing ODI's processes for investigating unintended
acceleration: ``investigating for phenomena other than pedal
misapplication absent an explanation for the ineffectiveness of the
brakes, which are independent of the throttle control system and are
designed to dominate engine torque, is not likely to be useful. [164]''
As further confirmation of this assessment, some of the VOQs
submitted by the petitioner had pre-crash EDR data available that show
brake status, accelerator pedal voltage, engine speed and vehicle speed
in the 5 seconds prior to the time of the collision trigger (if it was
on a model year 2009 or later Corolla). This information, together with
other relevant facts (e.g., law enforcement reports, accident
reconstruction, witness interviews), can be compared to the driver's
statement regarding the use of foot controls and their alleged
effectiveness prior to the collision.
Table 3--Summary of Incidents with Pre-Crash EDR Data
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI brake
category A--
Case No. VOQ No. Incident T-5 speed misapply B-- Summary of driver
date (mph) late apply C-- allegation
no apply
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........................... 10534094 Sep-11...... 45 B Driving at night in
rain, released
accelerator,
departed road,
crashed into tree.
2........................... 10334936 May-10...... 31 A Approaching stop
sign, applied
brake, accelerated
into fence.
3........................... 10363685 Oct-10...... 31 C Approaching stop
sign, applied
brake, accelerated
into utility pole.
4........................... 10523677 May-13...... 20 A Approaching
intersection,
applied brake,
accelerated into
tree.
5........................... 10352668 Mar-09...... 11 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
6........................... 10479582 Oct-12...... 10 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
7........................... 10369494 Nov-10...... 8 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into concrete post.
8........................... 10344874 Jul-10...... 6 A Entering driveway,
applied brake,
accelerated into
iron fence.
9........................... 10363886 Sep-10...... 6 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
10.......................... 10520195 Jun-13...... 6 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
over two curbs.
11.......................... 10551478 Oct-13...... 5 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into dumpster.
12.......................... 10597296 May-14...... 4 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
13 *........................ 10637908 Jun-14...... 4 A/B Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
14.......................... 10507434 Apr-13...... 2 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into building.
15.......................... 10552563 Oct-13...... 1 A Entering parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into parked
vehicle.
16.......................... 10578871 Apr-14...... 1 A Backing from parking
space, lightly
pressed
accelerator,
accelerated into
vehicle.
17.......................... 10447756 Jan-12...... 0 A Exiting parking
space, applied
brake, accelerated
into brick wall.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* petition incident.
Table 4--Summary of Brake and Accelerator Pedal Use in Incidents With Pre-Crash EDR Data.23
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
T-5 Brake switch status by EDR time interval Accelerator pedal apply status by EDR time interval
Case No. speed ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(mph) -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2.............................. 31 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High
6.............................. 10 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. High............. High............. High............. High
4.............................. 20 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. High............. High
16............................. 1 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med.............. High............. High
14............................. 2 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High............. High
8.............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. High............. High
12............................. 4 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High............. Off
15............................. 1 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. High
10............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Low.............. Low.............. Off.............. Low.............. High............. Off
11............................. 5 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. High
5.............................. 11 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med.............. Med
17............................. 0 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med
7.............................. 8 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Med.............. Off
1.............................. 45 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... On............... On............... Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Low.............. Off.............. Off
9.............................. 6 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off
13 *........................... 4 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. On............... Off.............. Off.............. Low.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off
[[Page 27842]]
3.............................. 31 Off............... Off............... Off............... Off............... Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off.............. Off
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* petition incident.
Summaries of the 17 crash incidents in which pre-crash EDR was
available are provided in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 provides a summary of
the speeds the vehicles were traveling approximately 5 seconds prior to
the collision events, ODI's assessment of the causes, and the incident
driver's allegation of the sequence of events leading to the collision.
Thirteen (13) of the incidents involved vehicles travelling at low-
speeds in parking lot maneuvers, including 11 that occurred while
parking the vehicle. Fifteen (15) of the incidents alleged that the
acceleration began after the brake was applied.\24\ These data are
consistent with EDR data collected during the prior Toyota study in
2010, which included 39 incidents assessed as pedal misapplications due
to no brake application or late braking, including 29 that initiated in
parking lots or at low speeds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ EDR reports with accelerator pedal data shown as voltage
readings from 0.78 to 3.70V were converted as follows: Off = 0.78V;
Low = 0.79 to 1.75V; Medium = 1.76 to 2.72V; and High = 2.73V and
above.
\24\ See supplemental report in the public file for this
investigation (www.safercar.gov) for a discussion of some of the EDR
downloads and associated VOQs, Supplemental Report, DP14-003, EDR
Examples.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ODI's assessments were based on the EDR download data and all
available supporting information, as to the cause of the unintended
acceleration event, i.e., a pedal misapplication, a braking that
occurred too late to in the event to effectively stop the vehicle in
time (driver error), a combination of both, and in one case no
application of accelerator or brake. Table 4 provides the EDR download
information for brake and accelerator pedal information for the
individual incidents. Twelve incidents showed no evidence of braking
during the crash event, 4 do not show braking until the airbag trigger
point, t = 0, and the final incident involved late transition from
accelerator to brake for a vehicle travelling over 40 mph (Case #1).
These incidents are a representative sampling of the incidents
alleging low-speed surging with ineffective brakes and demonstrate that
driver statements regarding pedal use in such incidents are not
reliable. It should be emphasized that in order for these 105 VOQs to
be included in this category there must have been an alleged concurrent
failure or weakness of the throttle and braking systems. No mechanism
has been identified that could cause a sudden failure of both systems.
No evidence of throttle or brake system faults were found in post-
incident inspections of these vehicles and there is no indication of
faults in those systems in the available service histories before and
after the events. Based on this analysis, ODI does not believe there is
evidence of a vehicle based defect in this category of complaints.
Category B: Category B complaints are incidents involving
allegations of engine racing or surging during brake application. These
incidents do not allege brake ineffectiveness and are therefore not
within the scope of the petitioner's alleged defect. The common
explanation for complaints alleging engine racing or surging during
brake application is that the driver is inadvertently applying both the
brake and accelerator pedals when intending to only apply the brake.
This is particularly evident in complaints that indicate that engine
races faster when the brake is pressed harder.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ These complaints further demonstrate the effectiveness of
the brakes in overcoming engine power.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several drivers recognized that inadvertently stepping on both
pedals was the cause of the engine surging they reported, either in the
initial complaint or in subsequent interviews with ODI. For example, in
a follow-up interview one owner (VOQ 10363529) noted that after a few
incidents, ``I realized in that case that my foot was on both the brake
and the accelerator. This may have been carelessness on my part.
However, it being a compact car, the brake is very close to the
accelerator. Perhaps closer that the other cars that I drive or have
driven. No one else in our family has reported unintended acceleration
with this car.''
A variation of dual application that increases the potential
severity of such incidents involves unsecured floor mats that slide
forward into a position where they can impede brake application. ODI
identified two crashes involving drivers who had floor mats that had
moved forward over the accelerator pedal and under the brake pedal such
that when the brake pedal was applied the force was transferred through
the floor mat to the accelerator pedal (in one case it was an
aftermarket floor mat plus a bathroom rug).
Category C: Category C complaints are incidents that do not fit the
alleged defect of ``engine surge in which the brakes fail to stop the
vehicle in time to prevent a crash.'' Examples are instances of high
idle at initial startup, transmission shift flares or delays in coast
down idle. Two of the crashes in this category were due to vehicles
being struck by following traffic which then propelled the vehicles
forward uncontrollably. Four of the crashes were due to a lack of brake
effectiveness, such as a soft brake pedal, without any corresponding
engine surge, three of the crashes were due to the driver applying the
accelerator pedal too aggressively without any brake application, and
one crash was due to a medical condition experienced by the driver.
3.5 Low-Speed Surge Hazards
ODI agrees that uncontrolled vehicle accelerations in parking lot
environments represent a clear safety hazard to surrounding traffic,
pedestrians and even building occupants, as vehicles often accelerate
inside of businesses with facing parking spaces where they have caused
serious and sometimes fatal injuries. However, investigations have
shown that these incidents are not isolated to any particular makes or
models of vehicles and rarely have any vehicle based defects been
identified in the throttle or brake systems in post-incident
inspections.
As background, to put ODI complaints of low-speed surging during
brake application in context, separate research conducted for NHTSA by
the Highway Safety Research Center to examine the prevalence of crashes
caused by pedal application errors found that they occur more
frequently than is generally known and exhibit many of the same
characteristics as the SA complaints received by ODI, although in much
greater numbers. The study included a review of North Carolina state
crash database records, which identified 2,411
[[Page 27843]]
self-reported pedal misapplication crashes between 2004 and 2008, an
average of approximately 480 per year.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Lococo, K., Staplin, L., Martell, C., and Sifrit, K. 2012.
Pedal Application Errors. Report DOT-HS-811-597. TransAnalytics, LLC
and Highway Safety Research Center, U.S. Department of
Transportation. www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/811597.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Projected nationally, the North Carolina data predict over 16,000
pedal error crashes per year, or about 44 incidents per day. These
pedal error crash counts are likely conservative, since they are
limited to self-reported incidents that were documented in law
enforcement accident reports. The total number of pedal error
incidents, including those in which the driver is not aware of the
error (such as the petitioner's incident) are unknown and the there is
no systematic process or database in the United States for tracking
such events. An April 2012 summary of the study notes that 57 percent
of pedal error crashes identified in the study occurred in parking lots
or driveways, which projects to over 9,000 incidents per year in those
driving environments nationwide.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ NHTSA. 2012. Pedal Error Crashes. Report DOT-HS-811-605.
Traffic Tech. U.S. Department of Transportation. (1). www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/traffic_tech/811605.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the Storefront Safety Council, an independent private
organization focused on safety hazards associated with vehicle into
building crashes, estimates that over 20,000 such crashes occur
annually in the U.S. (60 per day), resulting in over 4,000 injuries and
as many as 500 deaths.\28\ The Storefront Safety Council identifies
pedal error as the number one cause of these crashes at 35 percent
(other causes include other types of operator error, such as confusing
Drive and Reverse, impaired driving, medical conditions and deliberate
building intrusions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Storefront Safety Council--working to end vehicle into
building crashes. http://www.storefrontsafety.org/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These data indicate that pedal error crashes are much more common
than previously known, even well after the implementation of brake
shift interlocks. The patterns associated with these incidents are
similar to complaints to ODI and manufacturers alleging SA incidents
when analyzed by: (1) Location; (2) vehicle dynamics; (3) driver
demographics; and (4) vehicle design. Both occur predominantly in
parking lots and driveways; both involve sudden increases in engine
power, unchecked by braking, and coinciding with intended application
of the brake; both disproportionately involve younger and older
drivers; and both have occurred in vehicles with all forms of throttle
and cruise control systems. As previously noted, the incidents were
initially observed by ODI in vehicles with purely mechanical throttle
control and no cruise control in the earliest years of NHTSA's safety
defect enforcement program (EA78-010).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN14MY15.009
Complaints to ODI alleging SA related crashes are far less common.
In the same period from 2004 through 2008 that the pedal error study
identified over 2,400 pedal error related crashes in North Carolina
police reports, ODI received less than 40 complaints alleging SA
crashes in North Carolina in all light vehicles--or less than 2 percent
of the number of crash incidents identified in the pedal error study.
However, publicity can significantly increase ODI complaint volumes, as
is evident for Toyota Corolla vehicles equipped with ETCS-i, which saw
a 7,900% increase in speed control complaints alleging crashes and a
12,800% increase in total speed control complaints from the first
quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2010, after news media coverage
of Toyota's pedal entrapment and sticky pedal recalls (Figure 2). Each
of these factors, as well as the incident characteristics used for
identifying complaints likely to be related to a common cause (see
Section 2.1, Definitions), must be considered before conducting any
analysis of, or drawing any conclusions regarding, SA rates or trends
based strictly upon ODI complaint data.
These data support the petitioner's claim that uncontrolled vehicle
accelerations in parking environments are a public safety issue but are
not evidence of a motor vehicle defect and, therefore, do not support
the opening of a defect investigation.
4.0 Conclusion
In our view, a defects investigation is unlikely to result in a
finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety
[[Page 27844]]
exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, given a thorough analysis of the
potential for finding a safety related defect in the vehicle and in
view of the need to allocate and prioritize NHTSA's limited resources
to best accomplish the agency's safety mission and mitigate risk, the
petition is respectfully denied. This action does not constitute a
finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect does not exist. The
agency will take further action if warranted by future circumstances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at 49
CFR 1.50 and 501.8.
Frank S. Borris, II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement.
[FR Doc. 2015-11632 Filed 5-13-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P