The Crittenden Automotive Library

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

Topics: Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

Frank S. Borris II
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
July 30, 2015

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 146 (Thursday, July 30, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45578-45585]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-18672]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, (NHTSA), DOT.

ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation.

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SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a
petition, DP14-004, submitted by the Center for Auto Safety (the
petitioner) to the Administrator of NHTSA by a letter dated August 21,
2014, under 49 CFR part 552. The petition requests the agency to
initiate a safety defect investigation into alleged failures of Totally
Integrated Power Modules (TIPMs) installed in sport utility vehicles,
trucks, and vans built by Chrysler FCA (Chrysler) beginning in the 2007
model year. The petitioner alleges that TIPM defects may result in the
following safety defect conditions: Engine stall, airbag non-
deployment, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in unintended
acceleration, and fire.
After conducting a technical review of: (1) Consumer complaints and
other material submitted by the petitioner; (2) information provided by
Chrysler in response to information requests regarding TIPM design,
TIPM implementation and the complaints submitted by the petitioner; and
(3) Chrysler safety recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 addressing a fuel pump
relay defect condition that may result in engine stall while driving in
certain vehicles equipped with TIPM body control modules; and the
likelihood that additional investigations would result in a finding
that a defect related to motor vehicle safety exists, NHTSA has
concluded that further investigation of the issues raised by the
petition is not warranted. The agency, accordingly, has denied the
petition.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Kareem Habib, Vehicle Control
Division, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. Telephone 202-366-8703. Email
Kareem.Habib@dot.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the agency
initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or item
of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor
vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety. 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed
petition, the agency conducts a technical review of the petition,
material submitted with the petition, and any additional information.
Sec. 552.6. After considering the technical review and taking into
account appropriate factors, which may include, among others,
allocation of agency resources, agency priorities, and

[[Page 45579]]

the likelihood of success in litigation that might arise from a
determination of a noncompliance or a defect related to motor vehicle
safety, the agency will grant or deny the petition. Sec. 552.8.

II. Defect Petition Background Information

By a letter dated August 21, 2014, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS)
submitted a petition to NHTSA under 49 U.S.C. 30162 requesting ``a
safety defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and
vans beginning in the 2007 model year.'' On August 27, 2014, CAS sent
NHTSA a supplemental letter identifying 24 fatal crashes from Chrysler
Early Warning Reporting (EWR) submissions that CAS alleged may be
related to TIPM failures (Supplement I). On September 8, 2014, CAS sent
another supplemental letter to NHTSA with 35 additional complaints
allegedly related to TIPM failures (Supplement II). On September 25,
2014, NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI) opened DP14-004 to
evaluate the petition for a grant or deny decision. In a September 29,
2014 letter to CAS, ODI acknowledged receipt of the petition and
requested additional information from CAS in support of its allegations
that TIPM malfunctions may result in airbag non-deployment or
unintended acceleration caused by the fuel pump failing to shutoff.
After opening DP14-004, ODI received four additional CAS complaint
supplements on September 30, 2014 (Supplement III), November 13, 2014
(Supplement IV), January 14, 2015 (Supplement V), and April 1, 2015
(Supplement VI).
The CAS petition provided the following broad allegation of defect
conditions in TIPM modules:

Chrysler TIPM failures result in a variety of safety-related
issues in multiple vehicle components, many of which have the
potential for destructive results. Not only do Chrysler's faulty
TIPMs result in vehicle stalling, they have also been implicated in
airbag non-deployment, random horn, headlight, taillight, door lock,
instrument panel and windshield wiper activity, power windows going
up and down on their own, failure of fuel pump shutoff resulting in
unintended acceleration, and fires. In the interim, these owners
remain at the mercy of a defect which many have likened to the
vehicle being possessed and uncontrollable. A look at consumer
complaints filed with CAS suggests a better name for the TIPM--
Totally Inept Power Module.

Additionally, CAS referenced a recent filing of a class action
lawsuit in the United States District Court, Central District of
California, Velasco et al vs. Chrysler LLC, Case No. CV13-08080-DDP-
VBKx affecting fifteen different Chrysler models and cited recalls 07V-
291 and 13V-282. According to CAS, ``neither of these recalls was
sufficient to address the TIPM problem throughout Chrysler's fleet,
instead focusing on a highly limited set of vehicles and circumstances.
Given the number and range of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs, it
is time for NHTSA to formally investigate TIPM failures across the
board in 2007 and later models''.

III. Summary of the Petition

The petitioner requests that NHTSA formally investigate TIPM
failures across the board in 2007 and later models and cites the
following allegations:

1. Vehicle Stall

CAS stated in the defect petition letter and complaint Supplements
III and IV that:

TIPM failure contributes to a range of problems in vehicle
electric components, the safety issue which continues to present
itself in complaints is stalling, often in traffic where the dangers
are obvious. The most often cited TIPM failure is a loss of vehicle
power that can create a dangerous stall condition at any speed.
Additionally, a survey of complaints related to Chrysler TIPMs
suggests that a stall/no-start condition is most reported outcome of
TIPM failure, leaving drivers without power in traffic and stranded
for unknown periods of time before the vehicle regains the capacity
to be started.

2. Airbag Non-Deployment

According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement
IV, ``Not only do Chrysler's faulty TIPMs result in vehicle stalling,
they have also been implicated in airbag non-deployment. As NHTSA knows
from the GM ignition switch mass defect, it is virtually impossible to
be sure that an airbag will deploy until there is a crash. Complaints
directly citing airbag system warnings can be found in the complaints
received by CAS''.

3. Unintended Acceleration

CAS uses the term ``unintended acceleration'' in complaint letter
Supplement IV dated November 13, 2014, ``to indicate reports where the
vehicle continued to move or accelerate when the operator did not want
this to happen. TIPM issues related to acceleration appear to arise
from lack of fuel pump shut-off as well as problems with gear shift,
throttle, and cruise control. Consumer problems related to
acceleration, gear and/or throttle control may be found in CAS
complaints.''

4. Fire and Other Symptoms

According to CAS defect petition letter and complaint Supplement
IV, ``Chrysler's faulty TIPMs have also been implicated in fires.
Additionally, there are numerous complaints alleging bizarre and
unexplained headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity,
instrument panel failure, and door lock problems.''

5. EWR Fatalities

CAS included as Attachment A to Supplement I what it believes to be
EWR information for all fatal crashes involving TIPM failure. CAS
claims that ``[s]ince the TIPM functions as the central gateway for all
vehicle electronics, there are multiple EWR component codes that could
point to the defect. There are 24 such crashes involving 28 deaths that
the agency must consider in reviewing our petition, at least twelve of
which have been the subject of DI requests. There are also a large
number of injury crashes reported to EWR that involve these
components.''

6. Class Action Lawsuit

The petition references a class action lawsuit as evidence of the
breadth and scope of ``the actual TIPM problem.'' \1\ The class action
cited by the petition was originally filed on November 1, 2013. The
plaintiffs in the original complaint, which were not limited to TIPM
equipped vehicles, included 2 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners, a MY
2011 Dodge Grand Caravan owner and a MY 2008 Chrysler 300 owner.\2\ The
lawsuit provided the following description of the alleged defect and
affected vehicles:
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\1\ The petition references Velasco et al vs Chrysler LLC, Case
No. 13-cv-08080-DDP-VBK, in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California as ``incorporated herein by
reference, covering fifteen different Chrysler models over a number
of model years.''
\2\ The MY 2008 Chrysler 300 is not equipped with a TIPM body
control module.

Plaintiffs and the Class members they propose to represent
purchased or leased 2008 model year Chrysler 300 and 2011-2012 model
year Jeep Grand Cherokees, Dodge Durangos, and Dodge Grand Caravans
equipped with defective Totally Integrated Power Modules, also known
as TIPMs. The TIPM controls and distributes power to all of the
electrical functions of the vehicle, including the vehicle safety
and ignition systems. Vehicles equipped with defective TIPMs
progress through a succession of symptoms that begin with an
inability to reliably start the vehicle and lead to, among other
things, the vehicle not starting, the fuel pump not turning off and
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the engine stalling while driving.

A second amended complaint for the class action was filed on May 5,
2014,

[[Page 45580]]

listing seven plaintiffs and redefining the scope of vehicles as all
Chrysler vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 modules. The plaintiffs in the
amended complaint consist of 6 MY 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee owners and 1
MY 2011 Dodge Durango owner. The plaintiffs all alleged experiencing
``no-start'' concerns, with one also alleging a fuel pump run-on
condition and another reporting a single incident of engine stall while
driving. The amended complaint continued to focus on problems with
starting, engine stall while driving and fuel pumps that do not turn
off, while adding ``headlights and taillights shutting off'' and
``random and uncontrollable activity of the horn, windshield wipers,
and alarm system'' to the claimed TIPM deficiencies. The class action
does not include airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or fire
among the alleged consequences of the claimed TIPM defect.

7. Petition Issues

ODI identified several issues with the scope and supporting
evidence for defect allegations in the petition submitted by CAS. The
petition was unnecessarily broad in scope and included several alleged
defects that had no factual basis. After failing to identify any clear
basis for several of the petition allegations, ODI included a request
for supporting information for claims regarding airbag non-deployment
and unintended acceleration in its September 29, 2014 petition
acknowledgement letter. The CAS response, provided in a November 13,
2014 letter, did not provide any technical basis for claims of airbag
non-deployment and appeared to equate any illumination of the airbag
warning lamp with TIPM failure, even when the complaint clearly cited
other causes for the airbag system fault (e.g, ``faulty wiring in
passenger front seat causing airbag failure warning to illuminate'' \3\
and ``open circuit in drivers [sic] seat airbag'' \4\). Several other
complaints cited by CAS do not allege any airbag failures but, in
apparent reference to CAS petition claims, state that TIPM failure
``can cause the airbags to not deploy.''
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\3\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 62.
\4\ Identified by CAS as complaint number 146.
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With regard to the basis for its claims that TIPM failures can
result in unintended acceleration, CAS repeated its allegation that
such failures are associated with fuel pump shut-off failures,\5\ even
while acknowledging that none of the reports that it provided actually
involved instances where fuel pumps failing to shut off resulted in
unintended acceleration.\6\ ODI notes that claims that unintended
acceleration is caused by, or related to, a ``lack of fuel pump shut-
off'' are not supported by any known incidents. Moreover, any
allegation that a running fuel pump can, absent extremely idiosyncratic
failures of many other systems, cause a vehicle to accelerate on its
own demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of basic automotive
engineering.
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\5\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``TIPM issues
related to acceleration appear to arise from lack of fuel pump shut-
off as well as problems with gear shift, throttle, and cruise
control.''
\6\ The CAS November 13, 2014 letter states that, ``There are
quite a few consumer complaints in both CAS and NHTSA databases
citing lack of fuel pump shutoff that result in stalling and/or
nonstart condition but do not produce uncontrolled acceleration.''
This statement, which also misstates the effects of fuel pump
shutoff failure, acknowledges the absence of any related complaints
of unintended acceleration.
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IV. ODI Analysis

A. Scope Analysis

The CAS petition requests investigation of alleged failures of TIPM
modules in Chrysler light vehicles, with no reference to the automotive
industry body control technology implementations or architecture
functionality distinctions: ``The CAS hereby petitions the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to initiate a safety
defect investigation into failures associated with the Totally
Integrated Power Module (TIPM) installed in Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and
vans beginning in the 2007 model year''. Interpreted broadly, the CAS
petition potentially affects approximately 10 million \7\ vehicles
equipped with TIPM-6 or TIPM-7 modules. The petition scope does not
appear to recognize the functional distinctions between TIPM-6 and
TIPM-7. The petition also does not distinguish between the significant
electronics technology differences between the relay based TIPM-7 and
an all solid-state Field Effect Transistors (FET) TIPM-6.
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\7\ Chrysler SUV's, trucks, and vans equipped with TIMP-7 and
TIPM-6 beginning MY 2007.
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TIPM-7 vehicle function outputs (such as fuel pump control, wiper/
washer control. . .etc.) are a mix of electro-mechanical relays and
solid state FET devices equipped with digital Serial Peripheral
Interface (SPI) communication ports while TIPM-6 vehicle function
outputs are strictly solid state SPI-based FET devices with no electro-
mechanical relays. Relays are electro-mechanical devices with specific
inherent break down mechanisms including, but not limited to, the
degradation of the mechanically coupled moving contact spring arm and
contact resistance; \8\ both are design elements that do not exist in
silicon only devices associated with TIPM-6. Similarly, TIPM-7
implementations include a fuse for overcurrent protection while the
TIPM-6 system design uses an integrated silicon overcurrent protection
feature specific to solid state devices.
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\8\ Fuel pump relays were tested in simulated vehicle
environments incorporating variable factors such as relay type;
relay manufacture, simulated fuel pump current and inductance levels
of representative TIPM-7 vehicles.
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ODI is interpreting the petition as a request for investigation of
only vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 (subject vehicles) for the
following reasons: (1) The petition refers to TIPM installed in
Chrysler vehicles ``beginning in the 2007 model year'' and TIPM-7 was
introduced in the 2007 model year; (2) the affected models listed in
the petition and in the class action lawsuit referenced by the petition
are all TIPM-7 vehicles; \9\ (3) approximately 93 percent \10\ of the
complaints submitted by CAS involve vehicles equipped with TIPM-7; (4)
only 3 percent of CAS complaints are related to vehicles equipped with
TIPM-6 and ODI's review of these complaints did not identify any safety
defect trends; \11\ and (5) the significant technical differences
between the TIPM-6 and TIPM-7 modules as described above.
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\9\ The CAS petition references a recent filing of a class
action lawsuit in US District Court, Velasco et al. vs. Chrysler LLC
affecting fifteen different Chrysler models in which CAS cited the
same fifteen vehicle models in the defect petition dated August 21,
2014. The Court order referenced by CAS specifically cited TIPM-7 in
Case No. CV 13-08080 DDP, Dkt. No. 42, ``Plaintiffs allege that the
TIPM with which the Class Vehicles are equipped, referred to as TIPM
7.''
\10\ Percentage based on CAS complaints through Supplement V.
\11\ The remaining CAS complaints are associated with vehicles
equipped with Front Control Module and Body Control Modules.
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The TIPM-7 population includes approximately 4.7 million Chrysler
sport utility vehicles, trucks, and vans across 11 vehicle platforms
beginning in model year 2007 (Table 1). ODI conducted a detailed review
of complaint narratives submitted by CAS and consumers including
careful analysis of vehicle repair histories, warranty claims obtained
from the manufacturer and any available Customer Assistance Inquiry
reports (CAIR). In total, there were 296 complaints submitted by the
petitioner in the original petition and five supplements, including 271
complaints related to the subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7. ODI's
complaint analysis focused on vehicles equipped with TIPM-7.

[[Page 45581]]

Table 1--TIPM-7 Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Models (platforms) Model years Population
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chrysler Town and Country/Dodge Grand 2008-14 1,632,250
Caravan (RT)...........................
Jeep Wrangler (JK)...................... 2007-14 962,098
Ram 1500/2500/3500/4500and5500 (DS/DJ/DD/ 2009-12 929,036
DP)....................................
Jeep Grand Cherokee/Dodge Durango (WK/ 2011-13 526,939
WD)....................................
Jeep Liberty (KK)....................... 2008-12 331,717
Dodge Nitro (KA)........................ 2007-11 198,581
Dodge Journey (JC)...................... 2009-10 156,537
-------------------------------
Total TIPM-7........................ 2007-14 4,737,158
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B. TIPM Function

TIPM-7 is a controller area network (CAN) based body controller
integrated with an electrical power distribution center; and is
designed to support centralized and distributed vehicle control
functions. The TIPM-7 electrical architecture features three levels of
functional interactions with other vehicle systems: (1) Power only
interaction- circuits that only pass through the integrated fuse box
(e.g. occupant restraint controller); (2) power and data transfer
interaction for circuits that pass through the power distribution
center with no TIPM control function (e.g. powertrain controller and
transmission controller); and (3) power and control interaction for
circuits that pass through the power distribution center and are
directly controlled by the TIPM. The latter include power and control
logic for exterior lighting, windshield wiper/washer, door lock, and
horn. A distinguishing feature of the TIPM-7 from other Chrysler body
controllers is the integration of the fuel pump relay.

C. Fuel Pump Relay Defect

In a September 3, 2014 letter to NHTSA, Chrysler submitted a Defect
Information Report (DIR) identifying a defect in the fuel pump relay
(FPR) within the TIPM-7 which can result in a no start or stall
condition in approximately 188,723 model year (MY) 2011 Jeep Grand
Cherokee (WK) and Dodge Durango (WD) vehicles manufactured from January
5, 2010 through July 20, 2011 (14V-530). In a February 24, 2015 letter,
Chrysler submitted a second DIR expanding the scope of the FPR defect
condition to include an additional 338,216 MY 2012 through 2013 Jeep
Grand Cherokee vehicles manufactured from September 17, 2010 through
August 19, 2013 and MY 2012 through 2013 Dodge Durango vehicles
manufactured from January 18, 2011 through August 19, 2013 (15V-115).
Chrysler identified the root cause as deformation of the relay contact
spring due to the heat caused by contact power, ambient temperature
around the fuel pump relay, and battery voltage. These factors, present
in combination and in high amounts, led to premature fuel pump relay
failures, which usually resulted in a no-start concern. When the fuel
pump relay fails while driving, the fuel pump will cease to function
and the engine will shut off or ``stall.'' In the case of a stall, the
vehicle maintains power and functionality for certain features, such as
hazard indicators, seat belt pre-tensioners and airbags. Chrysler's
recall remedy involved installing a new, more robust fuel pump relay,
external to the TIPM.
Detailed analysis of relay material composition, lab reports and
fuel pump system design reviews performed by Chrysler and Continental
that ODI reviewed in examining the petition identified the root cause
of the premature relay failure to be contact erosion and the
deformation of the contact spring due to under-hood temperatures around
the fuel pump relay, current draws, and fuel pump inductance levels
specific to Delphi fuel pumps installed on MY 2011-2013 Jeep Grand
Cherokee and Dodge Durango vehicles. Vehicle fuel pump system
measurements indicated that WK/WD vehicles have the highest current
draw and inductance while RT minivans have the lowest current draw
coupled with lower fuel pump inductance. Relay durability test data
provided by Chrysler indicated that other TIPM-7 vehicle platform
relays substantially outlasted relays tested in a simulated WK/WD
environment. NHTSA believes that because the current draw is lower for
other vehicles equipped with the TIPM-7 than for the WK/WD vehicles,
the risk of fuel pump relay deformation for these other vehicles is
lower than for the WK/WD vehicles.
On October 20, 2014, ODI sent an Information Request (IR) letter to
Chrysler requesting production, complaint, and warranty claim data
related to the complaints provided by CAS and ODI complaints involving
stall while driving allegations potentially related to TIPM faults. The
IR letter also requested information related to the fuel pump relay
root cause analysis and technical data regarding TIPM design and
construction. Analysis of the field data submitted indicated that the
WK/WD vehicles exhibited significantly higher complaint rates related
to FPR failures than other subject vehicles (Table 2). The data show
that the primary failure mode of the fuel pump relay is a no-start
condition, with no-starts and starts followed immediately by stall
accounting for approximately 68% of the complaints for both the
recalled WK/WD vehicles and the non-recalled subject vehicles.

Table 2--Fuel Pump Relay Complaint Analysis, by Total Failure Rate \12\
[All rates are in complaints per 100,000 vehicles]
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TIPM-7 vehicles Fuel pump relay failure mode
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Stall while Start with No-start Pump run-on Total
driving immediate stall -----------------------------------------------------
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms ------------------------------------
No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate No. Rate
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Recalled............................. WK/WD.................. 37 7.0 4 0.8 82 15.6 3 0.6 126 23.9
Non-recalled......................... JC..................... 2 1.3 0 0.0 3 1.9 0 0.0 5 3.2

[[Page 45582]]

KA..................... 1 0.5 0 0.0 2 1.0 0 0.0 3 1.5
RT..................... 1 0.1 1 0.1 4 0.2 1 0.1 7 0.4
JK..................... 1 0.1 0 0.0 3 0.3 0 0.0 4 0.4
Ram.................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
KK..................... 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Total............... 5 0.1 1 0.0 12 0.3 1 0.0 19 0.5
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Grand Total TIPM-7............... ....................... 42 0.9 5 0.1 94 2.0 4 0.1 145 3.1
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ODI's analysis of all confirmed FPR failures identified a total of
145 complaints, including 42 resulting in at least one incident of
stall while driving. The recalled WK/WD vehicles, which comprise only
11 percent of the subject vehicle population, account for 126 of the
total FPR related complaints (87 percent) and 37 of those involving
stall while driving (88 percent). This analysis combined with overall
warranty claim data analysis and vehicle test data related to FPR root
cause analysis indicate that, based on currently available information,
the scope of recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115 adequately address the FPR
defect condition.
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\12\ Complaint data in Table 2 is limited to CAS complaints and
ODI VOQ's potentially related to stall while driving that were
identified prior to ODI's information request letter to Chrysler for
DP14-004.
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D. Other Stall While Driving Defects

In addition to the analysis of complaints related to confirmed FPR
failures to assess the scope of Chrysler recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115,
ODI also examined all stall while driving complaints allegedly related
to TIPM failures in the subject vehicles to assess whether any other
engine stall related defect conditions may exist in the subject
vehicles that are not already addressed by a safety recall. ODI's
analysis did not identify any specific TIPM faults resulting in
incidents of stall while driving that are not already addressed by
safety recalls \13\ and analysis of complaints did not identify any
additional defect trends associated with potentially TIPM-related stall
while driving that warrant additional investigation.
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\13\ In addition to FPR recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115, Chrysler
previously initiated recall 07V-291 to address a defect condition in
approximately 81,000 MY 2007 JK and KA vehicles associated with the
PCM momentarily shutting the engine down due to a prolonged (75ms)
TIPM microprocessor reset triggered by a vehicle-wide CAN bus error
event.
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ODI's analysis identified a total of 131 complaints alleging TIPM
related stall while driving incidents. Fifty-five (55) of the
complaints were found to be unrelated to TIPM failures, including 10
associated with a defect condition addressed by alternator replacement
recall 14V-634.\14\ A total of 76 complaints were identified that were
either confirmed to be related to a TIPM fault condition (49) or where
either the FPR or other, unspecified, TIPM fault condition may have
been the cause (27).\15\ Table 3 shows the failure rates for
potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents for the recalled
WK/WD vehicles and for each of the non-recalled platforms. These data
do not indicate a stall while driving defect trend outside of the
recall population.
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\14\ For recall 14V-634, vehicles equipped with the 3.6L engine
and 160 Amp Alternator may experience a rapid alternator failure
having limited or no detection, which can result in vehicle
shutdown/shut off and/or fire.
\15\ Unknown/possible TIPM's include several for which the
condition could not be duplicated by the servicing dealer.

Table 3--Stall While Driving Analysis, All Causes \17\
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TIPM-7 vehicles Not related to TIPM Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternator
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms recall 14V- Other non- Total Fuel pump Possible Total Total rate
634 TIPM \16\ relay TIPM (C/100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled............................ WK/WD.................. 10 17 27 40 14 54 10.2
Non-recalled........................ KA..................... 0 5 5 1 3 4 2.0
JC..................... 0 1 1 2 1 3 1.9
RT..................... 0 9 9 4 6 10 0.6
Ram.................... 0 5 5 1 2 3 0.3
JK..................... 0 6 6 1 1 2 0.2
KK..................... 0 2 2 0 0 0 0.0
Total............... 0 28 28 9 13 22 0.5
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Grand Total TIPM-7.............. ....................... 10 45 55 49 27 76 1.6
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 45583]]

Additionally, the recalled WK/WD vehicles and other TIPM-7
platforms differ significantly when age and exposure are considered.
The subject vehicles range from less than 1 year to up to 9 years of
service exposure, while the recalled WK/WD vehicles range in age from 2
to 5 years of service. Most of the WK/WD complaints involved the MY
2011 vehicles recalled under 14V-530, which account for 98 (78%) of the
total WK/WD FPR complaints shown in Table 2 and 48 (89%) of the
potentially TIPM related WK/WD stall complaints shown in Table 3. Table
4 shows complaint data related to FPR failures resulting in stall while
driving for the subject vehicles for just MY 2011 vehicles. The
recalled MY 2011 WK/WD vehicles account for 25 percent of production,
88 percent of confirmed FPR stall while driving incidents and 81
percent of all potentially TIPM related stall while driving incidents
in MY 2011 subject vehicles.
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\16\ Faults reported in repair histories included WIN control
module faults, PCM faults, engine misfire and other engine
compartment components and harness issues.
\17\ Table 3 includes all CAS (through Supplement VI) and ODI
complaints related to allegations of SWD.

Table 4--Stall While Driving Analysis, Potentially TIPM Related, MY 2011 Only
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MY 2011 TIPM-7 vehicles Potentially TIPM related
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Verified TIPM Total rate (C/
Fuel pump relay recalls Platforms Population (FPR) Possible TIPM Total 100k)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recalled.................................. WK/WD....................... 188,723 36 12 48 25.4
Non-recalled.............................. JC.......................... 0 0 0 0 0.0
KA.......................... 35,609 0 0 0 0.0
RT.......................... 137,740 4 4 8 5.8
JK.......................... 103,881 0 0 0 0.0
Ram......................... 242,676 1 2 3 1.2
KK.......................... 56,939 0 0 0 0.0
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Total................................. ............................ 576,845 5 6 11 1.9
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Grand Total MY 2011................... ............................ 765,568 41 18 59 7.7
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E. Airbag Non-Deployment

The CAS petition alleges that TIPM failures are responsible for
airbag non-deployments. ODI examined this contention and finds it has
no merit. First, ODI's analysis of the airbag system architecture in
the subject vehicles indicates that airbag control is performed by the
Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module in the Chrysler vehicles and
the TIPM-7 functions only to provide power to the ORC and does not
contain any logic for airbag deployment control or crash event
discrimination. Second, the TIPM supplies power to the ORC through two
independent fused power feeds providing an extra level of redundancy
and safety to the airbag system in the subject vehicles.\18\ Third, ODI
did not identify any mechanisms for TIPM failure or power disruptions
in a crash event. Fourth, any interruption in power resulting from such
a failure would not interfere with the ORC deployment decision or
prevent it from operating on reserve power.\19\ Lastly, the complaint
data offered by the petitioner, analysis of ODI complaint data, and
analysis of EWR death and injury claims cited by the petitioner that
were related to airbag deployment also failed to support a finding that
TIPM failures have caused any incidents of airbag non-deployment (see
Section F. EWR Fatalities). ODI's review of CAS and ODI complaints
related to airbags and TIPM did not identify any incidents where a TIPM
failure was followed by a crash event or any non-deployment incidents
in which the airbags would have been expected to deploy or were
associated with evidence of TIPM malfunction.
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\18\ The use of independent power feeds is a level of functional
safety that makes the power delivery for the ORC module in the
subject vehicles fairly robust in comparison to the airbag ECU's in
many peer designs reviewed by ODI.
\19\ There is a minimum of 150ms of back-up power internal to
the ORC that is available as reserve power in the event of power
interruption during a crash event.
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The Run-Start and Run-Only relays are integral to the TIPM and
provide power to multiple circuits including the ORC. The Run-Start
relay is powered during engine crank and both the Run-Start and Run-
Only relays are powered when the ignition is in RUN mode. Examination
of the airbag system architecture for the subject vehicles shows that
power flows in the Run-Only and Run-Start condition through the TIPM-7
to the ORC through two independent and redundant fused power feeds. The
ORC dual feed safety strategy is designed so that each power feed alone
is capable of providing the necessary power to deploy all required
restraints. According to Chrysler's IR response, the loss of power from
one ORC power feed will result in an Airbag Warning Lamp (ABWL), but
will not affect deployment capability. The ORC is still able to
evaluate sensor inputs, determine if a deployment is required, and
deploy airbags as needed. In the event of a loss of a single power
feed, whether the IGN_RS or the IGN_RO feed, the ORC will set a
specific fault code and turn on the ABWL.
If for any reason the ORC loses both power feeds while the vehicle
remains powered, the instrument cluster will set a fault and activate
the ABWL. None of the CAS or ODI complaints reviewed by ODI contained
evidence that either a single or dual power loss to the ORC occurred.
Simultaneous power loss on both ORC feeds could result from a complete
TIPM failure. However, in the event of a complete TIPM failure, the
vehicle will lose power to multiple other systems with instrument
cluster lights indicating faults in systems powered through the TIPM.
None of the repair history records provided by Chrysler included any
evidence of faults indicating a loss of power to the ORC or other
vehicle systems resulting from a failure of the power feed from the
TIPM. Complaints reporting active ABWL were either related to internal
ORC malfunctions or other SRS (Supplemental Restraint System) component
failures such as seat harness or clock spring shorting conditions.
The petitioner identified complaints citing airbag system warnings
as evidence of TIPM failures resulting in possible airbag non-
deployments. These

[[Page 45584]]

complaints, once analyzed, were found to be either related to specific
airbag system component malfunctions (such as seat harness, clock
spring failures . . . etc.), or occurred in vehicles subject to
previous TIPM-7 recalls, ORC recalls (13V-282),\20\ or inadvertent
ignition key (WIN/FOBIK) displacement recalls (11V-139 and 14V-373).
None of the incidents reported by the petitioner, ODI complaints or EWR
claims cited by the petitioner can be traced to a TIPM fault that
resulted in a loss of power to the ORC.
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\20\ For recall 13V-282, Occupant Restraint Control (ORC) module
resistor may fail from electrical overstress (EOS), resulting in
airbag light and loss of head restraint function.
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F. Unintended Acceleration

ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted
in incidents of unintended acceleration, either based on a technical
review of the vehicle powertrain control function area or analysis of
complaints. The Powertrain Control Module (PCM) performs all engine and
transmission management control functions in the Chrysler vehicles and
the TIPM functions only to provide power to the PCM and does not
contain any torque management control logic. ODI reviewed each
complaint submitted by CAS and consumers and did not identify any
evidence of TIPM, or any other vehicle component, failures resulting in
unintended acceleration.
The petitioner's allegations of UA resulting from the fuel pump
failing to shut-off after ``key-off'' vehicle shutdown are premised on
an incorrect belief that continued fuel pump operation and presence of
fuel line pressure would somehow translate into un-commanded
acceleration. The fuel pump only makes fuel available to the engine;
actual use of that fuel is controlled by the PCM through the fuel
injectors, not the pump. Moreover, once fuel is fed to the engine
cylinders by the fuel injectors, it must have both a stoichiometric air
mass from the throttle and be ignited by a spark, which are also
controlled by the PCM. When the ignition has been turned ``Off'', power
is removed from the PCM, the electronic throttle is disabled and the
ignition system no longer provides a spark. If a TIPM failure resulted
in the fuel pump continuing to run after the key is turned off, the
most likely harmful result would be a dead battery.
Analyses of the UA incidents alleged to have occurred by the
petitioner do not support a finding of any TIPM failure or any other
vehicle malfunction. For example, CAS cited an incident involving a MY
2013 Dodge Challenger. According to CAS Supplement IV, ``You will find
attached to this letter an accident report from a May 2014 crash
involving unintended acceleration in Vancouver, WA. The vehicle
involved, a 2013 Dodge Challenger, is not a model included in the CAS
petition, but does contain a TIPM that is the alleged source of the
acceleration event''. The referenced attachment provided a 42-page
police report and photographs. According to the police report, the
Challenger passed directly in front of a patrol car within
approximately 20-30 feet. The report specifically indicates that the
operator's head position appeared to be downward with chin resting
against the chest. The crash occurred when the operator did not make
any attempts to slow or steer the vehicle to negotiate a roundabout.
The PAR report made no reference to unintended acceleration or any
attempts by the driver to slow down the vehicle or avoid property
damage. Finally, ODI notes that the 2013 Challenger is not equipped
with a TIPM.

G. Fire and Other Symptoms

ODI finds no basis for CAS claims that TIPM failures have resulted
in vehicle fires or any other failure modes representing potential
safety hazards. Vehicle inspection reports of the alleged fires in the
petition letter and supplemental submissions lack any evidence of a
safety related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject
vehicles. Allegations reporting fire or smoke are either related to
external aftermarket vehicle body builder up-fitter integration \21\ or
thermal damage in the alternator diode with no damage beyond the
alternator assembly, recall 14V-634.
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\21\ Inspection and assessment confirmed that the cause of this
incident was improper installation of aftermarket equipment. There
are two aftermarket wire bundles extending from the B+ cable, which
are secured using a non OEM aftermarket nut. There was significant
aftermarket wiring throughout the vehicle that was not installed, or
connected in accordance with the Chrysler provided Ram Body Builders
Guide.
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Additionally, ODI carefully analyzed the petitioner data related to
headlight and taillight failure, windshield wiper activity, instrument
panel failure, and door lock problems. Vehicle functions related to
TIPM-7 EX-2 relays typically fail in an active state \22\ with no loss
of system functionality. ODI's analysis of complaints provided by CAS
and received by the agency did not identify any patterns or trends
related to loss of headlights or taillights while driving or to driver
distraction from unexpected activation of windshield wipers/washers,
horn or car alarm while driving due to TIPM malfunction.\23\ No safety
related defect or a trend of such defects in the subject vehicles is
observed.
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\22\ Active state typically involves a powered relay.
\23\ Repair records indicated malfunctions outside of TIPM, e.g.
wiper stalk.
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H. EWR Fatalities

ODI's analysis of 24 EWR death claims identified by CAS in
Supplement I as potentially related to TIPM failures,\24\ did not
identify any evidence that TIPM faults caused or contributed to any of
the incidents. None of the reports cited by the petitioner alleged loss
of control or airbag non-deployment due to loss of power from the TIPM
module. The petitioner posits that there was a loss of power to the ORC
and other vehicle systems in the referenced crash and non-deployment
events that led to the death and injury.
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\24\ According to CAS Supplement I: ``Since the TIPM functions
as the central gateway for all vehicle electronics, there are
multiple EWR component codes that could point to the defect. These
codes include airbags, electrical system, engine and engine cooling,
exterior lighting, fire related, powertrain, service brake, speed
control, and unknown''.
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Sixteen (16) of the reports cited by CAS are related to TIPM-7
equipped vehicles and included 6 death and injury incidents in which a
frontal airbag, side airbag, or pre-tensioner successfully deployed,
demonstrating the integrity of power delivery from the TIPM was not
compromised before or during the collision event. Of the remaining
reports, two reports did not involve any claims relating to loss of
control or airbag non-deployment, or any other vehicle defect.\25\ The
remaining claims were related to an unpowered rollaway due to
documented incorrect gear selection, an alleged sudden acceleration
with no evidence of any throttle control or brake system faults, a
brake failure claim, 3 airbag non-deployments with crash dynamics that
did not warrant deployment, and 2 non-deployment where the non-
deployment may have involved inadvertent ignition key (WIN/FOBIK)
displacement.\26\
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\25\ The ``claims'' were simply requests for assistance with
downloading EDR data for the crash event.
\26\ Both vehicles were 2008 Chrysler Town and Country minivans
that were in the scope of WIN/FOB recall 14V-373.
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V. Conclusion

ODI's analysis of the CAS allegations of TIPM defects resulting in
stall while driving, airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration,
fire and other faults identified a single defect condition related to 1
of over 60 different circuits in the TIPM assembly. The most common
effect of this defect

[[Page 45585]]

condition, related to the fuel pump relay, was a no-start concern, but
it could also result in stall while driving. This fuel pump relay
defect was limited to approximately 11 percent of the 4.7 million
subject vehicles equipped with TIPM-7 and has been addressed by safety
recalls 14V-530 and 15V-115. No valid evidence was presented in support
of claims related to airbag non-deployment, unintended acceleration or
fire resulting from TIPM faults and these claims were found to be
wholly without merit based on review of the field data and design of
the relevant systems and components.
Except insofar as the petitioner's contentions relate to the defect
condition addressed by the Chrysler recalls, the factual bases of the
petitioner's contentions that any further investigation is necessary
are unsupported. In our view, additional investigation is unlikely to
result in a finding that a defect related to motor vehicle safety
exists or a NHTSA order for the notification and remedy of a safety-
related defect as alleged by the petitioner at the conclusion of the
requested investigation. Therefore, the petition is denied. This action
does not constitute a finding by NHTSA that a safety-related defect
does not exist. The agency will take further action if warranted by
future circumstances.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30162(d); delegations of authority at CFR
1.95.

Frank S. Borris II,
Acting Associate Administrator for Enforcement, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2015-18672 Filed 7-29-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P