Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc., Receipt of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance |
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Topics: Lexus RX350, Lexus RX450h
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Jeffrey M. Giuseppe
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
7 April 2017
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 66 (Friday, April 7, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 17079-17082]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-06959]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0129; Notice 1]
Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
Receipt of Petition for Decision of Inconsequential Noncompliance
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA),
Department of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Receipt of petition.
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SUMMARY: Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North America, Inc.,
on behalf of Toyota Motor Corporation and certain other specified
Toyota manufacturing entities (collectively referred to as ``Toyota''),
has determined that certain model year (MY) 2016-2017 Lexus RX350 and
Lexus RX450H motor vehicles do not fully comply with Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 202a, Head Restraints. Toyota filed
a noncompliance information report dated November 29, 2016. Toyota also
petitioned NHTSA on December 21, 2016, for a decision that the subject
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
DATES: The closing date for comments on the petition is May 8, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit written data,
views, and arguments on this petition. Comments must refer to the
docket and notice number cited in the title of this notice and
submitted by any of the following methods:
Mail: Send comments by mail addressed to U.S. Department
of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
Hand Delivery: Deliver comments by hand to U.S. Department
of
[[Page 17080]]
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. The
Docket Section is open on weekdays from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. except
Federal Holidays.
Electronically: Submit comments electronically by logging
onto the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) Web site at https://www.regulations.gov/. Follow the online instructions for submitting
comments.
Comments may also be faxed to (202) 493-2251.
Comments must be written in the English language, and be no greater
than 15 pages in length, although there is no limit to the length of
necessary attachments to the comments. If comments are submitted in
hard copy form, please ensure that two copies are provided. If you wish
to receive confirmation that comments you have submitted by mail were
received, please enclose a stamped, self-addressed postcard with the
comments. Note that all comments received will be posted without change
to https://www.regulations.gov, including any personal information
provided.
All comments and supporting materials received before the close of
business on the closing date indicated above will be filed in the
docket and will be considered. All comments and supporting materials
received after the closing date will also be filed and will be
considered to the fullest extent possible.
When the petition is granted or denied, notice of the decision will
also be published in the Federal Register pursuant to the authority
indicated at the end of this notice.
All comments, background documentation, and supporting materials
submitted to the docket may be viewed by anyone at the address and
times given above. The documents may also be viewed on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov by following the online instructions for
accessing the dockets. The docket ID number for this petition is shown
in the heading of this notice.
DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement is available for review in a
Federal Register notice published on April 11, 2000, (65 FR 19477-78).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Overview: Toyota Motor Engineering & Manufacturing North
America, Inc. (Toyota), has determined that certain model year (MY)
2016-2017 Lexus RX350 and RX450H motor vehicles do not fully comply
with paragraph S4.5 of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS)
No. 202a, Head Restraints. Toyota filed a noncompliance information
report dated November 29, 2016, pursuant to 49 CFR part 573, Defect and
Noncompliance Responsibility and Reports. Toyota also petitioned NHTSA
on December 21, 2016, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and 30120(h) and
49 CFR part 556, for an exemption from the notification and remedy
requirements of 49 U.S.C. Chapter 301 on the basis that this
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
This notice of receipt of Toyota's petition is published under 49
U.S.C. 30118 and 30120 and does not represent any agency decision or
other exercise of judgment concerning the merits of the petition.
II. Vehicles Involved: Approximately 120,748 MY 2016-2017 Lexus
RX350 and Lexus RX450H motor vehicles manufactured between September
28, 2016, and November 23, 2016, are potentially involved.
III. Noncompliance: Toyota explains that the noncompliance is that
when adjusting the rear seat outboard head restraints in the subject
vehicles from the first adjustment position to the second, the lock
release button must be depressed while the head restraint is being
pulled upward. Since this is the same action that is required to remove
the head restraint, the requirements of paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No.
202a are not met.
IV. Rule Text: Paragraph S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a states:
S4.5 Removability of head restraints. The head restraint must
not be removable without a deliberate action distinct from any act
necessary for upward adjustment . . .
V. Summary of Toyota's Petition: Toyota described the subject
noncompliance and stated its belief that the noncompliance is
inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety.
In support of its petition, Toyota submitted the following
reasoning:
1. The rear outboard head restraints continue to meet the
underlying purpose of S4.5 of the standard:
a. Background of S4.5: Toyota referenced a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) that NHTSA issued in 2001 \1\ to upgrade FMVSS No.
202 and stated that its principal focus was to improve performance of
front and rear outboard head restraints to mitigate ``whiplash''
injuries, particularly in rear crashes. Toyota stated that the agency
recognized that existing adjustable head restraints could be manually
removed solely by hand, and not be replaced, thereby creating a greater
risk of injury. As a result, the proposed rule stated that removable
front seat head restraints would not be permitted, but that due to
concerns with rear visibility, removable restraints in the rear would
not be prohibited. Toyota stated that the draft rule did not contain
any requirement comparable to the one set forth in paragraph S4.5 of
FMVSS No. 202a.
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\1\ 66 FR 968 (January 4, 2001).
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Toyota further explained that when NHTSA issued the FMVSS No. 202
Final Rule in 2004,\2\ it made a variety of changes from the
requirements proposed in the NPRM. One of those was to not require rear
seat outboard head restraints, but to impose certain requirements on
head restraints that were voluntarily installed. Toyota noted that most
of the comments submitted on the NPRM favored removability of both
front and rear seat head restraints solely by hand, although some
supported a prohibition on removability at all positions, because a
removed restraint might not be replaced or correctly reinstalled.
Toyota stated that NHTSA ultimately decided to allow head restraint
removability for both front and rear restraints, but for both front and
rear optional head restraints, specified that removal must be by means
of a deliberate action that is distinct from any act necessary for
adjustment to ensure that head restraints are not accidentally removed
when being adjusted, thereby reducing the likelihood of inadvertent
head restraint removal and increasing the chances that vehicle
occupants will receive the benefits of properly positioned head
restraints. To implement this requirement, the agency added the text in
paragraph S4.5. In 2007, the agency amended the standard by adding the
word ``upward'' before ``adjustment'' to clarify the upward adjustment
and removability aspects of the requirement.
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\2\ 69 FR 74848 (December 14, 2004).
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b. The noncompliance is inconsequential because the rear outboard
head restraints meet the underlying purpose of S4.5: Toyota stated that
the rear seat head restraints in the subject vehicles allow manual
adjustment by sliding the head restraint in and out of the seat back on
stays attached to the head restraint. Position locking is achieved by
two notches in one of the stays, allowing for a detent mechanism.
Toyota stated that the posts go through plates on top of the seat back,
one of which contains a button which is pressed to allow the restraint
to be removed. To adjust the height of the head restraint from the
fully stowed position on top of the seatback to the first notch on the
stay, the restraint is simply pulled upward. To reach the
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second notch, the button must first be pressed to allow the restraint
to be lifted; it then will lock in position. To remove the restraint,
the button must again be pressed before lifting it out of the seatback.
Because the button must be pressed to adjust the restraint from the
first notch position to the second, and the same action is required to
start the removal process, the restraint does not conform to paragraph
S4.5 of FMVSS No. 202a.
Toyota stated that there are three factors, when considered
together, that make this noncompliance inconsequential to motor
vehicles safety:
i. With the subject head restraints, the necessity to press the
release button to move from the first notch to the second, in addition
to the need to press it to release the restraint from the second notch
to remove it, lessens the ease of removal, thereby reducing the
likelihood of inadvertent removal and increasing the chances that the
occupant will receive the benefits of a properly positioned head
restraint.
ii. The subject vehicle model can be generally described as a mid-
sized sports-utility vehicle (SUV). The roofline tends to slope
downward toward the rear of the vehicle, and the distance between the
top of the head restraint and the headliner is less than in other mid-
sized SUV's with a less sloped roofline. The rear seat can be manually
adjusted forward and rearward on the seat track for a distance of 120mm
from the front position to the rear position. The nominal design seat
back position is approximately 27 degrees rearward to the vertical
line, and the seat back can be reclined an additional 10 degrees. The
seat back folds forward from the nominal design position. (See figure 6
of Toyota's petition).
Given the rear seat design, there are a variety of combinations of
seat track and seat back positions that can be attained. Typically the
seat would most likely be placed in the mid-track position or rearward
for occupant comfort and convenience. From the mid-track position
(60mm) rearward there are 30 combinations of seat track/seat back angle
combinations for the manually reclining seat back.\3\ Of these
combinations there are 25 where there would be some degree of
interference between the top of the head restraint and the vehicle
headliner if someone intended to remove it. To completely remove the
restraint from the top of the seat in these 25 combinations, there must
be a deliberate action to compress the soft material of the restraint,
because it cannot be pulled directly out of the seatback. In some cases
the seat back angle would have to be adjusted or the seat moved forward
on the seat track before the restraint can be removed without headliner
interference. (See figure 7 of Toyota's petition)
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\3\ Some models are equipped with a power reclining seat back
with the same adjustment range as the manual reclining seat back,
but which can be replaced in positions between the 2 degree
increments of the manual seat back.
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Together with the need to press the release button to move the head
restraint when in either the first or second notches, such further
deliberate actions in many seat adjustment positions of either
compressing the restraint material, adjusting the seat slide position,
or adjusting the seat back angle lessen the ease with which the
restraint can be removed, reduce the chance of accidental removal, and
increase the chances that the occupant will receive the benefits of a
properly positioned head restraint.
iii. Finally, in addition to the two previously noted factors, it
is unlikely that the head restraint will be inadvertently removed as
there is a 97.7mm of travel distance from the second notch until the
head restraint is fully removed from the seat; this length is much
greater than the travel distance between the fully stowed position and
second notch (37.5mm). The difference is easily recognized by anyone
attempting to adjust the head restraint. (See figure 8 of Toyota's
petition) Therefore, the overall design and operation of the rear head
restraints in the subject vehicles fulfill the purpose and policy
behind the S4.5 requirement.
2. The Design and performance of the rear seat head restraints
provides safety benefits to a broad range of occupants and pose no risk
of exacerbating whiplash injuries, making the noncompliance
inconsequential:
a. Toyota stated that NHTSA elected not to mandate rear seat head
restraints in vehicles; however, certain requirements for voluntarily
installed rear head restraints were adopted. Toyota stated that the
requirements for rear outboard head restraints are common in some
respects with those of front seat restraints, but that rear seat
environment and usage resulted in several differences. Toyota stated
that NHTSA analyzed the usage of rear seats and studied the various
types of occupants who typically occupy rear seating positions. Toyota
stated that NHTSA found that 10 percent of all occupants sit in rear
outboard seats, and that only 5.1 percent of those are people who are
13 years or older. Toyota stated that this justified a difference in
the minimum height requirement for front and rear head restraints. The
standard requires front integral head restraints to have a height of at
least 800mm above the H-point \4\ to the top of the restraint; the top
of an adjustable restraint must reach at least 800mm and cannot be
adjustable below 750mm. Rear outboard head restraints must have a
height not less than 750mm in any position of adjustment. Toyota quoted
the agency as stating: ``The agency has estimated that a 750mm head
restraint height would offer whiplash protection to nearly the entire
population of rear seat occupants.''
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\4\ The H-point is defined by a test machine placed in the
vehicle seat. From the side, the H-point represents the pivot point
between the torso and upper leg portions of the test machine, or
roughly like the hip joint of a 50th percentile male occupant viewed
laterally.
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Toyota stated that the rear outboard restraints in the subject
vehicles meet or surpass all the requirements in the completely stowed
position and in the first notch position. Toyota stated that there is
nothing about the performance of these restraints that poses a risk of
exacerbating whiplash injuries and that the noncompliance does not
create such a risk.
b. Rear head restraint height well surpasses the requirements of
the standard: Toyota stated that when NHTSA established height
requirements for mandatory front head restraints, an adjustment range
was adopted that was estimated to ensure that the top of the head
restraint exceeded the head center of gravity for an estimated 93
percent of all adults. Toyota stated that research conducted since the
implementation of the previous height requirements has shown that head
restraints should be at least as high as the center of gravity of the
occupant's head to adequately control motion of the head and neck
relative to the torso.
Toyota stated that the rear head restraints in the subject vehicles
not only surpass the 750mm requirement for voluntarily installed rear
seat restraints, but also can be adjusted to surpass the 800mm
requirement applicable to mandatory front seat head restraints. In the
fully stowed position, the rear outboard head restraints measure 780mm
above the H-point. In the first notch position they are 797mm above the
H-point, and in the second notch position they are 816mm above the H-
point. (See figure 9 of Toyota's petition)
Toyota stated that it evaluated the height of the rear outboard
head restraints in the subject vehicles against the center of gravity
of various size occupants. In the first notch position, which can be
attained by simply pulling upward on the head restraint in a
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manner compliant with S4.5, the center of gravity of the head of an
occupant the size of an AM95 is below the top of the head restraint.\5\
(See figure 10 of Toyota's petition) Therefore, for virtually 100
percent of the female adult population of the United States \6\ and
over 95 percent of the U.S. male adult population, the rear outboard
head restraints can help ``adequately control motion of the head and
neck relative to the torso'' in a position that can be adjusted in
compliance with the standard. It can also protect occupants larger than
AM95 occupants when adjusted to the second notch position.
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\5\ NHTSA assumed during the rulemaking that the center of
gravity of the head of the AM95 was 105mm from the top of the head.
See FRIA at page 44. See also 66 FR at page 975. Figure 10, below,
uses this value. The center of gravity of the head of the BIORID III
ATD is 110.5mm below the top of the head.
\6\ ``The center of gravity height of a 99th percentile female
reclined at 25 degrees is about 19mm below a 750mm (29.5 inches)
high head restraint at a 50mm (2 inch) backset.''
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c. Toyota stated that the rear outboard head restraints in the
subject vehicles meet and surpass all other performance requirements of
the standard not only in the fully stowed position, but also in both
the first and second notch positons. These include energy absorption
(S4.2.5 and S5.2.5), backset retention (S4.2.7 and S5.2.7), and height
retention (S4.2.6 and S5.2.6). Toyota summarized the performance in
tables that can be found in its petition. It contended that there is
nothing about the performance of the rear outboard head restraints in
the subject vehicles that in relation to the additional criteria set
forth in these tables that poses a risk of exacerbating whiplash
injuries.
3. The occupancy rates and usage of the Lexus RX model further
supports the conclusion that the noncompliance with S4.5 is
inconsequential to safety: The rear seat vehicle environment has unique
aspects in terms of occupancy rates and usage. This is why the agency
decided to specify different requirements for front and rear seat head
restraints. As noted above, the agency found that, in the general
vehicle population studied for the purpose of adopting FMVSS 202a
requirements, the occupancy rate for the rear outboard seating
positions was about 10 percent. Toyota undertook an analysis of the
National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System
(GES) data to better understand the outboard rear seat occupancy rate
in the subject vehicles. The subject vehicles are the fourth generation
of the Lexus RX model series, which was introduced for MY2016. Because
the exposure of this model year in the fleet is somewhat limited, and
NASS GES does not yet contain MY2016 data, the three previous
generations of the RX model going back to MY 1999 were used for the
analysis. While there are design differences in each generation, all
are mid-size SUV's, and it is expected that the user demographics and
rear seat usage would be representative of the subject vehicles.
Based on the analysis, the occupancy rate for rear outboard seat
occupants in all types of crashes for the RX models analyzed was 10
percent--meaning that 10 percent of the RX vehicles involved in crashes
have a rear outboard passenger. This is the same as what NHTSA found to
be the occupancy rate in the general vehicle population when it
undertook the FMVSS 202a rulemaking. In a smaller subset of only rear
crashes, the occupancy rate in the RX models is slightly higher, but
still small--only 13 percent.
The data analyzed were insufficient to provide an understanding of
the size of the occupants who ride in the rear outboard positions in
the subject vehicles. However, considering that the occupancy rate is
consistent with NHTSA's previous analyses, there is no reason to
believe that occupant sizes would be significantly different from the
general vehicle population. In the Final Regulatory Impact Analysis,
the agency found that, of the small percentage of occupants that ride
in the rear of vehicles generally, 83 percent of all rear outboard
occupants were 5'9'' or less and 17 percent were 5'10'' and above. The
latter is the height of the average U.S. male. As outlined in Section
II, above, the rear outboard head restraints in the subject vehicles
are designed so that the center of gravity of the head of the small
percentage of large occupants who may occasionally ride in the rear
seats of the subject vehicles is below the top of the head restraint.
Therefore, the number of occupants who may actually seek to adjust the
rear outboard head restraints in the subject vehicles is insignificant,
further justifying a finding that the paragraph S4.5 noncompliance is
inconsequential to vehicle safety.
Toyota stated that it is unaware of any consumer complaints, field
reports, accidents, or injuries that have occurred as a result of this
noncompliance as of December 15, 2016.
Toyota concluded by expressing the belief that the subject
noncompliance is inconsequential as it relates to motor vehicle safety,
and that its petition to be exempted from providing notification of the
noncompliance, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30118, and a remedy for the
noncompliance, as required by 49 U.S.C. 30120, should be granted.
NHTSA notes that the statutory provisions (49 U.S.C. 30118(d) and
30120(h)) that permit manufacturers to file petitions for a
determination of inconsequentiality allow NHTSA to exempt manufacturers
only from the duties found in sections 30118 and 30120, respectively,
to notify owners, purchasers, and dealers of a defect or noncompliance
and to remedy the defect or noncompliance. Therefore, any decision on
this petition only applies to the subject vehicles that Toyota no
longer controlled at the time it determined that the noncompliance
existed. However, any decision on this petition does not relieve
vehicle distributors and dealers of the prohibitions on the sale, offer
for sale, or introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of the noncompliant vehicles under their control after Toyota
notified them that the subject noncompliance existed.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 30118, 30120: delegations of authority at
49 CFR 1.95 and 501.8.
Jeffrey M. Giuseppe,
Director, Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2017-06959 Filed 4-6-17; 8:45 am]
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