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General Motors Pickup Truck Defect Investigation Publication: Federal Register Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Byline: Christopher A. Hart Date: 17 November 1994 Subjects: American Government  • Safety
Topic: General Motors |
[Federal Register Volume 59, Number 221 (Thursday, November 17, 1994)]
[Unknown Section]
[Page 0]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 94-28542]
[[Page Unknown]]
[Federal Register: November 17, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
[Docket No. EA92-041; Notice 2]
General Motors Pickup Truck Defect Investigation
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Identification of information sought at public meeting.
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SUMMARY: On October 27, 1994, NHTSA published a notice that it will
hold a public meeting on December 6, 1994 regarding the initial
decision by the Secretary of Transportation that certain pickup trucks
manufactured by General Motors Corporation (GM) with fuel tanks mounted
outside the frame rails contain a defect that relates to motor vehicle
safety. The purpose of the meeting is to permit any interested person,
including General Motors, to present relevant information to NHTSA and
the Secretary on the issue of whether a defect that relates to motor
vehicle safety exists in these GM pickup trucks. This supplemental
notice identifies particular information that the Secretary believes
could be useful in making his final decision on whether to order a
recall or to close the investigation.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ellen Berlin, Director, Office of
Public and Consumer Affairs, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590; (202)
366-9550.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 17, 1994, Secretary of
Transportation Federico Pena announced his initial decision that model
year 1973-1991 full-sized GM pickup trucks and cab-chassis equipped
with fuel tanks mounted outboard of the frame rails contain a defect
related to motor vehicle safety. At the same time, he released a
comprehensive Engineering Analysis (EA) Report that explains in detail
the basis for the decision. A summary of that Report is set out in the
Federal Register notice announcing that decision. 59 Fed. Reg. 54025
(October 27, 1994).
The EA Report makes two fundamental findings. First, on the basis
of statistical analysis, laboratory crash tests, and a review of
available information concerning specific real- world crashes, the EA
Report demonstrates that the GM pickups at issue exhibit an increased
risk of fire in side-impact crashes compared to similar vehicles
(specifically, to contemporary Ford and Dodge full-sized pickups).
Second, primarily on the basis of this increased risk and an analysis
of GM's actions (both at the time it designed the trucks and during the
period they were in production), the Secretary concluded that this
increased risk is unreasonable. On the basis of these findings, and
other supplementary information, the Secretary made his initial
decision that the GM pickups contain a defect related to motor vehicle
safety.
The Secretary also announced that, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30118
and 49 CFR 554.10, a public meeting will be held on December 6, 1994,
in order to afford GM and other interested persons an opportunity to
present information, views, and arguments on the issue of whether the
vehicles covered by this initial decision contain a defect related to
motor vehicle safety. Following the public meeting, the Secretary will
decide whether to order a recall of the vehicles or to close the
investigation.
This defect investigation has raised many important and complex
factual, legal, and public policy issues. Substantial interest in those
issues has been expressed by affected individuals, auto manufacturers,
and members of the general public. The Department believes that the
December 6 public meeting will provide a valuable forum and opportunity
for both General Motors and the public to address these issues, either
in support of or in opposition to the initial decision.
To assist in reaching a final decision, interested persons are
requested to present relevant information and arguments on issues
raised by the investigation and in particular on the issues identified
below.
Issues Related to the Question of Increased Risk
1. Is there additional information supporting or rebutting the
finding in the EA Report that the GM pickups exhibit an increased risk
of fire and fatalities/injuries due to fire in side-impact crashes?
2. Is it appropriate in this investigation to focus only on side-
impact crashes as opposed to other crash modes? What is the most
appropriate focus and why?
3. Is it appropriate in this investigation to focus on fatal
crashes, fatal crashes in which there was a fire, and/or fatal crashes
in which the fatalities are due to fire? Would other data provide a
more appropriate basis for reaching a decision on these issues?
4. In ascertaining whether the design of the 1973-1987 GM pickups
at issue here causes an increased risk of death and injury in
accidents, is it appropriate to compare those pickups to other
contemporary pickups (i.e., 1973-1987 Ford full-sized pickups)? To what
other vehicles, if any, should these GM pickups be compared? Please
explain.
Issues Related to the Question of Unreasonable Risk
1. What factors should be considered in determining whether the
design of the GM vehicles creates an ``unreasonable risk of death or
injury'' due to post-crash fires?
2. In materials submitted to NHTSA, GM presented a series of
vehicle fire rate comparisons in an effort to demonstrate that many
other pairs of vehicles experience differences in the rate of fire-
related fatalities that are greater than the difference between GM and
Ford pickups. Do vehicle pair rate comparisons provide an appropriate
basis for analyzing the issue of whether these vehicles present an
unreasonable safety risk? If not, why not? If so, is the methodology
used by GM the best way to analyze the issue? Are there better
comparative rate methodologies for evaluating the existence of an
unreasonable risk?
3. Is the overall safety record of a vehicle relevant to the issue
of unreasonable risk when the alleged defect relates to a particular
component or type of crash? If so, how relevant?
4. Are the extent of a manufacturer's awareness of a potential or
ongoing safety risk, and the extent of a manufacturer's efforts to
avoid that risk, relevant to the issue of whether an unreasonable risk
exists? Is a manufacturer's failure to implement measures to mitigate
or eliminate an increased safety risk relevant to that issue?
5. What weight should be given to the foregoing three factors, and
any other relevant factors, in deciding whether a vehicle contains a
defect related to motor vehicle safety?
Other Information Sought
1. Additional information concerning post-crash fires in real-world
crashes involving the GM vehicles covered by this investigation and
comparable vehicles.
2. Additional information regarding GM's awareness of an increased
risk of post-crash fires due to the placement of the fuel tanks outside
of the frame rails of these trucks, both at the time of their design
and afterward.
3. Additional information regarding efforts by GM to eliminate or
mitigate any safety risk associated with the location of the fuel tanks
in these vehicles, both at the time of their design and afterward.
4. Information regarding what remedy or remedies would be
appropriate if the vehicles in question are finally determined to have
a defect related to motor vehicle safety.
As stated in the October 27 notice, persons wishing to make oral
presentations are requested to notify Ms. Judy Taylor, Office of
Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
Room 5326, 400 Seventh Street SW., Washington, DC 20590, (202) 366-
2850, before the close of business on November 28, 1994. Written
comments may be submitted to the same address and must be received not
later than the beginning of the meeting on December 6, 1994.
Because many people may be coming from other cities to appear at
the public meeting, NHTSA intends to give each person who wishes to
appear a reasonably precise idea of the day and time for his or her
presentation. Therefore, the agency urges persons desiring to appear to
notify Ms. Taylor as soon as possible in order to properly organize the
meeting. Depending upon the number of persons who wish to appear, NHTSA
may have to limit the time for each person's presentation or arrange
for group appearances.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. Sec. 30118.
Issued on: November 15, 1994.
Christopher A. Hart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 94-28542 Filed 11-15-94; 3:00 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P