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Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock Brake Systems Publication: Federal Register Agency: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Byline: Rodney E. Slater Date: 10 March 1995 Subject: American Government • Safety • Trucking
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[Federal Register Volume 60, Number 47 (Friday, March 10, 1995)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 13306-13309]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 95-5414]
Federal Register / Vol. 60, No. 47 / Friday, March 10, 1995 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 13306]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Highway Administration
49 CFR PART 393
[FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31]
RIN 2125-AD46
Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Antilock
Brake Systems
AGENCY: Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of intent; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: This document requests comments on the intent of the FHWA to
initiate a rulemaking concerning requirements for antilock brake
systems (ABS) on commercial motor vehicles engaged in interstate
commerce. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
has issued a final rule, published elsewhere in today's Federal
Register, requiring certain newly manufactured vehicles to be equipped
with ABS. The FHWA intends to initiate a rulemaking addressing
requirements for motor carriers to maintain the ABS on those vehicles
which are subject to the NHTSA's final rule and address certain other
ABS issues related to vehicles subject to the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). The FHWA requests comments on this action.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before May 9, 1995.
ADDRESSES: Submit written, signed comments to FHWA Docket No. MC-94-31,
Room 4232, HCC-10, Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Highway
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, D.C. 20590. All
comments received will be available for examination at the above
address from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., e.t., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. Those desiring notification of receipt of
comments must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Larry W. Minor, Office of Motor
Carrier Standards, HCS-10, (202) 366-2981; or Mr. Charles E. Medalen,
Office of the Chief Counsel, HCC-20, (202) 366-1354, Federal Highway
Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, D. C. 20590.
Office hours are from 7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m., e.t., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 4012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency
Act of 1991 (ISTEA) (Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914, 2157) directs the
Secretary of Transportation to initiate a rulemaking concerning methods
for improving braking performance of new commercial motor
vehicles,1 including truck tractors, trailers, and their dollies.
Congress specifically directed that such a rulemaking examine antilock
systems, means of improving brake compatibility, and methods of
ensuring effectiveness of brake timing. The ISTEA requires that the
rulemaking be consistent with the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (49
U.S.C. 31147(b)) and be carried out pursuant to, and in accordance
with, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (49
U.S.C. 30111 et seq.).
\1\For the purposes of section 4012, the term ``commercial motor
vehicle'' means any self-propelled or towed vehicle used on highways
to transport passengers or property if such vehicle has a gross
vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 11,794 kilograms (kg) (26,001
pounds) or more. The NHTSA's final rule on ABS applies to medium and
heavy vehicles with a GVWR of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more.
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The NHTSA Rulemaking
In response to the ISTEA, the NHTSA has issued a final rule (which
is published elsewhere in today's Federal Register) amending Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 105, Hydraulic Brake Systems,
and FMVSS No. 121, Air Brake Systems, to require medium and heavy
vehicles to be equipped with an antilock brake system (ABS) to improve
the lateral stability (i.e., traction) and steering control of these
vehicles during braking. For truck tractors, the ABS requirement is
supplemented by a 30-mph braking-in-a-curve test on a low coefficient
of friction surface using a full brake application. By improving
lateral stability and control, these requirements will significantly
reduce jackknifing and other losses of control during braking as well
as the deaths and injuries caused by those control problems.
In addition, the NHTSA final rule requires all powered heavy
vehicles to be equipped with an in-cab lamp to indicate ABS
malfunctions. Truck tractors and other trucks equipped to tow air-
braked trailers are required to be equipped with two separate in-cab
lamps: one indicating malfunctions in the towing vehicle ABS and the
other in the trailer ABS. Trailers produced during an initial eight-
year period must also be equipped with an external malfunction
indicator that will be visible to the driver of the towing tractor.
These indicators will provide valuable information about ABS
malfunctioning to the driver in the event that the trailer is towed by
a vehicle that is not equipped with an in-cab ABS malfunction indicator
for trailers.
The amendments to FMVSS No. 105 become effective on March 1, 1999.
The amendments to FMVSS No. 121 become effective on March 1, 1997, with
respect to truck tractors, and on March 1, 1998, with respect to air-
braked trailers, converter dollies, single unit trucks and buses.
In the 1970's, FMVSS No. 121 included stopping distance
requirements which essentially required heavy vehicles to be equipped
with antilock brake systems. In response to a legal challenge, the
United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit invalidated the
stopping distance and ``no lockup'' requirements in Standard No. 121,
along with certain other provisions, holding that the standard was
``neither reasonable nor practicable at the time it was put into
effect.'' PACCAR v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 862 (1978).
As explained in NHTSA's final rule, the preconditions for an ABS
requirement for heavy vehicles differ markedly from 20 years ago when
the petitioners challenged the agency in PACCAR. First, NHTSA's
extensive fleet study of heavy vehicle antilock systems demonstrates
that these systems are reliable. Second, the agency's testing of truck
tractors equipped with antilock systems indicates that they provide
significantly improved lateral control and stability compared to
vehicles without antilock systems. Third, unlike air brake systems in
existence in the mid-1970's that relied on significantly larger, more
aggressive foundation brakes, which could possibly create safety
problems if the antilock system malfunctioned, the requirements being
adopted today do not necessitate such aggressive brakes. Fourth,
antilock brake systems are now in widespread, everyday use in this
country and throughout the world. Fifth, the performance requirements
adopted in today's final rule are objective and practicable. Based on
these and other considerations discussed throughout its final rule,
NHTSA believes the final rule satisfies the concerns raised in the
PACCAR case.
To evaluate the reliability of current-generation ABS designs, the
NHTSA conducted extensive field studies of ABS-equipped heavy truck
tractors and [[Page 13307]] semitrailers2 in developing its final
rule. In response to the PACCAR case, these studies were structured to
assess whether current-generation heavy vehicle antilock brake systems
were reliable and fail-safe, whether they inordinately increased
vehicle maintenance costs, and whether they could be successfully
maintained and would remain functioning in typical U.S. heavy truck
operating environments.
\2\ ``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability,
Maintainability, and Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS)
for Heavy Truck Tractors,'' DOT Report No. 807 846, March 1992, and
``An In-Service Evaluation of the Reliability, Maintainability, and
Durability of Antilock Braking Systems (ABS) for Semitrailers,'' DOT
Report No. 808 059, October 1993.
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The NHTSA Research
Between 1988 and 1993, the agency tracked the maintenance
performance histories of 200 truck tractors and 50 semitrailers
equipped with ABS, as well as the histories of a comparison group of 88
truck tractors and 35 semitrailers not equipped with ABS, to determine
the incremental maintenance costs and patterns associated with
installing ABS on these heavy vehicles. Additionally, special on-board
vehicle recorders were used to monitor the functioning and performance
of the ABSs. Finally, drivers and mechanics at the participating test
fleets were periodically interviewed to ascertain their views about the
ABS test vehicles' performance and ease of maintenance. The study
authors concluded that, based on the data collected during the fleet
study, currently available antilock brake systems are reliable, durable
and maintainable. While ABS is not a zero-cost maintenance item, its
presence on a vehicle did not substantially increase maintenance costs
(less than one percent for tractors, less than two percent for
trailers) or decrease vehicle operational availability. Moreover, the
NHTSA study found that system malfunctions would not render the
vehicle's braking system unsafe, since the brake system would merely
revert to one without an ABS; foundation brakes are unchanged when ABS
is added. The incidents noted during the test program in which an ABS
malfunction did compromise the vehicle's underlying brake system
performance involved defective components.
The NHTSA's research report indicates that in both the tractor and
the trailer studies, many of the test vehicles either arrived in the
test fleets with faulty ABS or had ABS malfunction indications shortly
thereafter. These problems were the result of what was referred to as
installation or pre-production design-related problems. In general,
these problems were easily remedied, with most of the ABSs requiring
only adjustments or minor repairs. Problems of this nature were at
least partially attributable to the prototype nature of many of the
installations accomplished for this test program.
The NHTSA emphasizes that the problems encountered in the test
program do not reflect inherent design flaws with the principal
components (i.e., the electronic control units (ECU), modulators, and
wheel-speed sensing hardware) of ABS. Instead, they highlight the
importance of using high quality wiring components and paying close
attention to installation details. The NHTSA anticipates that the
frequency of these problems will be lower than that experienced during
the agency's test program once ABS production/installation increases to
a level high enough to enable the quality control programs typically
utilized by suppliers and truck manufacturers to take effect.
An average of 1.35 labor hours and $106.46 for replacement
components per test truck tractor were necessary to rectify these
installation/pre-production design-related problems. Comparable figures
for semitrailers were 1.9 labor hours and $65.36 for parts. All these
costs are usually recovered by fleets under the terms of typical
warranties offered by ABS suppliers and/or truck manufacturers. The
NHTSA notes that the start-up or installation/pre-production design-
related problems that the test fleets experienced are similar to the
experiences that fleets were reported to have had with electronically
controlled engines when they were first introduced on heavy trucks in
the mid-1980's.
During the two-year period in which the reliability of these
systems was evaluated, 200 ABS-equipped test tractors accumulated
39,818,659 miles of travel. During that period, 126 trucks (63 percent)
needed ABS related maintenance that could best be attributed to normal
service wear factors rather than installation or pre-production design-
related problems. A total of 421 incidents of this type occurred with
the 126 trucks, the majority (321 or 76 percent) of which involved
inspections/adjustments. The remainder (100 or 24 percent) involved
repairs/replacements. All brands of the ABSs involved in the test
program experienced incidents of this type at one time or another
during their in-service operation.
Forty vehicles experienced more than one failure warning, the
reason for which could not be discovered. Two vehicles experienced 35
and 31 such indications (23 percent of the total ECU resets (clearing
the failure message from the ECU memory)) respectively. Two other
trucks experienced 12 and 10 separate indications, respectively. These
four vehicles (4.5 percent of the trucks with failure warning problems)
accounted for 30 percent of the total intermittent failure warning
indications and ECU resets.
All five ABS systems (Bendix, Bosch, Midland, Rockwell, and WABCO)
experienced intermittent failure indications with at least one of the
forty test trucks each had involved in the test program. In each case,
the ABS was either manually reset or the warning light did not
reactivate when the truck's ignition was turned off and subsequently
turned on again at some later time. However, 61 percent of the total
failure warning indications of this type, and 34 percent of the
vehicles experiencing intermittent failure indications, were
attributable to one supplier's ABS. Another supplier's system accounted
for 18 percent of total failure warning indications and 28 percent of
the total vehicles involved. Since the time of the agency's test, both
suppliers' systems have been modified to reduce the number of these
false-positive malfunction indications.
The NHTSA's final rule summarizes the maintenance related to in-
service wear that was required during the tractor portion of the
program on each of the ABS components. Inspections and ECU resets
associated with intermittent failure warning indications were the
principal occurrences. In general, most of the work did not involve
parts replacements. Parts-replacement incidents totaled 40, with 55
percent of these (22) involving failure warning lamp bulbs or fuses.
The average number of in-service wear-related maintenance incidents,
including all inspections, adjustments, repairs, and replacements, was
2.11 incidents per truck over the two-year period of the test.
Replacing faulty major ABS components, plus performing all other
inspections, adjustments and repairs that were in-service wear-related,
required approximately 403 hours of labor and $4,068 for parts
replacements for all tractors in the test. At a standard hourly rate of
$35, this amounts to $18,173, or 0.046 cents per mile (based on
39,818,659 total miles of travel) for the cost of maintaining the ABSs
over the two-year period. The inspections/ECU resets, which only
involved labor [[Page 13308]] expenditure, accounted for 45 percent of
these total costs. Although they occurred infrequently, ECU
replacements were costly, accounting for 21 percent of the in-service
wear-related maintenance costs.
Similar findings were noted for the 50 ABS-equipped semitrailers
that were evaluated. The test vehicles accumulated 4,001,369 miles of
in-service use during almost two years of operation. In that period, 23
semitrailers (46 percent) needed ABS-related maintenance that could
best be attributed to normal service factors, rather than installation
or pre-production design-related problems. This compares favorably to
the 63 percent of tractors requiring ABS service during the tractor
program. A total of 44 incidents of this type occurred with the
semitrailers, with the majority (29, or 66 percent) involving
inspections or adjustments. The remainder (15, or 34 percent) involved
repairs or replacements. These percentages are similar to the 76
percent for adjustments and inspections and 24 percent for repairs and
replacements seen during the tractor program.
In summarizing the in-service maintenance that was required for ABS
components during the trailer portion of the test program, the NHTSA
notes that inspections and ECU resets associated with intermittent
failure warning indications were the principal occurrences. Parts-
replacement incidents totaled six, with three of these being status
light bulbs and three speed sensors. In general, most of the work did
not involve parts replacement.
The average number of in-service maintenance incidents, including
all inspections, adjustments, repairs, and replacements, was 0.88
incidents per semitrailer over the two-year test period. This compares
well with the 2.11 incidents per tractor seen during the tractor
portion of this program.
Replacing faulty ABS components, plus performing all other
inspections, adjustments, and repairs that were in-service related,
required approximately 44 hours of labor and $234 for parts
replacements. At a standardized hourly rate of $35, the total cost of
maintaining the ABSs over the two-year period ($1,774) amounts to 0.044
cents per mile (based on 4,001,369 total miles of travel). The
inspections and ECU resets (which only involved labor expenditure)
accounted for 35 percent of the total costs. The comparable tractor
figures are 0.046 cents per mile for total costs and 45 percent of the
total costs for inspection and ECU reset, indicating that the
semitrailers performed very much like the tractors.
Maintenance of ABS
At the completion of the overall 5-year test program, the NHTSA
conducted a final follow-up survey among the participating fleets.
Among the 13 fleets that were continuing to maintain the ABS on the
original test tractors, 97 percent of those tractors had functioning
ABS. On the other hand, the ABSs were not functioning on two-thirds of
the original test tractors in the other three fleets surveyed that
chose not to continue maintaining the systems. This demonstrates that
fleets must be committed to maintaining the ABS if it is to be kept
operational.
Antilock brake systems require some periodic, and occasionally non-
periodic, non-scheduled maintenance in order to remain functional.
Nonetheless, the NHTSA believes that the data contained in the two
fleet study reports indicate that equipping vehicles with ABS is
appropriate. Taken in total, those data indicate that, while ABS is not
a zero-maintenance component, it is neither difficult nor unduly
expensive to maintain. The fleet test results do not indicate that the
level of maintenance attention needed to keep ABS functional is
unreasonable relative to the safety benefits that will result from use
of these systems.
FHWA Intention
The FHWA has concluded that a rulemaking should be initiated
proposing to amend the FMCSRs to include ABS requirements for certain
commercial motor vehicles subject to those regulations. At a minimum,
the rulemaking would propose that motor carriers be required to
maintain the ABS units on all vehicles subject to the NHTSA rule.
The agency is not offering for comment at this time any proposed
language for amendments to the FMCSRs. The FHWA does, however, solicit
comments on its decision to initiate a rulemaking on ABS. Following a
careful review of the docket comments sent in response to this notice,
the FHWA will publish a notice of proposed rulemaking containing
specific regulatory language. The FHWA anticipates that this rulemaking
will be concluded prior to the effective date of the NHTSA's ABS
requirement.
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
All comments received before the close of business on the comment
closing date indicated above will be considered and will be available
for examination in the docket room at the above address. Comments
received after the comment closing date will be filed in the docket and
will be considered to the extent practicable. In addition to late
comments, the FHWA will also continue to file in the docket relevant
information that becomes available after the comment closing date, and
interested persons should continue to examine the docket for new
material.
Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review) and DOT
Regulatory Policies and Procedures
The FHWA has determined that this action is not a significant
regulatory action within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 or
significant within the meaning of Department of Transportation
regulatory policies and procedures. Due to the preliminary nature of
this document and lack of necessary information on costs, however, the
FHWA is unable to evaluate fully the economic impact of the potential
regulatory changes being considered in this rulemaking. Based on the
information received in response to this notice, the FHWA intends to
carefully consider the costs and benefits associated with various
alternative requirements. Comments, information, and data are solicited
on the economic impact of the potential changes.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
Due to the preliminary nature of this document and lack of
necessary information on costs, the FHWA is unable to evaluate fully
the effects of the potential regulatory changes on small entities.
Based on the information received in response to this notice, the FHWA
intends, in compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Pub. L. 96-
354; 5 U.S.C. 601-612), to carefully consider the economic impacts of
these potential changes on small entities. The FHWA solicits comments,
information, and data on these impacts.
Executive Order 12612 (Federalism Assessment)
This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and
criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined
that this rulemaking does not have sufficient Federalism implications
to warrant the preparation of a Federalism assessment. Nothing in this
document directly preempts any State law or regulation.
Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)
Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Number 20.217, Motor
Carrier Safety. The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372
regarding intergovernmental [[Page 13309]] consultation on Federal
programs and activities apply to this program.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This action does not contain a collection of information
requirement for the purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
National Environmental Policy Act
The agency has analyzed this rulemaking for the purpose of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and
has determined that this action would not have any effect on the
quality of the environment.
Regulation Identification Number
A regulation identification number (RIN) is assigned to each
regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations.
The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda
in April and October of each year. The RIN contained in the heading of
this document can be used to cross reference this action with the
Unified Agenda.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 393
Highway safety, Motor carriers, Motor vehicle safety.
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 31136, 31502; 49 CFR 1.48
Issued on: March 1, 1995.
Rodney E. Slater,
Federal Highway Administrator.
[FR Doc. 95-5414 Filed 3-7-95; 8:45 am]
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