Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, Partition, and Roof Panel Systems

Topics:  Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards

Joseph S. Carra
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
Federal Register
March 2, 2011

[Federal Register: March 2, 2011 (Volume 76, Number 41)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 11415-11417]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr02mr11-34]                         

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

49 CFR Part 571

[Docket No. NHTSA-2011-0027]
RIN 2127-AK52

 
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Power-Operated Window, 
Partition, and Roof Panel Systems

AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Withdrawal of notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This document withdraws a notice of proposed rulemaking issued 
pursuant to the Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 
2007. The Act directed NHTSA to initiate a rulemaking to consider 
requirements for automatic reversal systems (ARS) for power windows and 
to make a final decision. The agency has decided not to issue a final 
rule adopting any such new requirements and instead to terminate 
rulemaking.

DATES: Effective March 2, 2011, the proposed rule published September 
1, 2009, at 74 FR 45143 is withdrawn.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For non-legal issues, you may call 
Michael Pyne, NHTSA Office of Avoidance Standards, telephone 202-366-
1810. For legal issues, you may call J. Edward Glancy, NHTSA Office of 
Chief Counsel, telephone 202-366-2992. You may send mail to these 
officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building, Washington, DC 20590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: For the reasons set forth below, we have 
decided not to issue a final rule adopting any new requirements for 
automatic reversal systems (ARS) and are withdrawing our 2009 proposal 
regarding ARS. This document explains our decision.
    The Cameron Gulbransen Kids Transportation Safety Act of 2007 (K. 
T. Safety Act) directed the Secretary of Transportation to initiate a 
rulemaking to consider requiring all power windows and panels on light 
motor vehicles to stop closing and reverse direction automatically when 
they detect an obstruction, to prevent children and others from being 
trapped, injured, or killed. It also provided the Secretary with 
discretion whether to issue a final rule. It stated that if the 
Secretary determines that additional safety requirements are 
reasonable, practicable and appropriate, the Secretary shall issue 
those requirements. Alternatively, it stated if the Secretary 
determines that no additional safety requirements meet those criteria, 
the Secretary shall report to Congress on the reasons for not issuing 
such requirements.
    In response to the K. T. Safety Act, the Department's National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) published in the Federal 
Register (74 FR 45143; September 1, 2009) a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) proposing new requirements for ARS. The proposal 
discussed the agency's analysis of the injuries and fatalities related 
to power windows and the performance requirements that the agency had 
recently adopted for safer power window switches. The benefits of the 
safer switches rules will be increasingly realized as vehicles with 
``safer switches'' replace older vehicles lacking them.
    After the agency analyzed and considered the benefits and costs of 
installing ARS for all types of vehicle windows in developing the NPRM, 
NHTSA decided to propose requiring ARS on only one type of power

[[Page 11416]]

window, i.e., ``express-up'' or ``one-touch closing'' power windows. 
These windows close without continuous actuation of the window switch 
by a person. NHTSA also sought comments on requiring ARS for other 
power windows, and explained that the agency could include such a 
requirement in a final rule at the end of this rulemaking proceeding. 
The agency provided estimates of the costs and benefits of the proposal 
and a number of other regulatory alternatives. NHTSA also announced 
that it would begin providing consumers with information regarding 
which vehicles are equipped with ARS at http://www.safercar.gov by 
October 2009.
    In response to its proposal, NHTSA received comments from vehicle 
manufacturer associations, suppliers, safety advocacy organizations, 
members of Congress and individuals. Vehicle manufacturers supported 
the proposal. In contrast, several safety advocacy organizations, 
several suppliers, and a number of individuals urged that the agency 
require ARS for all power windows. The members of Congress said that 
they believed that the agency's proposal would not sufficiently achieve 
the Congressional intent of protecting children and asked the agency to 
review and take fully into account additional data submitted by 
commenters about the frequency of injuries and deaths involving power 
windows.
    Before reaching a final decision, we carefully considered all of 
the public comments. Among other things, we considered data from a 
survey conducted for and submitted by a safety organization relating to 
the incidence of minor injuries. We also considered cost estimates 
provided by a supplier. In the NPRM, we noted that because the agency's 
estimates of less severe injuries were primarily based on emergency 
room data, those estimates likely represented a floor rather than a 
ceiling. The survey data indicate that there are a substantial number 
of minor injuries, although the survey does not allow us to estimate 
the number of minor injuries on an annual basis.
    We attempted to calculate the number of each type of injury based 
on information from multiple sources, including mortality data, 
hospital emergency department records, the agency's Special Crash 
Investigations program, and survey information submitted during the 
comment period. For the purpose of making these calculations, we 
grouped power window injuries into two main categories.
    First, there are a very small number of critical and fatal power 
window injuries resulting from an occupant's (usually a young child) 
being strangled or having his or her chest compressed when trapped by a 
closing power window. Most of these critical and fatal injuries have 
occurred in older vehicles with unsafe switches. They happened as a 
result of an occupant's kneeling or leaning on a window switch in a 
vehicle with unprotected window switches, causing inadvertent window 
closings. This category of injuries has been addressed by our rules 
requiring safer switches. New vehicles with safety switches are 
steadily replacing the older vehicles without such switches, thus also 
steadily eliminating this category of injuries.
    Second, there is a much larger number of less serious, mostly 
minor, injuries, most often resulting from a power window's closing on 
a person's finger or hand. In these cases, the window is intentionally 
activated (presumably by the driver). The most common injuries involve 
the pinching of fingers.
    Given our present understanding of the data about the nature, 
source, and number of power window injuries, we believe that there are 
very few fatalities or serious injuries that any additional 
requirements for ARS could mitigate or prevent. They would instead 
address primarily ``finger-pinch'' type injuries.
    There is considerable uncertainty about benefits estimates, 
particularly with respect to preventing or mitigating the less serious, 
mostly minor, injuries involving a power window closing on a person's 
finger or hand. The agency has no data to indicate just how effective 
ARS is in reducing finger-pinch type injuries, because the number of 
finger-pinch type injuries is not collected in any data source. While 
the available information suggests that there may be a relatively large 
number of these injuries, we do not know how many occur annually; the 
survey results do not include or enable us to make a reliable estimate. 
The only information we have about the severity of those injuries is 
that in a survey respondent population of 1,001 people, 3 out of 33 
people injured sometime in their lifetime indicated that they had 
sought medical attention for a power window related injury, indicating 
that this was a very minor injury for most. The company that conducted 
the survey did not ask those respondents about the nature of their 
injury, the type or model year of vehicle and the type of power window 
involved, or the seating position they were occupying at the time of 
their injury. Thus, we do not have clear information about the severity 
or source of these injuries.
    Further, there is substantial uncertainty as to the proper way of 
valuing them for purposes of analyzing benefits and costs. For the 
NPRM, we did not have a method for valuing the cost of minor, non-crash 
injuries and so instead assumed values based on the comprehensive costs 
for persons who are injured in crashes ($16,799 for person whose 
maximum injury level was a minor injury). However, this approach had 
the effect of overstating the value because the costs associated with a 
person who experiences a minor ``finger-pinch'' type injury are not 
comparable to the costs associated with a person who is injured in a 
crash. In the latter situation, the person's entire body is typically 
exposed to crash forces, and the average person experiencing minor 
injuries in a crash has more than one such injury. The agency still 
does not have a generally accepted method for valuing the much lower 
cost of these more minor, non-crash injuries.
    We also considered the possibility of people being entrapped 
without being injured. While entrapment without an injury is 
theoretically possible, e.g., in situations of partial window 
enclosure, we are not aware of any evidence that this is an actual 
problem.
    In reaching a final decision regarding this rulemaking, we 
considered the statutory provision providing that the Department is to 
issue a final rule in this area only if it determines that additional 
safety standards are reasonable, practicable, and appropriate.
    After considering the comments and available data, we have 
determined for the reasons stated above that there is not sufficient 
information to make a determination at this time that a requirement for 
ARS for power windows that do not already have this feature would, or 
would not, be reasonable, practicable and appropriate. Such a rule 
would be costly, but we cannot determine with any certainty whether the 
costs would be reasonable given the potential benefits. Those benefits 
would almost wholly consist of an uncertain number of minor injuries.
    We also considered an alternative approach of requiring automakers 
to continue their currently voluntary practice of providing ARS for 
``express-up'' or ``one-touch closing'' power windows and to specifying 
an ARS test requirement. The alternative we proposed included an ARS 
test requirement based on a United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (ECE) regulation (R21). We believe that this alternative, if 
implemented, would result in minimal benefits and nearly no costs 
because vehicle manufacturers are

[[Page 11417]]

already voluntarily equipping their ``express-up'' or ``one-touch 
closing'' power windows with ARS that are either ECE compliant or 
nearly ECE compliant.
    We have also considered further whether safety would be materially 
improved by adopting the proposed alternative that requires ARS for 
express-up windows. Thus far, manufacturers have been voluntarily 
providing ARS for all express up windows. There is no reason at present 
to believe that vehicle manufacturers will discontinue this current 
practice. Moreover, the benefits of specifying the ECE R21 test 
requirement would be minimal. Given these considerations, adopting the 
proposed rule would not, at present, advance the child safety goal of 
the K. T. Safety Act. We do not read the statutory language to require 
issuance of such a rule, and we have accordingly decided not to issue a 
rule in this proceeding.
    We plan to monitor power window designs on new vehicles and data 
relevant to power window injuries. If a new entrant in the U.S. market 
began importing vehicles with express up windows lacking ARS or if a 
manufacturer discontinued its current voluntary practice of providing 
ARS, we would reexamine our options.
    The K. T. Safety Act specifies that if the Department does not 
issue a rule requiring ARS for power windows, it must make available to 
the public through the Internet and other means information indicating 
which vehicles with power windows and/or panels are or are not equipped 
with ARS. The Department has been or will be using several methods to 
provide this information since October 2009. We have been using our 
Five-Star safety rating program at http://www.safercar.gov to indicate 
whether particular make-models have ARS. To improve this program and 
help ensure that vehicles that are listed have effective ARS, we plan 
to list vehicles as having ARS only if they have ECE compliant ARS (as 
determined in a test procedure that in the near future we will place in 
Docket number NHTSA--2006-26555--accessible at http://
www.regulations.gov) or the slightly more stringent ARS test 
requirement that we developed for power windows systems that operate 
when the key is not in the ignition.
    We are also including general information about power window safety 
in our ``Buying a Safer Car for Child Passengers'' brochure and at our 
new Web site ``Keeping Kids Safe: Inside and Out''.\1\
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    \1\ http://www.nhtsa.gov/Driving+Safety/Child+Safety/
Keeping+Kids+Safe:+Inside+&+Out.
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    Based on the foregoing discussion, we are withdrawing our 2009 
notice of proposed rulemaking published at 74 FR 45143 on September 1, 
2009, and terminating rulemaking.

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, and 30166; 
delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50 and 501.8.

    Issued on: February 25, 2011.
Joseph S. Carra,
Acting Associate Administrator for Rulemaking.
[FR Doc. 2011-4734 Filed 2-28-11; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P