Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Warning Devices |
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Topics: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
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Christopher A. Hart
Federal Register
September 29, 1994
[Federal Register: September 29, 1994]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
49 CFR Part 571
[Docket No. 93-31, Notice 02]
RIN 2127-AE78
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Warning Devices
AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: This final rule amends Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
No. 125, Warning Devices. As amended, the standard applies only to
those warning devices that do not have self-contained energy sources
and that are designed to be carried in buses and trucks that have a
gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) greater than 10,000 lbs. Previously,
the standard applied to all warning devices that do not have self-
contained energy sources and that are designed to be carried in motor
vehicles. This final rule provides warning device manufacturers with
greater design flexibility and regulatory relief.
DATES: The amendments made by this final rule are effective October 31,
1994. Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule must be filed by
October 31, 1994.
ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this final rule should
refer to the docket and notice number cited in the heading of this
final rule and be submitted to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW, Washington, DC 20590. It
is requested, but not required, that 10 copies be submitted.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. Kenneth O. Hardie, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20590. Mr. Hardie's telephone number is: (202) 366-6987.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 125, Warning
Devices, specifies requirements for warning devices that do not have
self-contained energy sources (nonpowered warning devices) and that are
designed to be carried in motor vehicles and placed on the roadway to
warn approaching traffic of the presence of a stopped vehicle. The
standard does not apply to devices designed to be permanently affixed
to the vehicle. The purpose of the standard is to reduce deaths and
injuries due to rear-end collisions between moving traffic and disabled
or stopped vehicles. The standard specifies that the warning devices
are to be triangular, open in the center, covered with orange
fluorescent and red reflex reflective material, and capable of being
erected on the roadway. The characteristics are intended to assure that
the warning device can be readily observed during daytime and nighttime
lighting conditions, have a standardized shape for quick message
recognition, and perform properly when deployed.
Standard No. 125 proscribes manufacturers from marketing other
nonpowered warning devices with physical or performance characteristics
differing from the standard's specifications. Some, including P.C.S.
Safety Corporation, that petitioned for rulemaking to amend Standard
No. 125, have contended that the standard is too design restrictive
since it prohibits other nonpowered warning devices which may
adequately warn approaching drivers of a disabled vehicle.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
On May 10, 1993, NHTSA published in the Federal Register a notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (See 58 FR 27514). In the NPRM, NHTSA
proposed to amend Standard No. 125 by making the standard applicable
only to those warning devices that do not have self-contained energy
sources and that are designed to be carried in buses and trucks that
have a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) greater than 10,000 lbs. As a
rationale for the proposed change, NHTSA tentatively concluded that no
longer applying Standard No. 125 to nonpowered warning devices designed
to be carried in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 pounds or less would
provide greater freedom for manufacturers in designing nonpowered
warning devices for the general public and would relieve an unnecessary
regulatory burden on industry. NHTSA also tentatively concluded that
Standard No. 125 should continue to apply to nonpowered warning devices
for use in vehicles subject to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
regulations and to any comparable state regulations, since the FMVSS
and FHWA's regulations complement one another. The Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) (49 CFR parts 350-399) of the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) are applicable to commercial
motor vehicles (vehicles that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds)
and their operators.
NHTSA further noted that although it regulated nonpowered warning
devices designed to be carried in a motor vehicle, the agency has not
required that vehicles be equipped with such warning devices. In the
May 1993 NPRM, NHTSA also cited two NHTSA-funded studies of warning
device efficacy in support of its tentative conclusion that nonpowered
warning triangles may not be effective in reducing disabled vehicle-
related accident rates. Neither study addressed vehicles stopped on the
road. The studies addressed vehicles stopped on the road. The studies
addressed vehicles stopped on the shoulder of the road. (Since many
public comments addressed the studies' findings, the studies are more
fully discussed below in the section on NHTSA's response to public
comments.) In the NPRM, NHTSA further stated its belief that additional
data on the efficacy of the nonpowered warning triangles could be
collected only after significant expenditure of agency resources. Even
if NHTSA devoted its resources to collecting data, it believed the
findings resulting from the data might not demonstrate a safety
benefit.
NHTSA also acknowledged concern about problems that might occur if
nonpowered warning devices designed for use in passenger cars were no
longer subject to Standard No. 125. NHTSA invited comments and
supporting technical information about any potential problems which
commenters might envision.
This rulemaking also responds to a petition for rulemaking from
P.C.S. Safety Corporation. P.C.S. apparently wishes to market a
nonpowered warning device that does not meet Standard No. 125
specifications. P.C.S. petitioned NHTSA to amend Standard No. 125 to
permit the marketing of its device.
Public Comments and NHTSA Response
In response to the NPRM, NHTSA received comments from 16
commenters. Two commenters supported the proposal. One supporter was
Dr. Andrew Huang, an inventor of an alternate warning device, without a
self-contained energy source, that is designed to be carried in motor
vehicles. If the proposal becomes final, Dr. Huang's device would be
permitted to be produced for use in vehicles that have a GVWR of 10,000
lbs. or less. Ford Motor Company, the other supporter, stated that the
proposal would potentially benefit motor vehicle safety by removing
design restrictions that may result in warning devices whose designs
and costs are more suitable for purchase and use by drivers of light
duty vehicles. Another inventor, Mr. Carl Monk, wrote in favor of
changes to specifications for Standard No. 125, since ``no one can read
the required instructions for assembly at night without lights'' and in
emergencies, nighttime assembly may be necessary.
Thirteen commenters opposed the proposal to make Standard No. 125
applicable only to nonpowered warning devices designed to be carried in
buses and trucks that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 pounds. Most
commenters provided reasons for their opposition. Although the comments
varied, the commenters' reasons for opposing the proposal can generally
be categorized as follows:
1. Studies show Standard No. 125's equilateral triangle design
provides the most effective warning of a disabled vehicle.
2. Greater design freedom will dilute the distinctiveness of the
warning triangle, and will result in increased motorist confusion, with
a potential for increased collisions.
3. NHTSA's not regulating nonpowered warning devices designed to be
carried in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less would result in
state regulation of such warning devices. Motorists would be
discouraged from using warning devices, for fear that the use of a
particular device would be permitted in one state, but not in other
states.
The three issues raised by opposing commenters, additional minor
issues, and NHTSA's response to each issue are discussed below.
1. Studies On Efficacy of the Standard No. 125 Warning Triangle as a
Warning Device
Federal Mogul Corporation, K.D. Lamp Company, Sate-Light
Manufacturing, Transportation Safety Equipment Institute (TSEI), Dr.
Merrill Allen of Indiana University, and Dr. Helmut Zwahlen of Ohio
University, all disagreed with NHTSA's conclusion that studies did not
show efficacy of the Standard No. 125 warning device (warning
triangles). Sate-Lite and TSEI, in particular, disagreed with NHTSA's
position that two NHTSA-funded studies support the conclusion that
warning triangles may not be effective in reducing disabled-vehicle
related accident rates.
The two studies at issue are: Study of Safety-Related Devices--
Emergency Warning Devices for Disabled Vehicles, of August 19, 1986
(prepared by NHTSA's Office of Crash Avoidance Research); and Analysis
of the Dismounted Motorist and Road-Worker Model Pedestrian Safety
Regulation, August 1982 (prepared by Ulmer, Leaf, and Blomberg). Among
other subjects, both studies discussed field experiments conducted by
M.J. Allen, S.D. Miller, and J.L. Short of Indiana University. The
field experiments simulated disabled vehicles that were parked on the
shoulder of a roadway whose speed limit was 65 mph. The experiments
tried to evaluate the responses of passing motorists to a stopped
vehicle and warning devices, including warning triangles and flares.
The experiments were based on the assumptions that if warning
devices were effective, they would induce measurable decreases in
passing vehicle speed and increases in lateral separation between the
moving and disabled vehicle and that such measurable changes would
signify a decrease in accident potential. In a 1971 Allen, Miller and
Short experiment, it was determined that at night, the warning
triangles induced a reduction in passing vehicle speed of only 1.5 mph
on average. During the day, none of the emergency warning device
configurations (i.e., flares alone, flares and triangles, triangles
alone, etc.) induced any reduction in passing vehicle speed or any
increase in lateral separation, when compared to the situation when no
warning devices were placed behind the disabled vehicle. The 1971 Allen
et al experiment showed that although flares and triangles were about
equally effective, the single most effective daytime condition for
reducing speed was three triangles placed at 2, 48, and 100 paces
behind the vehicle. This condition, however, only induced a speed
reduction of 3-4 mph compared to the disabled vehicle-only condition.
In Standard No. 125, NHTSA does not specify the number of triangles
that should be deployed with a stopped vehicle. Figure 2 of Standard
No. 125 depicts only one triangle deployed behind the stopped vehicle.
At no time during the history of Standard No. 125, has NHTSA ever
considered the use of more than one triangle for vehicles with a GVWR
of 10,000 lbs. or less.
In 1975, Miller performed a follow-up study along the same roadway.
As in the earlier field experiment, disabled vehicles, parked on the
shoulder of the roadway, were simulated. Miller's experiment tried to
evaluate the responses of passing motorists to a stopped vehicle and
warning devices, including triangles and flares. In his follow-up
study, Miller added a four-way flasher activation (on the disabled
vehicle) as a condition. Miller concluded that during the day, the use
of four-way flashers or warning triangles generally had no effect on
speed. The 1975 Miller study also indicated that at night, four-way
flashers were more effective than warning triangles in inducing a
reduction in passing vehicle speed and an increase in lateral
separation in the disabled vehicle situation.
In their comments, both TSEI and Sate-Lite cited the August 1986
and August 1982 studies as showing efficacy of the warning triangles.
Both TSEI and Sate-Lite appeared to believe that NHTSA believes powered
warning devices are more effective than nonpowered warning triangles
because the powered devices may induce greater speed reductions and
greater lateral separations with respect to passing vehicles. NHTSA has
no position on the efficacy of warning devices with self-contained
energy sources, since it has no data regarding their effectiveness.
In the NPRM, NHTSA stated that the 1986 and 1982 studies about
warning devices evaluated the response of passing motorists to such
devices, based on the assumption that measurable changes in passing
vehicle speed and lateral separation between the moving and the
disabled vehicle signify a decrease in accident potential. While
studies based on this assumption may not fully evaluate warning device
effectiveness, they do evaluate the response of some drivers when
confronted with a warning device.
Sate-Lite in its defense of retaining warning triangle
applicability for vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less, stated
that the effectiveness or primary function of the warning triangle is
not necessarily to halt traffic, reduce speed or alter driving activity
such as lateral movement, as suggested by NHTSA's discussion of the
field experiments' data on the two studies at issue. Sate-Lite stated
that the purpose of the warning triangle is to impart awareness to the
approaching driver of the presence of a parked or disabled vehicle.
Sate-Lite in its discussion of this issue adopted the perspective that
the passing motorists may, in fact, have reacted to the warning
triangle, assessed the situation, and proceeded past the test site
without adjusting speed or separation because the drivers judged that
no hazard was involved (or that the motorist reacted well before the
site and then resumed normal course and speed). Sate-Lite suggested
that an apparently normal parked vehicle that is off the roadway would
not be considered hazardous and would cause no overt driving response
(although it might prompt changes in visual search behavior or in
readiness to respond; changes not detectable by remote measurement).
NHTSA does not find Sate-Lite's interpretation of the field
experiments' data to favor use of the warning triangle. Sate-Lite's
interpretation does not indicate whether the drivers may have slowed
down in advance of the vehicle because they saw just the stopped
vehicle or the warning triangle and the stopped vehicle. If it cannot
be shown that the Standard No. 125 warning triangle changes driver
behavior any more than just the presence of the stopped vehicle, there
does not appear to be any demonstrable safety benefit in using the
warning triangle.
Dr. Helmut Zwahlen also disagreed that speed reduction and lateral
displacement correctly measure accident reduction potential of a
warning device. He asserted that more guidance about the roadway
conditions ahead, such as that provided in a warning triangle, provides
more comfort in driving. However, Dr. Zwahlen provided no criteria for
measuring a warning device's accident reduction potential, and except
for data showing that the triangle shape is the one most recognizable
from a distance, provided no data on the Standard No. 125 warning
triangle's efficacy in accident avoidance or reduction.
Dr. Merrill Allen (one of the Indiana University researchers cited
in the NHTSA-funded studies) expressed concern that NHTSA has
interpreted his research as not supportive of warning triangles. Dr.
Allen commented that in reviewing ``hundreds'' of accident cases with
vehicles stopped in the lane of traffic, he had never seen a case where
an accident occurred with the warning triangles in place. Dr. Allen did
not specify the number of instances where he observed triangles in
place.
NHTSA notes that the Indiana University experiments, with Dr. Allen
as a participant, observed a different situation, where warning
triangles were used in association with a vehicle on the shoulder of
the road. Dr. Allen in his comments, acknowledged that his research
(involving vehicles on the shoulder of the road) was ``not
representative of the major purpose of the warning, namely place a
vehicle and triangles or flares in the lane of travel.'' Dr. Allen
offered no references to studies or other evidence of efficacy in using
warning triangles for vehicles stopped in the lane of travel. NHTSA is
aware of no reliable quantitative statistics relating to the
effectiveness of emergency warning devices in preventing accidents with
disabled vehicles on or off the roadway. The most meaningful studies
that NHTSA is aware of are similar to Dr. Allen's experiments of
measuring changes in passing vehicle speed and lateral separation. It
continues to be NHTSA's belief that these studies are not supportive of
warning triangles' efficacy in reducing disabled vehicle related
accident rates.
Apparently in the belief that a FHWA rulemaking concerning fusees/
flares is related to NHTSA's proposal to amend Standard No. 125, some
commenters described in detail the superiority of warning triangles
over fusees/flares as warning devices. Several commenters, including
TSEI, Sate-Lite, Federal Mogul, Cortina Tool and Molding, and Dr.
Zwahlen, cited a April 1992 Consumer Reports article that favorably
compared the warning triangle with several powered warning devices.
NHTSA, however, has no comment on Consumer Reports' research, or other
evidence comparing warning triangles with flares, fusees, or other
powered warning devices. The agency does not believe that the
information about powered warning devices has any bearing upon this
rulemaking, which addresses only nonpowered warning devices.
NHTSA does not disagree with commenters that state the equilateral
triangle may be the most effective warning device. However, after
reviewing the public comments, which did not offer new, probative
research information, NHTSA still is not convinced that using the
warning triangle is effective either in giving motorists advance
warning of a stopped vehicle or in reducing accidents.
2. Greater Design Flexibility
Federal Mogul, Mr. Jerry Wachtel, K.D. Lamp, Sate-Lite, Cortina
Tool and Molding, TSEI, James King and Co., Inc., Dr. Helmut Zwahlen,
and Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety each commented that greater
flexibility in warning device design, permitting warning devices other
than the Standard No. 125 device, will lessen the recognizability of
the warning triangle as a symbol of a stopped vehicle. They appeared to
state that less recognizability will result in increased motorist
confusion, possibly resulting in more collisions.
James King stated that it has manufactured Standard No. 125 warning
devices since 1989. James King commented that regulation to ensure
uniformity is necessary because the general public cannot assess
warning device effectiveness, and that ``ineffective reflectors'' do
not look significantly different from effective ones. James King's
comment, favoring Standard No. 125's specification of a nonpowered
warning device in a triangular shape, appears to presume that the
Standard No. 125 warning device is effective, and warning devices that
do not comply with Standard No. 125 are ineffective. However, no data
is available to NHTSA that supports the view that warning devices that
do not conform to Standard No. 125 will be less effective in preventing
accidents than warning devices that do conform to Standard No. 125.
NHTSA is conducting this rulemaking to relieve an unnecessary
regulatory burden on industry because of the design restrictive nature
of Standard No. 125, and because research data suggest that the
standard has produced no benefits. Additionally, this final rule will
result in greater design freedom for manufacturers to provide the
public with warning devices, should the public so desire, without an
adverse effect on safety.
James King also appears to believe that because it would
manufacture nonpowered Standard No. 125 warning devices designed to be
carried on motor vehicles subject to the Federal Highway
Administration's regulations, it would face unfair competition from
devices that (to the layperson) appear to comply with Standard No. 125,
but really do not. For the following reasons, NHTSA does not believe
James King would be at such a disadvantage. When this final rule
becomes effective, James King would have more flexibility, since it
could then manufacture any nonpowered warning device designed to be
carried in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less. If it decides
to manufacture nonpowered warning devices designed to be carried in
buses and trucks that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs., James King,
and its competitors, must manufacture devices to Standard No. 125
specifications. Anyone manufacturing a nonpowered device designed to be
carried in buses and trucks that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs.,
that does not meet Standard No. 125 specifications may be subject to an
enforcement action by NHTSA. Further, section 393.95 of title 49 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is enforced by the FHWA. Section 393.5
states that all bidirectional emergency reflective triangles deployed
by commercial motor vehicle operators must satisfy the requirements of
Standard No. 125.
Dr. Zwahlen commented that the safety device industry should be
kept within a narrow band of performance, physical specifications and
test procedures. Dr. Zwahlen stated that he had conducted independent
research that showed that the triangle shape was the most recognizable
from a distance, comparing the triangle with five other shapes, each
with an area of 18 sq. inches. NHTSA does not dispute Dr. Zwahlen's
contention that the triangular shape may be the most recognizable shape
from a distance. However, Dr. Zwahlen's research appears to presume
that drivers use warning devices. Dr. Zwahlen has not shown that
drivers are carrying and using warning devices of any type. A 1993
NHTSA survey (discussed below) indicates that few, if any, passenger
car and light truck drivers, in fact, use any warning devices when
their vehicles are stopped. If drivers do not carry and use warning
devices, there is limited practical significance to the fact that the
triangular shape is the most recognizable.
Although Standard No. 125 applies to devices designed to be carried
in all vehicles, the standard does not require that new vehicles be
equipped with them. Further, the agency cannot require that the device
be carried in used motor vehicles. As a result, since there is no NHTSA
requirement that they carry and use the devices, drivers of passenger
cars and light trucks rarely use Standard No. 125 devices when their
vehicles are stalled.
That the warning devices are rarely used by passenger car and light
truck drivers was indicated in a 1993 survey by two NHTSA engineers.
Traveling on approximately 700 miles of highway in the Washington, DC
area and between DC and Newport News, Virginia, the engineers counted a
total of 74 stopped vehicles. Based on personal observation, the
engineers classified each vehicle type. Of the 74 vehicles, the
engineers determined 65 stopped vehicles were passenger cars or light
trucks. The engineers observed that no warning device of any type was
used for 62 of these, flares were used for 2, and two orange cones were
used for the remaining one. None of the drivers of the stopped
passenger cars or light trucks used the Standard No. 125 warning
device. All of the remaining 9 vehicles were heavy trucks. No device
was used for 6 of them; the Standard No. 125 device was used for the
other 3 vehicles.
Since it appears use of the warning devices is infrequent with
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs or less, NHTSA does not believe
permitting additional types of nonpowered warning devices will result
in motorist confusion or in more collisions. If the usage rate
suggested in the NHTSA survey is typical, there would appear to be no
possibility of a significant adverse effect on safety if Standard No.
125 were amended to apply only to devices designed to be carried in
buses and trucks that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs. In fact, as
suggested in Ford Motor Company's comment, if there were no standards
for devices designed to be carried in motor vehicles under 10,000
pounds GVWR, nonprofessional drivers, having a greater variety of
nonpowered items to choose from, may be motivated to carry a warning
device of some sort when they have none now.
3. Potential State Regulation of Warning Devices
TSEI and the American Trucking Associations (ATA) commented that
the NPRM, if made final, might result in each state regulating warning
devices, since there would no longer be a Federal standard regulating
nonpowered devices. TSEI expressed a belief that state regulation would
discourage customers from using warning devices, for fear of purchasing
a device whose use is permitted in one state, but prohibited in
another. ATA favors an NHTSA-promulgated uniform standard for warning
devices designed to be carried in vehicles not subject to the Federal
Highway Administration's regulations, in order to preclude states from
issuing ``differing and conflicting standards.'' It urged no changes in
the applicability of Standard No. 125 until NHTSA develops a standard
applicable to warning devices designed to be carried in vehicles with a
GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less.
In response to the TSEI and ATA comments, the issue of state
regulation of warning devices was indirectly addressed above in section
2, Greater Design Flexibility. As noted in section 2, it appears that
use of the Standard No. 125 warning device is infrequent. Since driver
use of the devices is infrequent in the absence of state regulation, it
does not appear that the presence of such regulation would have any
significant effect.
4. Other Issues Raised by Commenters
Two commenters, Dr. Allen and Dr. Zwahlen, recommended that NHTSA
amend Standard No. 125 to require the warning triangles be carried in
and used with motor vehicles. These recommendations are outside the
scope of the NPRM. Further, as explained in the NPRM, NHTSA has not
required that vehicles be equipped with Standard No. 125 warning
triangles because NHTSA has never conclusively determined that the
warning triangles are effective. Since NHTSA believes obtaining data on
warning triangle efficacy (necessary to support rulemaking to mandate
carrying of warning devices) would be expensive and very likely would
not result in findings that conclusively support a safety benefit in
using triangles, it has not conducted research on warning triangle
efficacy. Without such data, the agency is not inclined to require that
vehicles be equipped with Standard No. 125 warning triangles.
The Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety commented that NHTSA
should focus more on traffic control functions that Standard No. 125
warning triangles provide under emergency conditions, rather than on
design features of the warning triangle. They offered several
suggestions for how the warning triangles can be improved to better
serve traffic control functions. The Advocates' comments address issues
that go beyond the scope of the current rulemaking. Thus, NHTSA has not
adopted the Advocates' suggestions.
Finally, TSEI asserts that a regulatory flexibility analysis of the
effect of this rulemaking on small businesses should have been
conducted. TSEI objected to NHTSA's proposal to make Standard No. 125
applicable only to devices designed to be carried in buses and trucks
that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs. TSEI's point appeared to be
that it was inequitable for NHTSA to propose not to regulate warning
devices designed to be carried in passenger cars, after the industry
(mainly small manufacturers) tried, ``at great cost'' to make its
devices meet Standard No. 125 specifications. Thus, TSEI requested a
regulatory flexibility analysis (pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Secs. 603 and
604) to assess the economic impact of this rulemaking on small
entities.
For the following reasons, NHTSA believes this rulemaking may have
a slight beneficial effect on small warning device manufacturers, but
will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. First, not regulating warning devices designed to be
carried in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less potentially
creates a market for new types of nonpowered warning devices. Because
of their expertise in Standard No. 125 devices, warning device
manufacturers should be able to take advantage of this lessening of
regulations and manufacture comparable devices that drivers of vehicles
with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less will buy. However, because use of
any warning devices for drivers of vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs.
or less is not mandated, NHTSA does not anticipate significant market
demand for these devices.
Second, it appears that there is limited potential for significant
loss of sales. Based on its 1993 road survey, NHTSA believes that the
current demand for Standard No. 125 devices among drivers of vehicles
with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less is apparently very small. Further,
the simple fact that other types of nonpowered warning devices may now
be manufactured for those vehicles does not mean that sales of those
devices will come at the expense of the triangular nonpowered warning
devices. Additionally, although a recent Federal Highway Administration
final rule (FHWA Docket No. MC-93-19), gives fusees and liquid burning
flares equal status with triangles for use as emergency warning devices
(with exceptions), this NHTSA final rule does nothing to change the
FHWA's requirements for use of bidirectional reflective triangles with
commercial motor vehicles that have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs.
Thus, there appears to be no significant economic impact on small
warning device manufacturers as a result of this rulemaking.
Effective Date
In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that if the proposed rule were made
final, the effective date for the final rule would be 30 days after the
final rule is published. NHTSA received no comments on the proposed
early effective date. This rule relieves a restriction in Standard No.
125. The Standard no longer specifies any restriction on warning
devices designed to be carried in motor vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000
lbs. or less. The lessening of the regulatory restriction will provide
drivers of vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less with greater
choices of warning devices to be purchased, and permit manufacturers
more flexibility in designing and selling warning devices designed for
vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less. Since this rule relieves a
regulatory restriction, NHTSA has concluded that the rule should take
effect sooner than 120 days after the issuance of the rule. The agency
finds for good cause that this rule should become effective 30 days
after it is published.
As earlier noted, this rulemaking responds to a petition for
rulemaking from P.C.S. Safety Corporation. On the rule's effective
date, if P.C.S.'s nonpowered warning device is designed to be carried
in motor vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less, the P.C.S. device
will be permitted to be manufactured and sold.
Rulemaking Analyses and Notices
Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
This action was not reviewed under E.O. 12866, Regulatory Planning
and Review. NHTSA has considered the impact of this rulemaking action
under the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and
procedures and determined that it is not ``significant.'' This action
relieves a regulatory restriction by narrowing the application of the
safety standard on nonpowered warning devices so that it is applicable
only to devices designed to be carried in motor vehicles that have a
GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs. Previously, the standard applied to all
nonpowered warning devices designed to be carried in motor vehicles.
The net economic impact of this action on manufacturers of nonpowered
warning devices designed to be carried in motor vehicles with a GVWR of
10,000 lbs. or less is expected to be slight. The final rule imposes no
new or additional requirements. For these reasons, the agency has
determined that the economic effects of this rule are so minimal that a
full regulatory evaluation is not required.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The agency has also considered the effects of this rulemaking under
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.). I certify that
this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. The rationale for this
certification is that by permitting alternative warning devices
designed to be carried in vehicles with a GVWR of 10,000 lbs. or less,
small warning device manufacturers will have an opportunity to sell
these alternative devices, as well as the triangular nonpowered warning
devices, to the owners of those vehicles. At the same time, since
Standard No. 125 specifies warning devices for buses and trucks that
have a GVWR greater than 10,000 lbs., and operators of such vehicles
are required to carry the devices, manufacturers of Standard No. 125
devices will continue to have a market for their devices. Accordingly,
the agency has not prepared a regulatory flexibility analysis.
Executive Order 12612 (Federalism)
This final rule has been analyzed in accordance with the principles
and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been
determined that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism
implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
National Environmental Policy Act
The agency has also considered the environmental implications of
this final rule in accordance with the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 and has determined that the rule will not significantly
affect the human environment.
Paperwork Reduction Act
This rule specifies that the warning devices be marked with certain
information, that are considered to be information collection
requirements, as that term is defined by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in 5 CFR Part 1320. The information collection
requirements for 49 CFR Part 571.125 have been submitted to and
approved by the OMB, pursuant to the requirements of the Paperwork
Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). This collection of information
has been assigned OMB Control No. 2127-0506, (Warning Devices
(Labeling)) and has been approved for use through March 31, 1994. A
request for an extension of this collection of information is pending
at OMB.
Executive Order 12866 (Civil Justice Reform)
This final rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under 49
U.S.C. section 30103, whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard
is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard
applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to
the Federal standard. 49 U.S.C. section 30161 sets forth a procedure
for judicial review of final rules establishing, amending or revoking
Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That section does not require
submission of a petition for reconsideration or other administrative
proceedings before parties may file suit in court.
List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571
Imports, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Rubber and rubber
products, Tires.
In consideration of the foregoing, 49 CFR part 571 is amended to
read as follows:
PART 571--[AMENDED]
1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, delegation of
authority at 49 CFR 1.50.
2. In Sec. 571.125, S3 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 571.125 Standard No. 125; Warning devices.
* * * * *
S3. Application. This standard applies to devices, without self-
contained energy sources, that are designed to be carried in buses and
trucks that have a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) greater than
10,000 pounds. These devices are used to warn approaching traffic of
the presence of a stopped vehicle, except for devices designed to be
permanently affixed to the vehicle.
Issued on: September 23, 1994.
Christopher A. Hart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. 94-24055 Filed 9-28-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-59-P-M