Highway Safety Programs; Determination of Effectiveness |
---|
Topics: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Highway Administration
|
Rodney E. Slater/Ricardo Martinez
Federal Register
December 13, 1994
[Federal Register: December 13, 1994] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Federal Highway Administration 23 CFR Part 1205 [NHTSA Docket No. 93-20; Notice 2] RIN 2127-AE89 Highway Safety Programs; Determination of Effectiveness AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: Section 2002(a) of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) required that the Secretary of Transportation either designate six key areas as priority highway safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the six program areas had already been designated as priority programs by the Secretary. This final rule adds Speed Control, but not School Bus Safety, to the list of priority programs. EFFECTIVE DATE: The amendments made by this final rule are effective January 12, 1995. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: In NHTSA: Ms. Marlene Markison, Office of Regional Operations, NRO-01, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 7th Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20590, telephone: (202) 366-2121; or Ms. Heidi L. Coleman, Office of Chief Counsel, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, telephone: (202) 366- 1834. In FHWA: Ms. Julie Cirillo, HHS-10, Federal Highway Administration, telephone: (202) 366-2170. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background The State and Community Highway Safety Grant Program (section 402 program) was established under the Highway Safety Act of 1966, 23 U.S.C. 402. The Act required the establishment of Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs to assist the States and local communities in organizing their highway safety programs. Eighteen such standards were established and have been administered at the Federal level by FHWA and NHTSA. NHTSA is responsible for developing and implementing highway safety programs relating to the vehicle and driver; FHWA has similar responsibilities in program areas involving the roadway. The FHWA is also responsible for implementing programs relating to commercial motor vehicle safety. These programs include measures related to speed control. Until 1976, the 402 program was principally directed towards achieving State and local compliance with the 18 Highway Safety Program Standards, which were considered mandatory requirements with financial sanctions for non-compliance. Under the Highway Safety Act of 1976, Congress provided for a more flexible implementation of the program so the Secretary would not have to require State compliance with every uniform standard or with each element of every uniform standard. As a result, the standards became more like guidelines for use by the States, and management of the program shifted from enforcing standards to one of problem identification and countermeasure development and evaluation, using the standards as a framework for the State programs. In 1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-35, revising the section 402 program. The Act directed the agencies to conduct rulemaking to determine those State and local highway safety programs most effective in reducing accidents, injuries, and fatalities. On April 1, 1982, NHTSA and FHWA issued a joint final rule (47 FR 15116) identifying six National Priority program areas which the agencies then considered to be the most effective highway safety programs. The six program areas included one FHWA program area, Safety Construction and Operational Improvements, and the following NHTSA Program Areas: Occupant Protection, Alcohol Countermeasures, Police Traffic Services, Emergency Medical Services, and Traffic Records. The April 1982 final rule provided that these National Priority program areas would be eligible for Federal funding using an expedited procedure under the 402 program. 23 CFR 1205.4. It also established a mechanism by which other, nonpriority programs identified by a State may be eligible for Federal funding. 23 CFR 1205.5(a) and (b). Periodic Review and Determination of Priority Programs On April 2, 1987, the enactment of the Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987 (Public Law 100-17) revised 23 U.S.C. 402. The changes provided for a periodic review of the effectiveness of the various programs eligible for funding under section 402 in reducing crashes, injuries and fatalities. The periodic review procedure was enacted to ensure the continued relevance of the section 402 program to changing circumstances and traffic safety needs and to ensure that Federal funds continue to be used for the most effective programs. The legislation also provided that the standards promulgated under section 402 and codified in 23 CFR Part 1204 be changed to guidelines. The purpose of this amendment was to conform the language of section 402 and Part 1204 to the current implementation of the programs. Pursuant to these amendments, NHTSA and FHWA conducted a rulemaking action to review those programs most effective in reducing crashes, injuries and fatalities. In a final rule issued on April 6, 1988 (53 FR 1255), the agencies determined that the National Priority program areas should continue to include the one FHWA program area, Roadway Safety (formerly, Safety Construction and Operational Improvements), and the five NHTSA program areas that had been identified in 1982. In addition, the agencies determined that a sixth NHTSA area, Motorcycle Safety, should be added. On May 3, 1991, NHTSA and FHWA published a joint NPRM (56 FR 20387) proposing to add Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety as one of the National Priority program areas. The public comments supported that proposal and the area of Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety was added to the list of National Priority program areas eligible for the expedited funding process on October 4, 1991 (56 FR 50250). As a result of these rulemaking actions, the National Priority program areas included the following: 1. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures 2. Police Traffic Services 3. Occupant Protection 4. Traffic Records 5. Emergency Medical Services 6. Motorcycle Safety 7. Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety 8. Roadway Safety ISTEA Requirements On December 18, 1991, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) was signed into law. Section 2002(a) of ISTEA required that the Secretary of Transportation either designate six key areas as priority highway safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons for not establishing these programs as priorities. The six program areas listed in ISTEA included programs: (1) To reduce injuries and deaths resulting from motor vehicles being driven in excess of posted speed limits (Speed Control), (2) to encourage the proper use of occupant protection devices (including the use of safety belts and child restraint systems) by occupants of motor vehicles and to increase public awareness of the benefit of motor vehicles equipped with air bags (Use of Occupant Protection Devices), (3) to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from persons driving motor vehicles while impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance (Driving While Impaired), (4) to reduce deaths and injuries resulting from accidents involving motor vehicles and motorcycles (Motorcycle Safety), (5) to reduce injuries and deaths resulting from accidents involving school buses (School Bus Safety) and (6) to improve law enforcement services in motor vehicle accident prevention, traffic supervision, and post-accident procedures (Police Traffic Services). The Secretary had already designated four of these six program areas as priority programs, but not Speed Control or School Bus Safety. Accordingly, on January 14, 1994, NHTSA and FHWA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register requesting comments from the public on whether to expand the list of National Priority program areas. The agencies explained that they apply three criteria to determine whether a program area should be identified as a National Priority program under 23 CFR Part 1205:Whether the problem is of national concern (including the relative magnitude of the problem); Whether effective countermeasures have been developed in this area which address this concern; and Whether State programs in the area appear to be among the most effective in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities as compared to other traffic safety program areas. The NPRM proposed to expand the list of National Priority program areas to include Speed Control, and requested comments on the agencies' preliminary determination that School Bus Safety should not be added as a National Priority program area at this time. Comments Received The agencies received 34 comments to the docket in response to the NPRM, including comments from 22 State agencies (with responsibility for transportation/highway safety, law enforcement and education); a local PTA Council; a county health department; a private bus operator; and nine national organizations. The national organizations represent highway safety interests (National Association of Governors' Highway Safety Representatives, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety and the Center for Auto Safety); law enforcement organizations (International Association of Chiefs of Police and National Sheriffs' Association); and pupil transportation interests (National Association for Pupil Transportation, National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation Services and National School Transportation Association). Based on our review of the comments received and other available information, NHTSA and FHWA have decided to adopt the proposal published in the NPRM. For the reasons set forth below, the agencies have decided to add Speed Control to the list of National Priority program areas, and not to add School Bus Safety to the list at this time. Speed Control Is Speeding a Problem of National Concern? NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM that speeding is a problem of national concern, based on a number of considerations. The agencies explained in the NPRM that speeding is defined as not only exceeding the posted speed limit, but also driving too fast for conditions. While the agencies recognized that reliable data on travel speeds are relatively limited and often difficult to compare, NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM, based on the most reliable data available, that the travel speeds of motorists have increased in recent years. The NPRM explained that NHTSA studies suggest that most drivers recognize that speeding is a violation of the law, but few regard the violation as a serious offense. This led the agency to conclude that the public does not view speeding per se as an immediate safety risk. However, as NHTSA and FHWA pointed out in the NPRM, speeding is one of the most prevalent reported factors associated with crashes, and studies identify correlations between speeding and other factors often associated with crashes, including alcohol involvement, young drivers, male drivers, motorcyclists and nighttime driving. The agencies reported in the NPRM that speeding is cited as a contributing factor in approximately 11 percent of all police-reported crashes and in approximately 34 percent of all fatal crashes (NHTSA, Fatal Accident Reporting System, 1991). The agencies estimated that in 1991, 13,909 fatalities and 77,000 moderate to critical injuries occurred in speed-related crashes, resulting in an economic cost for all speed-related crashes (including all injury levels) of over $19 billion. As explained in the NPRM, excessive speed contributes to motor vehicle crashes in a number of ways. Drivers have less time to react when travelling at higher speeds since speed increases the distance a vehicle travels during the time it takes for a driver to react to a perceived danger; speed increases the total stopping distance necessary to halt a vehicle; and speed reduces a driver's ability to steer safely around curves on highways or objects in the roadway. Speed variance, the difference in speed among vehicles in the traffic stream, also contributes to motor vehicle crashes. As speed variance increases, vehicles come close to each other more frequently, which leads to more frequent lane changes and passing maneuvers as the faster drivers seek to avoid slower-moving vehicles. Research studies have shown that motor vehicle crashes are more likely where speed variance is greater, and data have shown that a speed variance of 20 mph from the average speed can result in a crash risk 11 times greater than those travelling at the average speed. Finally, increased speeds result in reduced margins for error and increased severity for those vehicles involved in crashes. As the speed of a car increases from 20 mph to 80 mph, a factor of four, the energy of the impact delivered in a collision with a fixed object goes up by a factor of sixteen, increasing dramatically the chance of death or serious injury. Citing a recent FHWA study entitled Assessment of Current Speed Zoning Criteria, the NPRM indicated that: (1) On average, seven out of ten motorists exceeded posted limits; (2) average speeds ran approximately two to six mph above posted limits; and (3) prevailing 85th percentile speeds ran approximately eight to twelve mph above posted limits. One commenter, the West Virginia Division of Highways, questioned the agencies' tentative conclusion that speeding is a problem of national concern. The State asserted that the agencies' comparison between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit indicates a problem with speed zones (which, according to West Virginia, are set through public pressure rather than by engineering principles), not with speeding. West Virginia further suggested that, as drivers have gained additional experience driving faster than 55 (following the speed limit's being raised to 65 on certain rural Interstates), ``it is to be anticipated that speeds would gradually increase.'' The agencies accept West Virginia's explanation that, as drivers gain additional experience driving faster, their speeds tend to increase. We disagree, however, that this supports a conclusion that the difference between the 85th percentile speed and the speed limit indicates a problem with speed zones, not with speeding. In fact, if West Virginia's explanation is correct, the agencies believe that, if speed limits were increased to match the 85th percentile, speeds are likely to gradually increase even further, as drivers adjust to the higher speed limits. All other comments received in response to the NPRM supported the agencies' conclusion that speeding is a problem of national concern. New Mexico, for example, reported that it continues to suffer among the highest rates of motor vehicle deaths in the nation, and some 25% of their crash fatalities involve excessive speed. Michigan reported that in 1991 excessive speed accounted for 43% of the total crashes, 44% of fatal crashes, 52% of injury crashes and 41% of property damage crashes in that State. Alaska commented that traveling at unsafe speeds is the leading cause of the State's motor vehicle crashes and is a contributing factor in 27% of its fatal crashes. North Carolina stated that in 1992 speed was noted as a contributing factor in 32% of all crashes and 39.8% of fatal crashes. The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) provided data supporting the agencies' conclusion that travel speeds are increasing. In addition, IIHS stated that fatalities have increased along with travel speeds. According to IIHS: In the 40 States that increased their speed limits to 65 mph on rural interstates during 1987 and 1988, deaths on these roads were 17 percent higher in 1992, compared with the average number of deaths on the same roads during 1982-86. In contrast, deaths on rural interstates where the 55 mph limit was retained were 28 percent lower in 1992 compared with 1982-86. In the 40 States that raised their rural interstate speed limit, the urban interstate limit speed remained unchanged and on those highways, deaths in 1992 were 8 percent lower than in 1982-86 (IIHS, 1993b). The agencies continue to conclude that speeding is a problem of national concern. Have Effective Speed Control Countermeasures Been Developed? The agencies identified, in the NPRM, a number of speed control countermeasures that they consider to be effective. They indicated that NHTSA has identified and evaluated, and is currently demonstrating in the law enforcement community a number of new law enforcement technologies to further advance speed control efforts, including radar, VASCAR, laser speed measuring devices, aerial speed measurement, photo radar and electronic signing. The NPRM stated that NHTSA studies show that one of the best methods for obtaining compliance with speed limits is to combine an aggressive enforcement campaign with a vigorous public information and education effort. It also cited other effective countermeasures, such as saturation patrols and multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional enforcement efforts. In the areas of highway design and traffic control, the agencies explained that freeway design, culminating in the Interstate System, has eliminated at-grade intersections and provided for free flow traffic, which has resulted in a significant reduction in speed variance and the promotion of uniform operating speed. Other effective countermeasures were also mentioned. For example, the NPRM indicated that variable message speed signs have been developed to control speed for varying conditions and that real time regulatory variable speed limits are now being tested in the State of Washington. The NPRM indicated that these efforts can be further enhanced through the development of comprehensive speed control programs. The commenters cited many of the same countermeasures and technologies in their responses to the NPRM, and indicated they considered them to be effective. IIHS, for example, indicated it believes VASCAR and laser technologies can be effective at increasing the proportion of speeders cited for violations since they are not detectable by radar detectors. IIHS recommended also the use of radar detector detectors (RDDs) as an effective countermeasure for identifying individuals who are likely to be ``professional speeders.'' No commenters suggested that no effective speed control countermeasures have been developed, and the agencies continue to conclude that effective countermeasures have been developed. Do State Speed Control Programs Appear To Be Among the Most Effective in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities? NHTSA and FHWA stated in the NPRM that state programs that have been conducted to date demonstrate that speed control countermeasures are extremely effective in reducing deaths and injuries, and cited a number of examples. (For details, interested persons should read the NPRM.) The California Office of Traffic Safety (OTS) interpreted this statement to mean that the agencies were placing more importance on State, rather than local, programs. NHTSA and FHWA did not intend to give this impression. In fact, the agencies recognize that many countermeasures in the Speed Control area can be carried out most effectively at the local level. The agencies' reference to ``State programs'' was intended to cover programs conducted at either the State or local level within a State. California OTS went on to indicate that many countermeasures have been employed successfully throughout the State to address the speeding problem. The Department of California Highway Patrol (CHP) stated that effective countermeasures exist only for localized speed control. CHP claimed that the success of these programs is almost always localized and/or temporary. The agencies agree that localized enforcement efforts alone generally result in only localized, short-term impacts. However, it has long been established that enforcement efforts, when combined with a vigorous public information and education campaign, have much more long-lasting effects. (See, ``Evaluation of the New York State Police 55 MPH Speed Enforcement Project,'' August 1969, by the Institute for Traffic Safety Management and Research.) Commenters, such as IIHS and Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, supported this view. Advocates further commented, ``A national effort [which provides a greater level of public information and awareness regarding the safety dangers associated with speeding] will establish the safety context for state and local speed control efforts under the 402 Program and provide those efforts with added credibility.'' West Virginia questioned the validity of the examples cited in the NPRM. The State argued that ``the reductions in speed [experienced in South Carolina and St. Louis] were minuscule'' and ``the sample [used in California] was very small.'' West Virginia continued, ``the Notice states a belief that the programs were effective but it gives no measures of statistical significance or indications of necessary seasonal adjustments or other information to back up this conclusion.'' The agencies disagree with West Virginia's comments. The success of the South Carolina study, for example, was not measured by reductions in speed, but rather using other factors. As stated in the NPRM, there were 12,472 fewer crashes (a 10% decrease), 2,331 fewer injuries (a 7% decrease) and 106 fewer fatalities in 1991 in South Carolina as compared to 1989 (an 11% decrease). The vehicle miles traveled (VMT) in South Carolina increased from 32,780 million to 34,456 million (a 5% increase) during this period of time. The agencies believe the State's rural initiative contributed to these reductions and that these reductions are significant. The agencies agree that the reduction in average speed (from 62 mph to 61 mph) experienced in the first year of the St. Louis enforcement operation (Operation Gateway) was not a significant reduction. However, the NPRM stated that the St. Louis program was continuing and was expected to result in further speed decreases, and further results have in fact been achieved. The Missouri Division of Highway Safety did not report the reduction in average speed as part of the second phase of Operation Gateway. The State did report, however, that, prior to the kickoff of the operation, the average speed of vehicles stopped for speeding on I-270 was 78.3 mph, and the average speed of vehicles stopped during the Operation Gateway kickoff was 74.3 mph. This represents a 5% reduction in speed. The agencies believe this reduction is significant. With regard to the California study, the sample used may have appeared small, as compared with the general motor vehicle population, but the study's focus was on commercial motor vehicles, and the study used as its sample a census of all crashes where the commercial motor vehicle was at fault. As the agencies explained in the NPRM, speed control efforts targeted commercial motor vehicles, and the data revealed that the number of crashes where commercial motor vehicles were at fault decreased by 3.5% (from 810 in 1986 to 782 in 1987). The number of crashes caused by commercial motor vehicles which resulted in injuries also declined, by 11.2% (from 259 in 1986 to 230 in 1987). Seasonal adjustments were not made for the studies referenced in the NPRM because they were not considered to be necessary. Seasonal adjustments are not considered to be necessary, for example, for studies in which data is to be collected during a brief period of time involving no seasonal changes or for studies in which data is to be collected during comparable time periods. Data was collected for the South Carolina study during the same four months in 1990 and 1991. Data was collected for the St. Louis effort during a brief period of time before and during the kickoff of Operation Gateway, so seasonal changes were not a factor in that study. Most of the commenters agreed with the conclusion in the NPRM that Speed Control Programs appear to be among the most effective in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities, and they provided examples demonstrating the effectiveness of speed control countermeasures. IIHS indicated that, in South Carolina, police issued 41 tickets per 1,000 vehicles using lasers, as compared with 33 per 1,000 using conventional radar. New York State reported that it experienced the lowest fatality rate on record in 1992 (1.65 deaths per hundred million vehicle miles traveled), ``due in large part to the Division's strict [comprehensive speed] enforcement program.'' According to New York, the fatality rate of 1.65 was 29 percent lower than 2.33 in 1987 (when the State started its program) and equates to 520 fewer lives lost on the highways of that State. The program included a saturation strategy that not only led to the apprehension of specific motorists, but also established a visible presence and generated publicity which raised the perception of risk among all motorists within the State. Based on available information and the comments received in response to the NPRM, the agencies continue to conclude that Speed Control Programs are among the most effective in reducing crashes, injuries, and fatalities. Other Comments Received About Speed Control The State of Illinois agreed that Speed Control should be designated a priority program, but commented that there should be no earmarking of funds for Speed Control (or any other program) and monetary sanctions should not be imposed on States for failing to meet compliance levels. Congress enacted the National Maximum Speed Limit law, which established monetary sanctions for noncompliance and has, from time to time, imposed earmarking or set-aside requirements in appropriations legislation. NHTSA and FHWA are bound to implement these congressional requirements. However, the designation of Speed Control as a priority program under section 402 in this final rule will not create any additional earmarking requirements or monetary sanctions. Most comments strongly supported the designation of Speed Control as a National Priority program area, particularly at this time. New Mexico, for example, expressed its view that: Speed control is ready to mature as a significant injury prevention tool, following the cycle of public attitude change, institutional preparation, and coordinated operational programming that has worked well in * * * other areas. * * * [S]tate programs in the coming * * * years for speed control could be among the most productive injury control measures available to the safety world. Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety stated: Speeding and excessive highway speeds have reached epidemic proportions and must be treated as a national public health problem. * * * It is incumbent on the agencies to develop a high profile national program against speeding that provides a greater level of public information and awareness regarding the safety dangers associated with speeding. NAGHSR concurred with the designation of Speed Control as a National Priority, but expressed concern about the ``proliferation of 402 priorities'' and the ``possible overlap and duplication'' between the Speed Control and Police Traffic Services (PTS) programs. NAGHSR suggested that the agencies consider instead combining these two programs in a way that emphasizes the importance of speed compliance activities. Three other commenters also recommended that Speed Control be included under PTS, but for different reasons. California OTS expressed concern that a separate Speed Control program area could ``result in the redirection of efforts into `speed only' projects and dilute the accomplishments made in highlighting speed as a major problem in all traffic safety ventures.'' CHP stated that Speed Control already receives considerable attention, and argued that including Speed Control under PTS would allow individual States to better balance their overall approach to traffic safety. West Virginia expressed its opinion that ``public acceptance is likely to be higher if the Speed Control function is part of a well-reasoned and balanced enforcement program rather than as a stand-alone effort which can be interpreted as a revenue enhancement measure.'' The agencies agree with the commenters that Speed Control programs should continue to be included as part of broader traffic safety programs. However, the designation of Speed Control as a priority program does not require that States establish ``stand-alone'' efforts. States have the ability and, in fact, are encouraged by the agencies to continue to include Speed Control messages in their other traffic safety programs. It is the agencies' hope that the program's designation as a National Priority program area will result in the inclusion of Speed Control messages in more traffic safety programs than before. NHTSA and FHWA have considered the comments cited above, and decided not to include Speed Control as part of PTS. The agencies recognize that there will be some overlap between the areas of Speed Control and PTS, since law enforcement activity is an important component in any Speed Control program. (There is a similar level of overlap between the areas of PTS and other priority programs, such as Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant Protection, to the extent that police agencies enforce laws designed to address these issues.) However, the agencies believe it is important to list the Speed Control program (as well as Alcohol Countermeasures and Occupant Protection) separately, to reflect non-law enforcement activities that are equally important components of these programs. In the area of Speed Control, these components include, for example, the development and enactment of speed-related laws, the use of new technologies, public information and education activities, and the reexamination of speed zoning criteria to ensure that posted speed limits are appropriate for conditions. Speed Control Determination The agencies conclude that speeding does represent a significant traffic safety problem throughout the country, and that numerous countermeasures have been developed that have proven to be most effective in addressing this problem. Accordingly, NHTSA and FHWA have decided to designate Speed Control as a separate National Priority program area. Speed Control will be administered jointly by both agencies. School Bus Safety Is School Bus Safety a Problem of National Concern? NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that the safety of children in school buses has been a primary concern of parents and school systems ever since buses began to be used to transport children and that this concern has helped develop school buses into the safest form of transportation in the country. The NPRM reported that, according to the National Safety Council's ``Accident Facts'' (1991), during the 1989-90 school year, an estimated 380,000 buses were used to transport 22 million pupils approximately 3.8 billion miles (21 million miles per school day) and that occupant fatality rates per hundred million passenger miles in 1989 were 1.12 for passenger cars and 0.04 for school buses. The agencies recognized in the NPRM that school bus crashes, as compared with automobile crashes, have a much different effect on the population as a whole. When a child is fatally injured in a school bus crash, there is a greater sense of loss and a greater sense of tragedy. For this reason, school bus fatalities and crashes often receive a high degree of public attention and draw an immediate and passionate response from the community. However, the number of fatalities in school bus crashes is small, particularly when considering exposure and when compared to the number of fatalities related to other priority programs. In 1991, passenger cars were involved in 86.4 percent of all traffic crashes and 67.9 percent of all fatal crashes; whereas school buses were involved in only 0.4 percent of all traffic crashes and in 0.3 percent of all fatal crashes. These data demonstrate that the safety problem related to school buses is not great when compared to that of other types of vehicles. Based on these findings, NHTSA and FHWA tentatively concluded in the NPRM that School Bus Safety is not a problem that merits designation as a National Priority program area. Two commenters argued that any number of school bus fatalities above zero is too high a fatality rate and, therefore, justifies designating School Bus Safety as a Priority program. According to the California Department of Education, ``school bus safety must be a priority issue for both the State and Federal Government for as long as our accident statistics show one `1' pupil passenger or one `1' pupil pedestrian fatality. Zero `0', tolerance of pupil passenger and pedestrian fatalities must be our goal.'' Similarly, the Center for Auto Safety argued that ``the only way DOT could reject school bus safety as a Priority Program would be to find that such a designation would not reduce injuries and deaths in school buses at all.'' The agencies disagree, and while other commenters sought to have the agencies designate School Bus Safety as a priority program area, they did not suggest that School Bus Safety represents a significant national problem. In fact, the Superintendent of Public Instruction for Washington State said, ``We cannot disagree with [the statistics] you have published [and w]e can not provide any additional statistics that disagree with what you have already stated regarding Pupil Transportation as the safest means of travel in the highway safety system.'' Most commenters fully agreed with the agencies' conclusion that School Bus Safety does not represent a serious problem when compared to safety in other types of vehicles. The Oregon Department of Transportation, for example, stated ``Oregon has had one serious school bus accident in the last seventeen years. And, even though safety of our children is a major concern, I do not believe school busses should be a NHTSA priority. * * * School busses are probably the safest place for students to be. We do not need to concentrate extraordinary effort on school bus safety.'' The North Carolina Department of Transportation commented, ``In North Carolina, as in the rest of the nation, school buses remain the safest mode of transportation. * * * While the safety of our children is still paramount, it will be extremely difficult for any further school bus safety initiatives to be cost effective.'' New Mexico provided data which supported the agencies' conclusion. The State's comments indicated, ``95 percent of school children in serious crashes during school hours were in conventional passenger vehicles--passenger cars, pickups, and vans.'' Only one percent of New Mexico's school children in serious crashes during school hours were in buses. The remaining 4 percent were pedestrians, on motorcycles, on pedalcycles, and others, at one percent each. New Mexico's comments continued, ``It is fair to say that non-use of safety belts in private vehicles is the largest part of New Mexico's schoolchild safety problem. * * * Indeed, the only deaths involving school buses in the past decade have occurred outside the bus, or while entering or leaving.'' Based on the comments received and the information available to the agencies, NHTSA and FHWA continue to find that School Bus Safety does not represent a serious problem that warrants its designation as a National Priority program area. Have Effective School Bus Safety Measures Been Developed? NHTSA and FHWA explained in the NPRM that, although statistics demonstrate that school buses already provide a remarkably safe form of transportation, steps have been taken to further improve School Bus Safety. These steps included providing set-aside funds in 1990 and 1991 to assist States in implementing ``effective'' and ``most effective'' school bus safety measures and publishing a number of rulemaking actions, such as a final rule requiring new school buses to be equipped with a stop signal arm, a final rule revising the minimum requirements for school bus emergency exits and improving access to school bus emergency doors and a final rule requiring that school buses enable drivers to see either directly or through mirrors certain specified areas in front of and along both sides of the vehicle. For a full discussion of these and other actions, interested individuals are encouraged to read the NPRM (59 FR 2341-42). NHTSA has taken a number of additional steps that were not listed in the NPRM to improve School Bus Safety. For example, to improve the lateral stability and control of medium and heavy vehicles (including school buses) during braking, NHTSA issued an NPRM proposing to require that these vehicles be equipped with an antilock brake system (58 F.R. 50738). NHTSA also published a School Bus Safety Report and an annual publication entitled ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993--School Buses.'' In addition, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on a school bus/pedestrian safety educational program, developed recently by NHTSA for children in grades K-6. This program is currently being modified into a product that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates reaching over seven million people in its initial marketing effort. NHTSA has also taken steps to improve communications with the Pupil Transportation community. The Department issued a press release concerning school bus safety in August 1994, just prior to the beginning of the new school year and, on August 18, 1994, NHTSA conducted a National Meeting on Transporting Pre-Kindergarten Children on School Buses. The meeting brought together, for the first time, school bus manufacturers, child safety seat manufacturers, pupil transportation officials, child safety seat trainers, injury control professionals and Federal officials to discuss this emerging transportation issue. NHTSA and FHWA will continue to engage in appropriate activities that improve the safety of school buses. Do State School Bus Safety Measures Appear To Be Among the Most Effective in Reducing Crashes, Injuries, and Fatalities? As stated previously, school buses already provide the safest form of transportation in our country. Since the number of fatalities that are school bus-related is already so small, it is difficult to quantify the benefits of the actions that have been taken. The agencies believe, however, that these actions (described above), are the ones most likely to reduce or eliminate fatal and serious injuries. Other Comments Received About School Bus Safety Fourteen commenters supported the agencies' tentative conclusion not to designate School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area. These commenters included three national highway safety organizations, ten State highway safety/transportation agencies and one State highway patrol. Twelve commenters urged the agencies to reconsider their tentative conclusion. These commenters included one national highway safety organization, one national police organization, three national pupil transportation organizations, five State departments of education, one local PTA council and one private bus operator. Several commenters supported the designation of School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area based on specific safety concerns they face. Three commenters, for example, expressed concern over recent increases in the number of incidents involving misbehavior and violence on school buses, and one commenter expressed concern about crashes involving buses and heavy trucks. While these problems may be of concern in particular communities, the comments did not reveal and our data do not indicate that these are problems of great magnitude throughout the nation. The section 402 program provides States with a mechanism for funding programs that address State or local concerns, by providing justification that includes information on the identified problem and the activities or projects that are planned. Accordingly, these States and communities have the ability, if they so choose and can provide the justification, to develop programs to address the problems identified in their comments. Moreover, the existence of these local problems does not support a decision to designate School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area for the entire nation. A number of commenters supported the agencies' view. The Massachusetts Governor's Highway Safety Bureau, for example, stated, ``School bus safety deserves a place within the 402 program, however each state should identify the need for funding, within the framework of the existing 402 guidelines.'' The Michigan Department of State Police commented, ``[school bus safety] is an important element of any state's highway safety program but should be based upon the identified need in a particular state.'' The Arizona Governor's Office of Highway Safety reported that it was able to support a school bus driver/ instructor training and certification program using section 402 dollars using the current funding procedures. Arizona commented, ``There was no program priority for school bus safety at that time, and we were still able to address the issue by utilizing the current U.S. Department of Transportation 402 program management procedures already in place.'' The comments of the National Association of Governors' Highway Safety Representatives (NAGHSR) were most comprehensive, and represented the views expressed by many of the other commenters. NAGHSR stated: We * * * concur that school bus safety should not be designated a National Program Priority. NAGHSR is very supportive of the need for protecting the safety of school children. However, state crash statistics indicate that the problem is not of sufficient magnitude to warrant a priority designation. Furthermore, we are concerned that the designation of school bus safety will divert scarce 402 resources away from critical highway safety areas such as impaired driving, occupant protection, and speed control. States currently have the flexibility to spend 402 funds on school bus safety if the needs exist and can be documented. This flexibility is sufficient to address whatever school bus safety needs may exist. Many commenters that urged the agencies to designate School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area did so not based on a perceived current safety problem or concern, but rather based on a need for continued funding to maintain their positive safety record. As explained previously, however, this is not a valid criterion for designating a program to be a National Priority area. The agencies are not attempting, as suggested by the National School Transportation Association, to ``[p]enaliz[e] the industry for doing a good job.'' In fact, we applaud the industry for its dedication and continued excellent record of service and safety. Rather, we are simply making our best efforts to ensure that scarce 402 resources are used where they can have the greatest positive effect. Most of the commenters agreed with this approach. The North Carolina Department of Transportation, for example, stated, ``By not including school bus safety as a priority program NHTSA and FHWA will allow limited resources to be utilized where they can be most effective.'' New Mexico commented that it supports the agencies' decision to ``leav[e] school bus safety in its current status as an important area of state efforts to protect children, but without elevating it to a higher status as a national priority program area.'' The agencies understand the concern of many of the commenters who are fearful that funds currently available may be discontinued. The agencies do not intend for the decision not to include School Bus Safety as a National Priority program to create an implication that resources currently devoted to School Bus Safety should be reduced or redirected. A number of commenters noted that many more school children die or are injured as pedestrians or bicyclists than as school bus occupants. The National School Transportation Association stated, ``Outside the bus, in the loading/unloading zone area, has been and is still the problem area.'' According to NHTSA's ``Traffic Safety Facts 1993-- School Buses,'' of the people who lost their lives in school bus- related crashes from 1983 through 1993, 59 percent were occupants of other vehicles involved in the crash, 30 percent were non-occupants (pedestrians, bicyclists, etc.) and only 11 percent were occupants of school buses. Some of these commenters were hopeful that problems related to the loading and unloading of school children can be addressed through the Pedestrian Safety program area, which was designated a National Priority area in 1991. Within this context, some commenters requested additional emphasis and attention from the agencies with regard to pedestrian safety issues, and the Superintendent of Public Instruction in Washington State cautioned that ``the emphasis of [pedestrian safety programs] usually has little to do with school bus stops.'' NHTSA has already taken steps to address this concern, which is shared by the agencies. In September 1992, NHTSA started a research and development effort relating to elementary school-age pedestrians who are school bus riders. Under this effort, which was completed in the spring of 1994, the agency reviewed existing training materials and national crash data relating to school bus pedestrian safety for elementary school-age children; developed a school bus/pedestrian safety educational program for children in grades K-6, which includes teacher's guides, a poster and a video for grades K-3, videos and brochures for parents and bus drivers, and promotional materials; selected a school district to assess the program's effectiveness in reducing crash-related behaviors; implemented and evaluated the program in that district and modified the program, as warranted. A report regarding this effort is expected to be published in the spring of 1995. As stated earlier, the National Safety Council (NSC) has agreed to undertake a comprehensive marketing campaign on the school bus/ pedestrian safety educational program. This program is currently being modified into a product that will be more marketable. NSC anticipates reaching over seven million people in its initial marketing effort. The Center for Auto Safety (CAS) objected to the agencies' decision by arguing that Congress ``mandated'' in ISTEA that School Bus Safety must be a priority program. CAS asserted that, since Congress was aware when it enacted ISTEA that there were lower fatality rates for school buses, ``The only way for DOT to overturn the Congressional mandate in ISTEA that school bus safety shall be a Priority Program is for DOT to find that a Priority Program cannot reduce deaths and injuries in school bus accidents.'' According to CAS, ``DOT cannot substitute its judgment for that of Congress which has determined that saving even a few lives from school bus accidents is as important a priority as saving thousands of lives lost due to excess speeds.'' The agencies strongly disagree with CAS' comments. We have no reason to believe, and CAS cites no basis for its assertions, that Congress mandated that School Bus Safety must be designated a priority program if the program has the potential to save just a single life or that Congress believes that the thousands of lives lost due to excess speeds (many of whom are children) are somehow less important than the few children whose lives are lost in school buses. In fact, the legislative history shows quite the contrary. The House version of ISTEA identified eight required and seven optional highway safety programs. Speeding was identified in the House legislation as a required program; school bus safety was identified as an optional program. (The Senate version of ISTEA had no comparable provision.) The final ISTEA legislation, which was developed in conference, listed just six program areas and eliminated the separate categories. However, it specifically provided the agencies with the option of choosing not to designate one or more of these six programs as National Priorities by reporting to Congress the reasons for not establishing the programs as priority areas. (CAS acknowledged this option in its comments.) Moreover, there is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that School Bus Safety (or any of the highway safety programs, for that matter) should meet criteria other than those normally applied by the agencies when they determine what programs should be designated as National Priority areas. CAS also questioned the agencies' reliance on data from FARS, ``Accident Facts'' and the National Safety Council. CAS argued that the agencies should not rely on these data because they under-report school crashes, deaths and injuries. Another commenter, Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety, also pointed out that school bus crashes, injuries and fatalities may be under-reported, and suggested that the agencies investigate this issue. This commenter, however, fully supported the agencies' preliminary conclusions. The agencies acknowledge that there may be some under-reporting of school bus crashes, deaths and injuries, and we are taking steps to improve these data. Currently, pursuant to section 2002(a) of ISTEA, the Department is in the process of developing minimum reporting criteria for States regarding deaths and injuries resulting from school bus crashes, as well as deaths and injuries involving other circumstances. While it may be possible to improve the data, it is clear from the data currently available (including those contained in comments received in response to the NPRM) that the numbers of school bus crashes, injuries and fatalities are extremely low. School Bus Safety Determination The safety of children in school buses is an important concern, since any crash, particularly one resulting in fatalities or serious injury to children, is so tragic. However, the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities involving school buses is small, particularly when considering exposure and when compared to the number of crashes, injuries and fatalities related to other priority programs. The agencies believe significant attention has been devoted to School Bus Safety and steps have been taken to improve the already excellent safety record of this mode of transportation. Furthermore, the states already have the ability under the Section 402 program to address school bus and other highway safety programs, and are proficient in allocating existing resources as they deem necessary to achieve maximum safety benefits. In addition, the States are able to address the majority of school bus-related fatalities, which occur while children are boarding or exiting, not riding the bus, under the Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety program, which is a designated National Priority area. For these reasons, and based on a review of the comments and other information currently available, the agencies conclude that there is not sufficient justification for designating School Bus Safety as a National Priority program area. Therefore, the agencies have not included School Bus Safety as a National Priority program at this time. The agencies wish to stress that this decision should not be construed to imply that the current resources focused upon School Bus Safety should be reduced or redirected. NHTSA and FHWA believe that all existing efforts in this area should be continued to maintain the impressive safety record associated with school bus transportation. Other Comments One commenter, a local health department in Reno, Nevada, urged the agencies to reinstate Emergency Medical Services (EMS) as a priority program under section 402. As mentioned earlier in this notice, EMS was designated as a priority program on April 1, 1982. It has not been removed from the list of priorities. In fact, every program that has been designated by the agencies as a priority program remains on the list. As explained above, ISTEA required that the Secretary of Transportation either designate six program areas as priority highway safety programs or submit a report to Congress describing the reasons for not establishing these programs as priorities. Four of the programs that NHTSA and FHWA had previously designated as priority areas (Traffic Records, Emergency Medical Services, Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety and Roadway Safety) were not listed in ISTEA. ISTEA continued to provide the agencies with authority, however, to include additional programs or maintain existing programs on the list of priority areas. Accordingly, these four programs continue to be included on the list of National Priority program areas. The National Sheriffs' Association recommended that the following be considered priority programs: (1) Speed Control; (2) Occupant Protection/Child Safety Protection; (3) DWI/DUI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Programs for law enforcement officers/ deputies; (4) Conspicuity Markings at Railway/Railroad/Mass Transit Crossings and (5) Drug Evaluation, Classification, Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), and the Drug Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for law enforcement officers/deputies. As explained above, this final rule designates Speed Control as a National Priority program area. Occupant Protection has been a National Priority area since 1982. It includes activities designed to protect occupants who are children. Alcohol and Other Drug Countermeasures has also been a National Priority since 1982. States and communities may conduct DWI/DUI Detection, Standardized Field Sobriety, Drug Evaluation and Classification (DEC), Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), and Drug Recognition Technician (DRT) Programs for law enforcement officers/ deputies under this program area. The agencies do not see a need to emphasize these programs as separate priorities. Finally, States and communities can conduct certain activities to improve the conspicuity of markings at railway, railroad and mass transit crossings under Roadway Safety, a FHWA National Priority program. In addition, there are other sources of Federal assistance available from FHWA to improve safety in this area. FHWA does not believe there is reason to designate these activities as a separate priority program. Economic and Other Effects The agencies have considered the impacts associated with this action, and determined that it is not significant within the meaning of Executive Order 12866 and the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The rulemaking does not affect the level of funding available in the highway safety program or otherwise have a significant economic impact. Accordingly, this rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O. 12866. Small Entity Impact In compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the agencies have evaluated the effects of this action on small entities. Based on the evaluation, we certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. States are the recipients of any funds awarded under the section 402 program. Accordingly, the preparation of a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is unnecessary. Environmental Impacts The agencies have also analyzed this action for the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act. The agencies have determined that this action will not have any effect on the human environment. Federalism Assessment This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612 and it has been determined that it has no federalism implication that warrants the preparation of a federalism assessment. Paperwork Reduction Act The requirement relating to this regulation, that each State must submit a highway safety plan to receive section 402 grant funds, is considered to be an information collection requirement, as that term is defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 5 CFR part 1320. Accordingly, these requirements have been submitted to and approved by OMB, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Sec. 3501 et seq.). These requirements have been approved through 11/ 30/95; OMB No. 2127-0501. This final rule establishes no new information collection requirement, as that term is defined by the OMB in 5 CFR part 1320. List of Subjects in 23 CFR Part 1205 Grant programs, Highway safety. In consideration of the foregoing, the agencies amend 23 CFR Part 1205 as follows: PART 1205--[AMENDED] 1. The authority citation for Part 1205 continues to read as follows: Authority: 23 U.S.C. 402; delegations of authority at 49 CFR 1.48 and 1.50. 2. In Sec. 1205.3, paragraph (c) is revised to read as follows: Sec. 1205.3 Identification of National Priority Program Areas. * * * * * (c) Under statutory provisions jointly administered by NHTSA and FHWA, the following highway safety program areas, jointly administered by NHTSA and FHWA, have been identified as encompassing a major highway safety problem which is of national concern, and for which effective countermeasures have been identified. Programs developed in such areas are eligible for Federal funding, pursuant to guidelines issued by NHTSA and FHWA and the review procedures set forth in Sec. 1205.4: (1) Pedestrian and Bicycle Safety (2) Speed Control Issued on: December 7, 1994. Rodney E. Slater, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration. Ricardo Martinez, Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. [FR Doc. 94-30514 Filed 12-12-94; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910-59-P