Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Air Brake Systems; Air Applied, Mechanically Held Brake Systems |
---|
Topics: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
|
Howard M. Smolkin
Federal Register
February 14, 1994
[Federal Register: February 14, 1994] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 49 CFR Part 571 [Docket No. 93-17; Notice 2] RIN 2127-AE77 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Air Brake Systems; Air Applied, Mechanically Held Brake Systems AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: This rule amends Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, with respect to the requirements related to the application and holding of parking brake systems and the requirements related to the supply line pressure retention for trailer brakes. NHTSA initiated rulemaking to respond to concerns raised by International Transquip Industries (ITI) which manufactures air-applied, mechanically held parking brakes. These amendments provide regulatory relief by removing unnecessary restrictions to facilitate the use of alternative brake systems, without adversely affecting safety. DATES: Effective Date: The amendments in this notice become effective March 16, 1994. Petitions for Reconsideration: Any petitions for reconsideration of this rule must be received by NHTSA no later than March 16, 1994. ADDRESSES: Petitions for reconsideration of this rule should refer to Docket 93-17; Notice 2 and should be submitted to: Administrator, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Richard Carter, Office of Vehicle Safety Standards, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590 (202-366-5274). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: I. Introduction II. Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking And Comments On The Proposal III. Agency Decision A. Grade Holding Requirements 1. Background Considerations 2. Diaphragm Failure Modes 3. Test Procedure B. Supply Line Pressure Requirements for Trailers IV. Leadtime V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 1. Executive Order 12688 (Federal Regulation) and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 2. Regulatory Flexibility Act 3. Executive Order 12612 (Federalism) 4. National Environmental Policy Act 5. Civil Justice Reform I. Introduction Manufacturers typically comply with the parking brake requirements in Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 121, Air Brake Systems, by equipping their air-braked vehicles with spring brake systems. With these brake systems, air pressure holds the spring in the released position when a vehicle is being driven. Upon parking, the air pressure is vented, allowing the springs to apply the parking brakes. Consistent with NHTSA's policy to issue Federal safety standards that are not unnecessarily design restrictive, the agency has conducted a number of rulemakings to ensure that the standard does not unnecessarily prevent the manufacture of parking brake systems other than conventional spring brake systems (e.g., air-applied, mechanically held parking brake systems). See 44 FR 46850, August 9, 1979; 51 FR 10641, March 28, 1986; 56 FR 26927, June 12, 1991. In 1992, International Transquip Industries, Inc. (ITI), a manufacturer of an air-applied, mechanically held parking brake system, informed NHTSA that it believed two of Standard No. 121's current requirements are unnecessarily design restrictive or otherwise inappropriate for its brake system design. One of these requirements specifies that a vehicle must meet parking brake grade holding requirements on a 20 percent grade (or other equivalent requirements), with ``any single leakage-type failure'' of certain parts, including a failed diaphragm. See S5.6 of Standard No. 121. ITI argued that this requirement is unnecessarily restrictive with respect to its air- applied, mechanically held single diaphragm brake system. That company argued that its brake system is designed so that the diaphragm will never experience a major failure, and that vehicles equipped with its brake system can be parked on a 20 percent grade in the presence of the types of diaphragm failures that typically occur. The other requirement that ITI believed is inappropriate for its brake design is the supply line pressure requirement for trailers. See S5.8.2. This requirement addresses brake drag. According to ITI, it is inappropriate for its brake system, which is designed so that its brakes are either fully applied or fully released. II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Comments on the Proposal After considering ITI's arguments, NHTSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that proposed certain changes to Standard No. 121. (58 FR 13437, March 11, 1993). Specifically, the agency proposed to amend the requirements related to the application and holding of parking brake systems and the requirements related to the supply line pressure retention for trailer brakes. In that notice, the agency tentatively concluded that these amendments would remove unnecessary restrictions, thus facilitating the use of air-applied, mechanically held parking brake systems. The agency further explained that the Standard should not unnecessarily prevent parking brake systems that are different than conventional spring brake systems. The agency believed that this proposal would provide regulatory relief by removing a restriction affecting the use of non-spring brake systems, while continuing to ensure appropriate grade holding performance of air braked heavy vehicles. NHTSA received twelve comments on the proposal. Among the commenters were ITI, which commented twice; the Motor Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA), a trade association that represents heavy duty brake manufacturers; spring brake manufacturers and spring brake rebuilders, including Midland-Grau, MGM Brakes, Neway Anchorlok, Allied Signal, TSE Brakes, and Ferodo America; heavy vehicle manufacturers including GM/Volvo White and Freightliner; and the American Trucking Associations (ATA). There was no consensus among the commenters about whether the proposal should be adopted. While ITI favored the proposal which it believed would eliminate an unnecessary design restriction, the manufacturers of spring brake systems opposed it. The spring brake manufacturers would experience increased competition from the additional use of air-applied, mechanically held systems, which, according to ITI currently represent 2 percent of the air brake chamber market. The ITI system would provide weight savings but would cost an additional $28 more per axle than spring brake chambers. The spring brake manufacturers argued that the proposal poses significant safety problems since they believe that brake diaphragms can and do experience rapid catastrophic failures. The commenters also addressed specific issues about the proposed test procedure for air- applied, mechanically held parking brake systems and the need to retain the supply line pressure requirement for vehicles equipped with these systems. The agency has analyzed the comments and responds to the significant ones below. III. Agency Decision A. Grade Holding Requirements 1. Background Considerations Standard No. 121 currently requires an air-braked vehicle to have a parking brake system that enables it to meet certain grade holding requirements. Manufacturers have the option of complying with either a 20 percent grade holding test or an equivalent static drawbar pull test. The purpose of the parking brake requirement is to ensure that an air-braked vehicle has adequate parking brake performance on a grade. The standard provides that the parking brake grade holding requirements must be met with ``any'' single leakage-type failure of certain parts, including service brake diaphragms. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that a driver can safely park a vehicle in the event of a leakage-type failure in the service brake system. The standard specifies ``any'' failure because leakage-type failures of many types, sizes, and locations can occur in vehicle brake systems. To ensure that a vehicle has adequate grade holding performance regardless of the specific nature or extent of a leakage-type failure, the agency intentionally did not limit the size or location of such failures. In the NPRM, NHTSA explained that most brake systems are designed with two diaphragms, one for the service brake function and one for the parking brake function. Further, most brake systems incorporate a spring brake for parking. These brake systems can easily meet the parking brake holding requirements with a failure in the service brake diaphragm, because a failure in that diaphragm does not adversely affect parking brake performance. In contrast, the ITI air-applied, mechanically held brake system has only one diaphragm that provides both the parking brake and service brake functions. A hole in that diaphragm can therefore affect both parking brake and service brake performance. According to ITI, it is inappropriate to require vehicles to meet grade holding requirements with ``any'' failure in the common diaphragm of its brake system, because its system is designed so that a hole in the diaphragm with not get any larger than \1/8\ inch during real-world use. ITI further stated that a vehicle equipped with its brake system will hold on a 20 percent grade and can never be driven with a failure larger than \1/8\ inch. This is because, according to ITI, diaphragm failures begin as very small holes, develop very slowly, and its brakes will not release once the hole gets larger than \1/8\ inch. Thus, once a hole gets that large and the driver parks the vehicle at the end of the day, it will not be possible to drive the vehicle without repairing the brakes. As explained in the NPRM, NHTSA evaluated the issues raised by ITI through tests of the air-applied, mechanically held system conducted at the agency's Vehicle Research and Test Center (VRTC). (See, Evaluation of Mini-Max Parking Forces with Chamber Diaphragm Failures, December 17, 1992, which has been placed in Docket No. 93-17, Notice 1.) That testing confirmed that vehicles equipped with the ITI system could not be unparked in the presence of a relatively small failure. In the NPRM, NHTSA sought comment on two primary issues related to air-applied, mechanically held brake systems: (1) Whether the current requirement is appropriate for an air-applied, mechanically held brake system like ITI's system and (2) whether it is possible to develop a test procedure that will identify the ``worst case'' diaphragm failure that might be experienced in the real world. 2. Diaphragm Failure Modes In the NPRM, NHTSA discussed whether air-applied, mechanically held brake systems only experience small, gradual failures or whether they can experience catastrophic failures.\1\ If diaphragms do in fact experience catastrophic failures, then the proposed requirement would not ensure the safety of air-braked vehicles. However, based on information provided by ITI and the agency's analysis of that information, NHTSA assumed, for purposes of this rulemaking, that diaphragm failures begin small and develop very slowly. Accordingly, the proposed test procedure was designed to evaluate the small, gradual leakage-type failures that, according to ITI, occur with its system. Notwithstanding NHTSA's decision to propose requirements that would be appropriate only if diaphragms only experience small, gradual leakage- type failures, the agency sought comment about whether catastrophic diaphragm failures occur in the real world. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\By ``catastrophic failure,'' the agency means one in which a service brake application is made and the diaphragm fails, for any reason, to an extent that the brake chamber will not generate sufficient torque to add significantly to the vehicle's braking. Types of catastrophic failures include puncturing the diaphragm with a broken spring, pulling the diaphragm loose from the air brake chamber clamp ring, or blowing a large hole in the diaphragm. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The commenters expressed conflicting views about the nature of diaphragm failures. On the one hand, ITI reiterated its view that diaphragm failures begin small and develop very slowly because the diaphragms use a rip stop nylon fabric. This led ITI to conclude that long before a hole becomes large enough to affect parking capabilities, it is no longer possible to release the parking brakes. ITI accordingly requested that diaphragms be excluded from failure testing. On the other hand, the spring brake manufacturers (Midland-Grau, MGM Brakes, Neway Anchorlok, Allied Signal, MEMA, and Ferodo) stated that diaphragms can and do experience rapid massive failure in addition to the gradual failure discussed by ITI. The spring brake manufacturers alleged that there were several catastrophic failure modes, including: (1) The piston plate wearing a hole through the diaphragm, (2) air permeating between the rubber or neoprene compound causing it to balloon out and then blow, (3) the effects of exposing the diaphragm to oil which causes the compound to delaminate from the fabric, (4) broken springs or piston plates cutting into the diaphragm, (5) and manufacturing defects in the nylon fabric. Neway Anchorlok believed that because these catastrophic failure modes can occur between parking brake applications, they may significantly and suddenly impair the service brake's capabilities. The potential for catastrophic failures led the spring brake manufacturers to recommend that the agency retain the ``any leakage'' requirements. After reviewing the conflicting comments, NHTSA decided to examine further the failure modes experienced by diaphragms. To this end, the agency visually inspected failed diaphragms submitted by Bendix, Ferodo, and MGM. In addition, the agency contacted diaphragm manufacturers. In its examination of diaphragms submitted by various manufacturers, NHTSA found no evidence of catastrophic failure; rather, the agency found that failures typically involved slow deterioration through extended use. The only time the agency found a catastrophic failure was when there was a rapid air loss resulting from a spring puncture or a pull-out from the clamp band area. Spring puncture failures are not relevant to the present rulemaking about air-applied, mechanically held systems which do not have springs. With respect to possible pull-out, ITI has stated that if, in servicing its units, the diaphragm is installed improperly, the brakes cannot be released upon air-up of the system. The agency has placed the findings of its inspection of failed diaphragms in the docket. In response to agency inquiries, Longwood Elastomers and Goodyear, two large diaphragm manufacturers, stated that diaphragms do not fail catastrophically. While they acknowledge that some failure modes mentioned by the spring brake manufacturers do occur (e.g., spring puncture, plate chaff, unseating, flex cracking in the bead area, accelerated degradation caused by exposure to oil), they contended that such failures either happen so infrequently that they do not raise safety concerns or would not happen with an air-applied, mechanically held brake system (e.g., a single diaphragm brake system has no heavy spring brake that can pierce the diaphragm after failing from fatigue). With respect to failure rates, one diaphragm manufacturer informed the agency that it had returns of about 20 units from an annual production of between 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 units. This failure rate translates to a reliability of about 99.999 percent. These reliability figures are for the useful lifecycle before wearout begins. All diaphragms would eventually wear out. Therefore, diaphragms in air-applied, mechanically held systems and in the service side of spring brake systems are typically replaced after between four and five years of service. The diaphragm manufacturers further stated that they have never encountered a catastrophic failure during cycle testing of their production runs. Based on NHTSA's review of the failed diaphragms, contacts with diaphragm manufacturers and other available information, the agency has concluded that diaphragms used with air-applied, mechanically held parking brake systems do not fail catastrophically. Rather, the typical failure mode with these systems is a gradual deterioration through extended use. The agency further notes that GM/Volvo White and Freightliner, which use ITI air brake chambers as original equipment on their vehicles when ordered by a customer, have not experienced any catastrophic failures with these systems. Accordingly, the agency concludes that the current requirement to require vehicles to meet the parking brake requirements with ``any'' single leakage type failure is unnecessarily design-restrictive with respect to air-applied, mechanically held air brake systems. ITI requested that NHTSA exclude diaphragms entirely from failure testing with respect to the parking brake requirements. However, NHTSA has decided that an exclusion would be inappropriate. A diaphragm is an integral part of the parking brake system, and the failure of a diaphragm can have adverse safety consequences. Therefore, excluding diaphragms from such testing would be inconsistent with the safety purposes of the standard. Such an exclusion would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the parking brake requirements which serve to ensure that a driver can safely park a vehicle in the event of a leakage-type failure in the service brake system. Because diaphragms do fail, as ITI readily admits, it would be inconsistent with the parking brake requirements to exclude such an important component in the brake system from the relevant test requirements. 3. Test Procedure In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed a test procedure that it tentatively concluded would identify the ``worst case'' leakage-type diaphragm failure that is likely to occur with brake systems using common diaphragms. Under the proposed procedure, the first step would be to determine the threshold level of diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) at which the vehicle's parking brakes become unreleasable. A measurement would then be taken of the leakage rate associated with that level of failure. The proposal explained that the ``threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate'' is the rate of reservoir air pressure decrease, for whichever of the vehicle's reservoirs that is experiencing the most rapid decrease in pressure level, that results from that threshold level of leakage. The agency proposed that a vehicle would be required to meet grade holding requirements with a level of diaphragm leakage-type failure that results in a reservoir leakage rate that is three times the threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate. This ``three times'' safety factor was included to account for the possibility that a small diaphragm failure could grow larger between parking brake applications. Midland-Grau, ITI, and Allied Signal believed that the proposed test procedure was unnecessarily complex. Midland-Grau stated that the procedures were difficult to follow and could be interpreted in many ways. Midland-Grau requested that NHTSA modify the test procedure so that it could be easily followed. Moreover, it stated its preference for testing parameters that are concise, and lead to consistent test results that allow easy assessment of whether the system passes or fails. ITI requested that the agency simplify the test to make it less complicated. Allied Signal criticized the proposal for being overly complex, claiming that multiple attempts would be necessary to establish the size of diaphragm failure for both release and application. After reviewing the proposal in light of the comments, NHTSA believes that the proposed test procedure, with minor adjustments, is appropriate to evaluate brake systems that incorporate a common diaphragm. The agency further believes that the test procedure is not unreasonably complicated. In particular, the agency's experience at VRTC in running the tests indicates that the tests are not overly burdensome and that with a valving meter in place, various pressure levels of leakage can be obtained relatively quickly and without much difficulty. The agency notes that to simplify testing, it could have specified a fixed orifice size to be used for all systems. However, such an approach would have prevented certain parking brake systems and thus have been unnecessarily design restrictive, since the size of leak at which sufficient force is generated to park the vehicle varies for different systems. In contrast, the variable leak rate procedure that the agency is adopting in this final rule may be used to evaluate any brake system regardless of its design. In response to specific comments and further analysis of the regulatory text, NHTSA has made some minor changes to the proposed test procedures applicable to air-applied, mechanically held brake systems. For instance, in response to criticisms by Midland-Grau of terminology that it believed was ambiguous, NHTSA has deleted reference to ``certain level'' of failure as proposed in S5.6(b). In addition, as explained below, the agency has modified the terminology related to the concept of parking brake ``release.'' Nevertheless, NHTSA has decided to retain the following terms that Midland-Grau criticized: ``Increasing or decreasing,'' ``threshold level of diaphragm leakage,'' ``threshold maximum reservoir leakage associated with that level of failure,'' and ``threshold of allowable leakage.'' With respect to finding the leakage rate at which the parking brake system becomes unreleasable, the agency believes it is necessary for the test evaluator to find the appropriate threshold level with ``progressively increasing or decreasing levels'' of failure because each brake configuration is different. While this procedure will require some searching for the leakage rate at which the system becomes unreleasable, the agency believes the appropriate level of failure can be ascertained without too much difficulty by using metering valves. NHTSA notes that in VRTC's testing to develop this rule's requirements and procedures, the agency installed an adjustable metering valve in the brake chamber housing to simulate a leak in the brake chamber diaphragm. The ``threshold level of common diaphragm leakage type failure'' at which the parking brakes become unreleasable was determined by increasing the leakage rate, by ``opening'' the metering valve, from one test to the next in relatively large increments until the parking brakes would not release. Then, the metering valve was ``closed,'' to decrease the leakage rate, in smaller increments until the parking brakes would release. The leakage rate was then increased by even smaller increments until the parking brakes were again unreleasable. The precision with which the final determination of the ``threshold level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure'' at which the parking brakes become unreleasable is determined by the number of times the direction of leakage rate change, e.g., from increasing to decreasing and vice versa, and the magnitude of the increments by which the leakage rate is increased or decreased. With respect to various references to the concept of the ``threshold,'' the agency has modified these provisions slightly to use just two terms: ``Threshold level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure'' in S5.6.7.1.1 and S5.6.7.2.1 and the ``threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate'' in S5.6.7.1.2 and S5.6.7.2.2. NHTSA, nevertheless, disagrees with Midland-Grau's more general concern that the term ``threshold'' is ambiguous. The agency notes that the dictionary defines ``threshold'' to mean ``a level, point, or value above which something is true or will take place and below which it is not or will not.''\2\ Applying this definition to the parking brake test for systems with common diaphragms, the agency believes that ``threshold level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure'' is an objective term that means the initial level at which the parking brake can no longer be released. Similarly, the meaning of the phrase ``threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate'' was discussed in the NPRM and means the rate of reservoir air pressure decrease that results at that threshold level of leakage. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \2\Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, 1986. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With respect to the concept of ``release,'' NHTSA has decided to clarify the term so that it covers brake applications that involve a vehicle being parked on a grade or a drawbar pull test. NHTSA notes that in addressing a similar issue in an earlier rulemaking about what was meant by ``release,'' the agency stated that ``NHTSA considers a brake to be released at the point where it no longer exerts any torque.'' (37 FR 12495, June 24, 1972). The agency believes that this discussion of release is pertinent to the procedure set forth in S5.6(b). Accordingly, in the final rule, the agency has specified that the relevant consideration is when the parking brakes ``become unreleasable.'' Since the final rule specifies the criteria in terms of ``becom(ing) unreleasable,'' Midland-Grau's concerns about when the released condition exists or about the status of a partial release are no longer relevant. Midland-Grau requested that the agency provide an acceptable leakage value for each brake component. It further stated that statements about ``compressor shut-off points'' and ``air flow'' should be pinned down to definitive values. NHTSA disagrees with Midland-Grau's request to provide a specific level of leakage for each brake component. The agency's goal in this rulemaking is to establish a performance test for the entire brake system, because the agency's concern is to test for and prohibit system-wide failures that may pose safety problems. The agency therefore is not concerned with the leakage level of any particular component. Nor does the agency believe it is necessary or appropriate to specify definitive values for the compressor shut-off points. Such an action might be unnecessarily design restrictive and serve to prohibit some manufacturers from selecting a higher cut off value than would be appropriate for its system. Allied and Midland-Grau expressed concern that the rate of reservoir pressure drop is influenced by valving, plumbing, and air supply capability. NHTSA acknowledges that these variables exist; however, the agency believes that they are not large enough to adversely affect the test results. Specifically, as long as testing is done at three times the leak rate, the actual numerical value of the leak rate is not overly important, because the value for the safety factor is measured in the same way, which results in factoring out most of the variability. The agency further notes that these variables are part of the manufacturing process and thus, if necessary, they can be controlled by the brake system manufacturer. Moreover, alternative methods of testing would have necessitated using expensive flow meters that would not significantly reduce the level of variability or otherwise improve the test results. NHTSA notes that while the rate of air flow through the system may be affected by slight variations in air hose lengths from vehicle to vehicle, internal size variations in the castings used in the hose fittings, and differences in valve tolerances; the leak rates at issue are not sufficiently large to be significantly affected by this type of variability from vehicle to vehicle. Internal drag on air flow does not become a factor until the flow rates become substantially higher than those being measured here. In the NPRM, NHTSA proposed that a vehicle would be required to meet grade holding requirements with the level of diaphragm leakage failure of three times the threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate. The agency reasoned that a safety factor was necessary to address the situation when a small diaphragm failure grows larger between parking brake applications, prior to the time the vehicle is parked (at which point the parking brakes would be unreleasable. Midland-Grau, ITI, and Allied objected to including a safety factor ``three times the threshold maximum reservoir leakage.'' Midland-Grau stated that the rationale for this test is not easily visualized and is questionable as to why it was selected as a test parameter. ITI stated that the safety factor should be eliminated to avoid additional time and cost in compliance testing. Allied stated that it was not aware of any information or data that the agency used to establish the three times reservoir pressure drop rate as being a ``worst case'' type of failure for a brake chamber diaphragm. After reviewing the comments, NHTSA continues to believe that it is necessary to include a safety factor in the application and holding requirements for air-applied, mechanically held parking brake systems. The agency notes that including the provision for grade holding at ``three times the failure rate'' is essential to ensure the brake system's safety since the hole associated with a diaphragm failure grows larger during the day. In addition, including a safety factor serves to prevent marginal systems from being manufactured. The agency selected a safety factor of three based on general engineering principles and the agency's testing at VRTC. In general, a safety factor needs to be as large as possible to ensure safety, while not be too large to make it unreasonable, impracticable, and unaffordable. In agency tests at VRTC, NHTSA determined that the ITI system would still produce sufficient parking force with a diaphragm leak over ten times larger than the system would detect and still not release the parking brakes. Based on its understanding of diaphragm failures associated with air-applied, mechanically held braking systems, NHTSA determined that a safety factor of three was the most appropriate level of safety for inclusion in a FMVSS. The agency believes that this level of safety will not require manufacturers to ``over-design'' their parking brake systems, but will ensure appropriate brake system performance. NHTSA disagrees with ITI's comment that inclusion of a safety factor would add needless complexity to the requirement. Agency testing at VRTC indicates that inclusion of a safety factor will not significantly add to the time and cost of compliance testing. Essentially, as a result of the safety factor, a test evaluator needs to establish the threshold value for the maximum reservoir leakage rate and then triple it. Based on its experience at VRTC, the agency believes that this will add only five to ten minutes to the compliance testing (at only nominal additional cost.) B. Supply Line Pressure Requirements for Trailers Section S5.8.2 of Standard No. 121 currently requires that any single leakage type failure in the service brake system must not result in the pressure in the supply line falling below 70 p.s.i., measured at the forward trailer supply coupling. (See 56 FR 50666, October 8, 1991). The purpose of this provision is to prevent brake drag caused by the automatic application of trailer parking brakes while the minimum trailer supply line pressure is maintained. In a June 5, 1992 letter to the agency, ITI requested that the agency ``exempt'' its brake system from S5.8.2. It argued that this provision relates to problems caused by brake drag, a situation that it contends is not applicable to ITI's brake system, which, by design, can only be in the fully applied or fully released positions. After considering ITI's arguments, NHTSA, in the NPRM, tentatively concluded that no safety purpose would be served to apply this provision to non-towing trailers using air-applied, mechanically held parking brakes that use a common diaphragm. The agency noted that these vehicles do not use spring brakes and thus the requirement which addresses the safety problem of brake drag is not relevant to them. Accordingly, the agency proposed to amend section S5.8.2 to clarify that this provision would not apply to non-towing trailers equipped with air-applied, mechanically held parking brakes that use a common diaphragm. Nevertheless, NHTSA emphasized that section S5.8.2 would continue to apply to towing trailers, since the 70 psi requirements may be necessary for other vehicles in the train. Midland-Grau, ITI, ATA, and Allied Signal addressed the issue of whether the 70 psi supply line pressure requirement should be retained for trailers, particularly towing trailers, equipped with air-applied, mechanically held parking brakes. Midland-Grau stated that making the 70 psi requirement optional for towing trailers with air-applied mechanically hold brake systems introduces a detriment to the couple vehicles in the event of system failure. This led Midland-Grau to conclude that it is necessary to apply failure. This led Midland-Grau to conclude that it is necessary to apply the supply line pressure requirements to trailers since a towing trailer will experience brake degradation if it is not properly protected from towed trailer system failures. In contrast, ITI stated that this requirement should not be applied to either towing or non-towing vehicles equipped with air-applied, mechanically held vehicles since they do not experience brake drag. This led ITI to state that S5.8.4 was not necessary, because it claimed that partial application or brake drag is not an issue with its brake systems. Thus, it requested that towing trailers with air-applied, mechanically held systems be permitted without the 70 psi supply line protection feature, even though it acknowledge that this may result in some mismatches. In response to Midland-Grau's comment, ITI stated that trailers equipped with spring brakes manufactured before and after the October 1992 rule that specified these requirements (56 FR 50666, October 8, 1991) will experience compatibility problems. Therefore, ITI believed that the problem raised by Midland-Grau will exist with spring brake equipped trailers as well as trailers equipped with air-applied, mechanically held equipped trailers. ATA commented that the existing 70 psi supply line requirement is inappropriate and prevents tractor low air pressure warning systems from warning drivers of the loss of service pressure in trailers. Therefore, it requested that the agency either exempt all trailers from the 70 psi supply line requirement or modify the requirement. Allied Signal similarly stated that the 70 psi requirement has undermined the effectiveness of the low pressure warning system, especially for doubles and triples. After reviewing the comments, NHTSA has decided not to apply the supply lone pressure requirements to single trailers equipped with air- applied, mechanically held brake systems. Such trailers, which do not experience brake drag, also do not affect the braking of any other vehicle because they are not connected to other trailers. Therefore, as discussed in the NPRM, this requirement would not benefit this type of trailer. Nevertheless, the agency has decided that the supply line pressure requirements are relevant to air-applied, mechanically held brake systems on towing trailers used in double and triple trailer combinations.\3\ The agency is not convinced by ITI's argument that trailers equipped with their system should not have to comply with the 70 psi requirement because there are older spring brake-equipped trailers that will pose similar compatibility problems. The agency believes that there would be a safety problem if it were to apply the supply line pressure requirements to certain vehicles in double or triple combinations but not others. Specifically, if ITI's request were adopted, a trailer being towed by a trailer equipped with air-applied, mechanically held brakes would not necessarily receive adequate air pressure and therefore could experience brake drag. The agency's decision to apply these requirements to towing trailers is consistent with recent legislation and the efforts of the agency, manufacturers, and end-users to standardize operating conditions to improve compatibility. Specifically, section 4012 of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) directs the agency to initiate rulemaking to improve compatibility of truck tractors, trailers, and their dollies. The agency further notes that a specialized trailer protection valve could be developed for ITI's system that would permit compliance with the requirements of S5.8.2 and S5.8.3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\A towing trailer is one that is equipped with a pintle hook and air line connections at the rear to tow another air braked trailer. In doubles and triples operations, nearly all trailers are so equipped, regardless of the position they may occupy in any particular trailer train. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- With respect to concerns expressed by ATA and Allied about the 70 psi supply line pressure requirement, NHTSA notes that it is reviewing this provision in the context of a rulemaking petition submitted by the California Highway Patrol. The agency anticipates issuing another notice addressing the supply line pressure requirements in 1994. IV. Leadtime Section 103(c) of the Vehicle Safety Act requires that each order shall take effect no sooner than 180 days from the date the order is issued unless ``good cause'' is shown that an earlier effective date is in the public interest. NHTSA has determined that there would be ``good cause'' not to provide the 180 day lead-in period given that this amendment will not impose any mandatory requirements on manufacturers. The public interest will also be served by not delaying the introduction of the requirement. Based on the above, the agency has determined that there is good cause to have an effective date 30 days after publication in the final rule. V. Rulemaking Analyses and Notices 1. Executive Order 12688 (Federal Regulation) and DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures NHTSA has analyzed this rulemaking and determined that it is neither ``significant'' within the meaning of the Department of Transportation's regulatory policies and procedures nor ``significant'' within the meaning of Executive Order 12688. This rulemaking document was not reviewed under E.O. 12688, ``Regulatory Planning, and Review.'' A full regulatory evaluation is not required because the rule will have no mandatory effects. Rather, the rule will provide regulatory relief to facilitate the introduction of alternative brake systems. Therefore, the agency does not believe that this rulemaking will result in significant additional costs or cost savings. 2. Regulatory Flexibility Act In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, NHTSA has evaluated the effects of this action on small entities. Based upon this evaluation, I certify that the amendments will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Vehicle and brake manufacturers typically will not qualify as small entities. This amendment will also affect small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental units to the extent that these entities purchase air-braked vehicles. As discussed above, the agency's assessment is that this amendment will have no significant cost impact to the industry. For these reasons, vehicle manufacturers, small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental units which purchase motor vehicles will not be significantly affected by the requirements. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibility analysis has been prepared. 3. Executive Order 12612 (Federalism) This action has been analyzed in accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 12612, and it has been determined that the rule will not have sufficient Federalism implications to warrant preparation of a Federalism Assessment. No State laws will be affected. 4. National Environmental Policy Act The agency has considered the environmental implications of this rule in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and determined that the rule will not significantly affect the human environment. 5. Civil Justice Reform This rule will not have any retroactive effect. Under section 103(d) of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (15 U.S.C. 1392(d)), whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, a state may not adopt or maintain a safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance which is not identical to the Federal standard. Section 105 of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1394) sets forth a procedure for judicial review of final rules establishing, amending or revoking Federal motor vehicle safety standards. That section does not require submission of a petition for reconsideration or other administrative proceedings before parties may file suit in court. List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 571 Imports, Incorporation by reference, Motor vehicle safety, Motor vehicles, Rubber and rubber products, Tires. In consideration of the foregoing, title 49 part 571 is amended as follows: PART 571--FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS 1. The authority citation for part 571 continues to read as follows: Authority: 15 U.S.C. 1392, 1401, 1403, 1407; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.50. 2. Section 571.121 is amended by revising S4 to add a new definition; revising S5.6; removing S5.6.3.5; adding a new S5.6.7 through S5.6.7.2.3; revising S5.8.2; and adding a new S5.8.4. The revised and added paragraphs read as follows: Sec. 571.121 Standard No. 121; Air brake systems. * * * * * S4 Definitions. * * * * * Common diaphragm means a single brake chamber diaphragm which is a component of the parking, emergency, and service brake systems. * * * * * S5.6 Parking brake system. (a) Except as provided in S5.6(b) and S5.6(c), each vehicle other than a trailer converter dolly shall have a parking brake system that under the conditions of S6.1 meets the requirements of: (1) S5.6.1 or S5.6.2, at the manufacturer's option, and (2) S5.6.3, S5.6.4, S5.6.5, and S5.6.6. (b) At the option of the manufacturer, for vehicles equipped with brake systems which incorporate a common diaphragm, the performance requirements specified in S5.6(a) which must be met with any single leakage-type failure in a common diaphragm may instead be met with the level of leakage-type failure determined in S5.6.7. The election of this option does not affect the performance requirements specified in S5.6(a) which apply with single leakage-type failures other than failures in a common diaphragm. (c) At the option of the manufacturer, the trailer portion of any agricultural commodity trailer, heavy hauler trailer, or pulpwood trailer may meet the requirements of Sec. 393.43 of this title instead of the requirements of S5.6(a). * * * * * S5.6.7 Maximum level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure/ Equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm. In the case of vehicles for which the option in S5.6(b) has been elected, determine the maximum level of common diaphragm leakage- type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) according to the procedures set forth in S5.6.7.1 through S5.6.7.2.3. S5.6.7.1 Trucks and buses. S5.6.7.1.1 According to the following procedure, determine the threshold level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) at which the vehicle's parking brakes become unreleasable. With an initial reservoir system pressure of 100 psi, the engine turned off, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes, and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the supply line coupling, introduce a leakage-type failure of the common diaphragm (or equivalent leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm). Apply the parking brakes by making an application actuation of the parking brake control. Reduce the pressures in all of the vehicle's reservoirs to zero, turn on the engine and allow it to idle, and allow the pressures in the vehicle's reservoirs to rise until they stabilize or until the compressor shut-off point is reached. At that time, make a release actuation of the parking brake control, and determine whether all of the mechanical means referred to in S5.6.3.2 continue to be actuated and hold the parking brake applications with sufficient parking retardation force to meet the minimum performance specified in either S5.6.1 or S5.6.2. Repeat this procedure with progressively decreasing or increasing levels (whichever is applicable) of leakage-type diaphragm failures or equivalent leakages, to determine the minimum level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) at which all of the mechanical means referred to in S5.6.3.2 continue to be actuated and hold the parking brake applications with sufficient parking retardation forces to meet the minimum performance specified in either S5.6.1 or S5.6.2. S5.6.7.1.2 At the level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) determined in S5.6.7.1.1, and using the following procedure, determine the threshold maximum reservoir rate (in psi per minute). With an initial reservoir system pressure of 100 psi, the engine turned off, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the supply line coupling, make an application actuation of the parking brake control. Determine the maximum reservoir leakage leakage rate (in psi per minute), which is the maximum rate of decrease in air pressure of any of the vehicle's reservoirs that results after that parking brake application. S5.6.7.1.3 Using the following procedure, introduce a leakage-type failure of the common diaphragm (or equivalent leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) that results in a maximum reservoir leakage rate that is three times the threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate determined in S5.6.7.1.2. With an initial reservoir system pressure of 100 psi, the engine turned off, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the supply line coupling, make an application actuation of the parking brake control. Determine the maximum reservoir leakage rate (in psi per minute), which is the maximum rate of decrease in air pressure of any of the vehicle's reservoirs that results after that parking brake application. The level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) associated with this reservoir leakage rate is the level that is to be used under the option set forth in S5.6(b). S5.6.7.2 Trailers. S5.6.7.2.1 According to the following procedure, determine the threshold level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) at which the vehicle's parking brakes become unreleasable. With an initial reservoir system and supply line pressure of 100 psi, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes, and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the supply line coupling, introduce a leakage-type failure of the common diaphragm (or equivalent leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm). Make a parking brake application by venting the front supply line coupling to the atmosphere, and reduce the pressures in all of the vehicle's reservoirs to zero. Pressurize the supply line by connecting the trailer's front supply line coupling to the supply line portion of the trailer test rig (Figure 1) with the regulator of the trailer test rig set at 100 psi, and determine whether all of the mechanical means referred to in S5.6.3.2 continue to be actuated and hold the parking brake applications with sufficient parking retardation forces to meet the minimum performance specified in either S5.6.1 or S5.6.2. Repeat this procedure with progressively decreasing or increasing levels (whichever is applicable) of leakage- type diaphragm failures or equivalent leakages, to determine the minimum level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) at which all of the mechanical means referred to in S5.6.3.2 continue to be actuated and hold the parking brake applications with sufficient parking retardation forces to meet the minimum performance specified in either S5.6.1 or S5.6.2. S5.6.7.2.2 At the level of common diaphragm leakage-type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) determined in S5.6.7.2.1, and using the following procedure, determine the threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate (in psi per minute). With an initial reservoir system and supply line pressure of 100 psi, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the rear supply line coupling, make a parking brake application by venting the front supply line coupling to the atmosphere. Determine the maximum reservoir leakage rate (in psi per minute), which is the maximum rate of decrease in air pressure of any of the vehicle's reservoirs that results after that parking brake application. S5.6.7.2.3 Using the following procedure, a leakage-type failure of the common diaphragm (or equivalent leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) that results in a maximum reservoir leakage rate that is three times the threshold maximum reservoir leakage rate determined in S5.6.7.2.2. With an initial reservoir system and supply line pressure of 100 psi, no application of any of the vehicle's brakes and, if the vehicle is designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, a 50 cubic inch test reservoir connected to the rear supply line coupling, make a parking brake application by venting the front supply line coupling to the atmosphere. Determine the maximum reservoir leakage rate (in psi per minute), which is the maximum rate of decrease in air pressure of any of the vehicle's reservoirs that results after that parking brake application. The level of common diaphragm leakage- type failure (or equivalent level of leakage from the air chamber containing that diaphragm) associated with this reservoir leakage rate is the level that is to be used under the option set forth in S5.6(b). * * * * * S5.8.2 Supply Line Pressure Retention. Any single leakage type failure in the service brake system (except for a failure of the supply line, a valve directly connected to the supply line or a component of a brake chamber housing) shall not result in the pressure in the supply line falling below 70 p.s.i., measured at the forward trailer supply coupling. A trailer shall meet the above supply line pressure retention requirement with its brake system connected to the trailer test rig shown in Figure 1, with the reservoirs of the trailer and test rig initially pressurized to 100 p.s.i. and the regulator of the trailer test rig set at 100 p.s.i.; except that a trailer equipped with an air- applied, mechanically-held parking brake system and not designed to tow a vehicle equipped with air brakes, at the manufacturer's option, may meet the requirements of S5.8.4 rather than those of S5.8.2 and S5.8.3. * * * * * S5.8.4 Automatic Application of Air-Applied, Mechanically Held Parking Brakes. With its brake system connected to the supply line portion of the trailer test rig (Figure 1) and the regulator of the trailer test rig set at 100 psi, and with any single leakage type failure in the service brake system (except for a failure of the supply line, a valve directly connected to the supply line or a component of a brake chamber, but including failure of any common diaphragm), the parking brakes shall not provide any brake retardation as a result of complete or partial automatic application of the parking brakes. * * * * * 3. Figure 1 of Sec. 571.121 is revised to appear as follows: BILLING CODE 4910-59-M BILLING CODE 4910-59-C Issued on: February 9, 1994. Howard M. Smolkin, Executive Director. [FR Doc. 94-3364 Filed 2-9-94 3:11 pm] BILLING CODE 4910-59-M