Clark v. Paul Gray, 306 U.S. 583 (1939)

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
 
Case:   CLARK V. PAUL GRAY

Case #: 306US583


NO. 534.  ARGUED MARCH 27, 1939.  - DECIDED APRIL 17, 1939.  - 23
F.SUPP.  946, REVERSED. 


1.  THE COURT RAISES SUA SPONTE THE QUESTION WHETHER JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNTS WERE IN CONTROVERSY IN THE DISTRICT COURT.  P. 588. 

2.  WHEN SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS ASSERT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT DEMANDS IN A
SINGLE SUIT, THE AMOUNTS INVOLVED CAN NOT BE ADDED TOGETHER TO SATISFY
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS; JURISDICTION AS TO EACH SEPARATE
CONTROVERSY DEPENDS UPON THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THAT CONTROVERSY.  P.
589. 

3.  WHEN SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS ASSERT SEPARATE AND DISTINCT DEMANDS IN
ONE SUIT, A GENERAL ALLEGATION IN THE BILL THAT THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN
THE LITIGATION IS IN EXCESS OF $3,000 AND A FINDING OF THE DISTRICT
COURT THAT THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE SUIT EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT, GIVE NO INDICATION THAT THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY WITH RESPECT
TO THE CLAIM OF ANY SINGLE PLAINTIFF EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT,
AND ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OF THE CAUSE.  P. 589. 

4.  THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY IN A SUIT TO RESTRAIN ILLEGAL
IMPOSITION OF FEES OR TAXES IS THE AMOUNT OF THE FEES AND TAXES WHICH
WOULD NORMALLY BE COLLECTED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE LITIGATION.  P.
589. 

5.  THE QUESTION WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT WAS INVOLVED IN
THE DISTRICT COURT IS DETERMINED BY THE RECORD OF THAT COURT, WHICH CAN
NOT BE SUPPLEMENTED BY AFFIDAVITS FILED IN THIS COURT.  P. 590. 

6.  A SUIT BY SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS, EACH BOUND TO ESTABLISH THE
JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT WITH RESPECT TO HIS OWN CLAIM, SHOULD BE
DISMISSED AS TO THOSE WHO FAIL TO DO SO.  P. 590. 

7.  THE STATES HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EXACT REASONABLE FEES
FOR THE USE OF THEIR HIGHWAYS BY VEHICLES MOVING INTERSTATE; AND FOR
THAT PURPOSE THEY MAY CLASSIFY THE VEHICLES ACCORDING TO THE CHARACTER
OF THE TRAFFIC AND THE BURDEN IT IMPOSES ON THE STATE BY THAT USE, AND
CHARGE FOR THE USE A FEE NOT SHOWN TO BE UNREASONABLE OR EXCESSIVE.  P.
593. 

8.  SUCH CLASSIFICATION IS A LEGISLATIVE ACT AND IS PRESUMED TO BE
SUPPORTED BY FACTS KNOWN TO THE LEGISLATURE, UNLESS FACTS JUDICIALLY
KNOWN OR PROVED PRECLUDE THAT POSSIBILITY.  P. 594. 

9.  IN PASSING UPON THE VALIDITY OF SUCH A CALSSIFICATION, THE
FUNCTION OF THE COURT IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY
THAT THE LEGISLATIVE DECISION IS WITHOUT RATIONAL BASIS.  THIS IS
EQUALLY THE CASE WHERE THE CLASSIFICATION, WHICH IS ONE WHICH THE
LEGISLATURE WAS COMPETENT TO MAKE, IS APPLIED TO VEHICLES USING THE
STATE HIGHWAYS IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  P. 594. 

10.  THE CALIFORNIA "CARAVAN" ACT OF 1937, DEFINING "CARAVANING" AS
THE TRANSPORTATION OF ANY VEHICLE OPERATED ON ITS OWN WHEELS, OR IN TOW
OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE, EXACTS TWO LICENSE FEES,
EACH OF $7.50, FOR A SIX MONTH'S PERMIT TO "CARAVAN" A VEHICLE ON THE
STATE HIGHWAYS.  ONE OF THE FEES IS DECLARED TO BE TO REIMBURSE THE
STATE FOR EXPENSE INCURRED IN ADMINISTERING POLICE REGULATIONS
PERTAINING TO THE OPERATION OF VEHICLES MOVED PURSUANT TO SUCH PERMITS,
AND PERTAINING TO PUBLIC SAFETY UPON THE HIGHWAYS AS AFFECTED BY SUCH
OPERATION; THE OTHER IS DECLARED TO BE COMPENSATION FOR THE PRIVILEGE
OF USING THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS.  VEHICLES MOVING WHOLLY WITHIN EITHER OF
TWO ZONES, WHICH ARE APPROXIMATELY THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN HALVES OF
THE STATE, ARE EXCEPTED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE.  HELD: 

(1)  THAT THE TAX IS NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN ON INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, NOR AN INFRACTION OF THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AS APPLIED TO ONE ENGAGED IN THE
DISTINCT BUSINESS OF BRINGING MOTOR CARS INTO THE STATE FOR SALE, IN
EXTENSIVE CARAVANS OR CONVOYS COMPOSED LARGELY OF CARS COUPLED IN TWOS,
EACH PAIR IN CONTROL OF A SINGLE DRIVER.  CF. MORF V. BINGAMAN, 298
U.S. 407.  PP. 594-595. 

THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT COUPLED CARS, UNDER CONTROL OF A SINGLE
DRIVER, SUBJECT THE HIGHWAYS TO INCREASED WEAR AND TEAR BECAUSE OF
THEIR TENDENCY TO SKID AND SWAY ON CURVES AND IN PASSING OTHER TRAFFIC,
AND THAT THE LENGTH OF THE CARAVANS AND THE INEFFICIENCY AND
IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE DRIVERS, CASUALLY EMPLOYED, INCREASE TRAFFIC
CONGESTION AND THE INCONVENIENCES AND HAZARDS OF AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC. 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CAUSED THE STATE TO MAKE INCREASED PROVISION
FOR THE POLICING OF THE TRAFFIC. 

(2)  ONE ENGAGED IN THIS CLASS OF HIGHWAY TRAFFIC HAS NO GROUND OR
STATUS TO COMPLAIN OF THE DISCRIMINATION INVOLVED IN EXACTING THE FEES
WHERE CARS ARE TRANSPORTED INTO THE STATE FOR SALE SINGLY AND NOT WHERE
THEY MOVE SINGLY INTRAZONE OR ENTER THE STATE NOT FOR PURPOSES OF
SALE.  P. 595. 

(3)  NO UNCONSTITUTIONAL DISCRIMINATION RESULTS FROM FAILURE TO APPLY
THE STATUTE TO CARS THAT MOVE FOR SALE INTRAZONE IN CARAVANS, IT
APPEARING THAT CARS IN THAT CLASS ARE DRIVEN RELATIVELY SHORT
DISTANCES, OVER HIGHWAYS OF MORE THAN TWO LANES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
CARAVANS COMING FROM WITHOUT THE STATE, WHICH MOVE FOR LONG DISTANCES
OVER TWO-LANE HIGHWAYS IN MOUNTAIN DISTRICTS; THAT SUCH INTRAZONE
CARAVANS OR CONVOYS AS THERE ARE CONSIST OF TWO TO FOUR CARS; THAT
COUPLING IS NEGLIGIBLE; THAT EACH CAR IS IN CHARGE OF A REGULARLY
LICENSED DRIVER; AND THAT SUCH INTRAZONE MOVEMENT IS SUBJECT TO OTHER
LICENSING AND TAXING PROVISIONS, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHICH AND THE
EXACTIONS HERE IN QUESTION MAY BEAR A FAIR RELATION TO THE DIFFERENCES
IN THE BURDEN OF THE TRAFFIC FOR WHICH THE STATE MUST PROVIDE.  P.
596. 

(4)  THE LEGISLATURE HAVING MADE ITS CLASSIFICATION BY THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES, IN THE LIGHT OF SPECIAL CONDITIONS IN THE
STATE, COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO SET ASIDE ITS DETERMINATION UNLESS THEY
CAN SAY THAT IT IS WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL BASIS.  P. 596. 

(5)  THE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT SUSTAINED THE BURDEN OF PROVING, AND THE
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW, THAT THE FEES EXACTED BY THE STATUTE ARE
EXCESSIVE, FOR THE PURPOSES INDICATED.  P. 600. 

CLARK, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, ET AL. V. PAUL GRAY,
INC. ET AL. 

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 

APPEAL FROM A FINAL DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT OF THREE JUDGES
WHICH ENJOINED THE APPELLANTS, OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
FROM ENFORCING STATUTORY PROVISIONS IMPOSING LICENSE FEES FOR THE USE
OF THE STATE HIGHWAYS IN THE TRANSPORTATION FOR SALE OF MOTOR VEHICLES
IN "CARAVANS." 

MR. JUSTICE STONE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 

THE PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS FOR DECISION ARE WHETHER THE CALIFORNIA
CARAVAN ACT OF 1937, EXACTING FEES AGGREGATING $15 FOR EACH AUTOMOBILE
DRIVEN INTO THE STATE FOR SALE, IMPOSES A FORBIDDEN BURDEN ON
INTERSTATE COMMERCE OR INFRINGES THE DUE PROCESS OR EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 

THIS IS AN APPEAL UNDER SECS. 238(3), 266 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE; 28
U.S.C. SECS. 345(3), 380, FROM A FINAL DECREE OF THE DISTRICT COURT FOR
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, THREE JUDGES SITTING, ENJOINING APPELLANTS,
OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FROM ENFORCING THE LICENSE AND FEE
PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 788, P. 2253, CALIFORNIA STATUTES OF 1937.  GRAY
V. INGELS, 23 F.SUPP.  946.  FN1 

THE STATUTE, KNOWN AS THE CARAVAN ACT, WAS ENACTED AS A SUBSTITUTE
FOR THE CARAVAN ACT OF 1935, C. 402, CAL. STAT. 1935, HELD INVALID IN
INGELS V. MORF, 300 U.S. 290, AS AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE.  "CARAVANING" IS DEFINED IN SEC. 1 OF THE PRESENT ACT AS THE
"TRANSPORTATION OF ANY VEHICLE  ..  OPPERATED ON ITS OWN WHEELS, OR IN
TOW OF A MOTOR VEHICLE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SELLING OR OFFERING THE SAME
FOR SALE  ..  WIITHIN OR WITHOUT THIS STATE."  SECTIONS 4, 5 AND 6
EXACT IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER FEES TWO LICENSE FEES, EACH OF $7.50, FOR A
SIX-MONTHS PERMIT FOR CARAVANING A VEHICLE ON THE STATE HIGHWAYS.  ONE
OF THESE IS "TO REIMBURSE THE STATE FOR EXPENSE INCURRED IN
ADMINISTERING POLICE REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE OPERATION OF
VEHICLES MOVED PURSUANT TO SUCH PERMITS AND TO PUBLIC SAFETY UPON THE
HIGHWAYS AS AFFECTED BY SUCH OPERATION"; THE OTHER IS DECLARED TO BE
"COMPENSATION FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF USING THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS."  SECTION
8 EXCEPTS FROM THE OPERATION OF THE STATUTE VEHICLES MOVING WHOLLY
WITHIN EITHER OF TWO ZONES WHICH ARE APPROXIMATELY THE NORTHERN AND
SOUTHERN HALVES OF THE STATE.  OTHER SECTIONS OF THE ACT MAKE PROVISION
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSES AND THE COLLECTION OF FEES.  SECTION 12
PROVIDES FOR THE COLLECTION OF FEES BY SEIZURE AND SALE OF VEHICLES
TRANSPORTED IN VIOLATION OF THE ACT, AND SEC. 13 PRESCRIBES CRIMINAL
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION. 

APPELLEES, NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS, COPARTNERSHIPS AND CORPORATIONS,
JOINED IN BRINGING THE PRESENT SUIT AGAINST APPELLANTS, STATE OFFICERS
CHARGED WITH THE DUTY OF ENFORCING THE ACT, ALLEGING THAT EACH APPELLEE
HAD DRIVEN AND WOULD IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS DRIVE AUTOMOBILES INTO
CALIFORNIA FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE.  THEY PRAYED AN INJUNCTION
RESTRAINING APPELLANTS FROM COLLECTING THE FEES AND ENFORCING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE IN AID OF THEIR COLLECTION.  THE DISTRICT
COURT'S FINDINGS STATE THAT THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE ACTION IS IN
EXCESS OF THE SUM OF $3,000; THAT EACH OF APPELLEES, IN THE COURSE OF
BUSINESS OF SELLING MOTOR CARS, PURCHASES CARS PREVIOUSLY REGISTERED IN
OTHER STATES AND "CARAVANS" THEM INTO THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; THAT
CARS FOR SALE ARE OFTEN MOVED BETWEEN POINTS IN A STATE ZONE; THAT THE
OPERATION OF CARS IN CARAVANS DOES NOT CREATE AN ADDITIONAL HAZARD OR A
TRAFFIC PROBLEM NECESSITATING SPECIAL POLICING OF THE CARAVANS AND THAT
THE CARAVANING OF CARS DOES NOT CREATE UNDUE WEAR AND TEAR ON THE
HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE; THAT THE FEES CHARGED ARE EXCESSIVE AND BEAR NO
RELATION TO THE ADDED EXPENSE TO THE MOTOR VEHICLE DEPARTMENT OF
POLICING THE HIGHWAYS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA; AND THAT THEY ARE
DISPROPORTIONATE TO OTHER TAXES OR LICENSE FEES CHARGED BY THE STATE
FOR THE USE OF THE HIGHWAYS.  THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT THE STATUTE
DISCRIMINATED AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE, DEPRIVED APPELLEES OF THEIR
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, AND DENIED TO THEM EQUAL PROTECTION OF
THE LAWS, IN THAT IT APPLIES ONLY TO THOSE USING THE HIGHWAYS FOR THE
TRANSPORTATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES FOR THE PURPOSES OF SALE AND DOES NOT
APPLY TO OTHER PERSONS USING THE HIGHWAYS UNDER COMPARABLE
CIRCUMSTANCES. 

APPELLANTS ASSAIL HERE THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT BELOW ON
WHICH IT PREDICATED ITS CONCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY, AND INSIST
THAT UPON THE EVIDENCE THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
FEES EXACTED ARE EXCESSIVE OR THAT THERE IS DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
INTERSTATE COMMERCE OR A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS. 

JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 

A MOTION OF APPELLANTS IN THE COURT BELOW TO DISMISS THE BILL OF
COMPLAINT FOR WANT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT WAS WITHDRAWN, AND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT CHALLENGED HERE.  BUT ON THE
ARGUMENT, IT APPEARING DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE "MATTER IN CONTROVERSY"
EXCEEDED "THE SUM OR VALUE OF" $3,000, SEC. 24(1) OF THE JUDICIAL CODE;
28 U.S.C. SEC. 41(1), WE RAISED THE QUESTION WHETHER THE JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT WAS INVOLVED, AS WAS OUR DUTY.  MANSFIELD, C. & L.M. RY. CO. V.
SWAN, 111 U.S. 379, 382; STRATTON V. ST. LOUIS SOUTHWESTERN RY. CO.,
282 U.S. 10, 13; ST. PAUL MERCURY INDEMNITY CO. V. RED CAB CO., 303
U.S. 283, 287, NOTE 10.  THE BILL OF COMPLAINT ALLEGES GENERALLY THAT
"THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THIS LITIGATION IS IN EXCESS OF THREE THOUSAND
DOLLARS ($3,000.00), EXCLUSIVE OF INTEREST AND COSTS."  BUT IT IS PLAIN
THAT THIS ALLEGATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS WHERE THERE ARE NUMEROUS PLAINTIFFS HAVING NO JOINT OR
COMMON INTEREST OR TITLE IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUIT.  AS THE
BILL OF COMPLAINT SHOWS ON ITS FACE, AND AS THE FINDINGS ESTABLISH,
EACH APPELLEE MAINTAINS HIS OWN SEPARATE AND INDEPENDENT BUSINESS,
WHICH IS SAID TO BE AFFECTED BY THE CHALLENGED FEES.  NO JOINT OR
COMMON INTEREST OF APPELLEES IN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUIT IS
SHOWN.  CF. GIBBS V. BUCK, 307 U.S. 66. 

IT IS A FAMILIAR RULE THAT WHEN SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS ASSERT SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT DEMANDS IN A SINGLE SUIT, THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN EACH
SEPARATE CONTROVERSY MUST BE OF THE REQUISITE AMOUNT TO BE WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, AND THAT THOSE AMOUNTS CANNOT BE
ADDED TOGETHER TO SATISFY JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.  WHELESS V. ST.
LOUIS, 180 U.S. 379; ROGERS V. HENNEPIN COUNTY, 239 U.S. 621; PINEL V.
PINEL, 240 U.S. 594; SCOTT V. FRAZIER, 253 U.S. 243.  THE GENERAL
ALLEGATION IN THE BILL OF COMPLAINT THAT "THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THIS
LITIGATION IS IN EXCESS OF" $3,000 AND THE FINDING OF THE COURT THAT
"THE AMOUNT INVOLVED IN THE WITHIN ACTION" EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTIONAL
AMOUNT, GIVE NO INDICATION THAT THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY WITH RESPECT
TO THE CLAIM OF ANY SINGLE PLAINTIFF EXCEEDS THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
AND ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION
OF THE CAUSE.  PINEL V. PINEL, SUPRA. 

EXAMINATION OF THE RECORD SHOWS THAT ONLY IN THE CASE OF A SINGLE
APPELLEE, PAUL GRAY, INC., IS THERE ANY ALLEGATION OR PROOF TENDING TO
SHOW THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY.  AS TO IT THE BILL OF COMPLAINT ALLEGES
THAT "IT CAUSES TO BE CARAVANED INTO THE SAID STATE  ..  APPPROXIMATELY
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY (150) AUTOMOBILES EACH YEAR."  THIS ALLEGATION IS
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE THAT THIS APPELLEE IS REGULARLY ENGAGED IN THE
BUSINESS AND TENDING TO SHOW THAT ITS VOLUME EXCEEDED THAT AMOUNT WHEN
THE ACT WENT INTO EFFECT JULY 2, 1937.  SINCE THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY
IN A SUIT TO RESTRAIN ILLEGAL IMPOSITION OF FEES OR TAXES IS THE AMOUNT
OF THE FEES OR TAXES WHICH WOULD NORMALLY BE COLLECTED DURING THE
PERIOD OF THE LITIGATION, HEALY V. RATTA, 292 U.S. 263, WE CANNOT SAY,
UPON THIS STATE OF THE RECORD, THAT JURISDICTION WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AS
TO APPELLEE PAUL GRAY, INC. 

WE IGNORE AFFIDAVITS FILED HERE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUPPLEMENTING THE
RECORD BY SHOWING THE AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY AS TO ANOTHER APPELLEE. 
WHILE IT HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE OF THIS COURT TO RECEIVE AFFIDAVITS FOR
THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING ITS OWN APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER
STATUTES PRESCRIBING THAT A SPECIFIED AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY IS
PREREQUISITE TO THE APPEAL, WILLIAMSON V. KINCAID, 4 DALL.  20; RUSH V.
PARKER, 5 CRANCH 287; ROURA V. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 218 U.S. 386; SEE
RED RIVER CATTLE CO. V. NEEDHAM, 137 U.S. 632, THAT PROCEDURE IS
INAPPLICABLE HERE.  OUR REVIEW OF THE ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN
ASSUMING JURISDICTION IS CONFINED TO THE RECORD BEFORE THE DISTRICT
COURT.  HENNEFORD V. NORTHERN PACIFIC RY. CO., 303 U.S. 17. 

PROPER PRACTICE REQUIRES THAT WHERE EACH OF SEVERAL PLAINTIFFS IS
BOUND TO ESTABLISH THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT WITH RESPECT TO HIS OWN
CLAIM, THE SUIT SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS TO THOSE WHO FAIL TO SHOW THAT
THE REQUISITE AMOUNT IS INVOLVED.  FN2  OTHERWISE AN APPELLATE COURT
COULD BE CALLED ON TO SUSTAIN A DECREE IN FAVOR OF A PLAINTIFF WHO HAD
NOT SHOWN THAT HIS CLAIM INVOLVED THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT, EVEN
THOUGH THE SUIT WERE DISMISSED ON THE MERITS AS TO THE OTHER PLAINTIFFS
WHO HAD ESTABLISHED THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT FOR THEMSELVES.  ALTHOUGH
IT APPEARS THAT SUCH A RESULT COULD NOT FOLLOW HERE, WE THINK IT BETTER
PRACTICE TO DISMISS THE SUIT FOR WANT OF THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT AS
TO ALL APPELLEES EXCEPT PAUL GRAY, INC. SEE RICH V. LAMBERT, 12 HOW. 
347; EX PARTE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD CO., 106 U.S. 5; HASSALL V.
WILCOX, 115 U.S. 598.  CF. GROSJEAN V. AMERICAN PRESS CO., 297 U.S.
233. 

DISCRIMINATION. 

APART FROM APPELLEES' INSISTENCE THAT THE FEES ARE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE BECAUSE EXCESSIVE, THE
SUBSTANCE OF THEIR CONTENTION IS THAT THE STATUTE DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN
AUTOMOBILES TRANSPORTED INTO THE STATE SINGLY AND THOSE SIMILARLY
TRANSPORTED INTRAZONE, FOR WHICH NO FEE IS CHARGED, AND ALSO THAT THE
STATUTE DISCRIMINATES BETWEEN THOSE CARS DRIVEN BY APPELLEES IN
CARAVANS AND THOSE SIMILARLY DRIVEN WHOLLY WITHIN EITHER OF THE STATE
ZONES, FOR WHICH NO FEE IS CHARGED. 

IN MORF V. BINGAMAN, 298 U.S. 407, WE HAD OCCASION TO CONSIDER THE
VALIDITY OF A FEE OR TAX EXACTED BY NEW MEXICO FOR THE TRANSPORTATION
INTO THE STATE OF ANY MOTOR VEHICLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE WITHIN OR
WITHOUT THE STATE.  IT THERE APPEARED THAT THE PLAINTIFF, WITH OTHERS,
WAS ENGAGED IN TRANSPORTING MOTOR CARS ON THEIR OWN WHEELS IN CARAVANS
ACROSS THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO FOR THE PURPOSE OF SALE, AND THAT THEIR
TRANSPORTATION FOR THAT PURPOSE HAD RESULTED IN THE CREATION OF A
DISTINCT CLASS OF MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC OF CONSIDERABLE MAGNITUDE.  IN
THE COURSE OF THIS BUSINESS SECOND-HAND CARS PURCHASED AT POINTS IN THE
EAST ARE ASSEMBLED IN CARAVANS, WHICH ARE DRIVEN AS SUCH TO THE POINT
OF SALE IN CALIFORNIA.  LARGE NUMBERS OF THE CARS ARE COUPLED IN TWOS,
EACH TWO IN CHARGE OF A SINGLE DRIVER WHO OPERATES THE FORWARD CAR AND
CONTROLS THE MOVEMENT OF BOTH BY THE USE OF THE MECHANISM AND BRAKES OF
ONE.  THE DRIVERS OF CARAVANS, EXCEPT TWO OR THREE REGULARLY ENGAGED,
ARE CASUALLY EMPLOYED AND SERVE WITHOUT PAY OR FOR SMALL COMPENSATION
IN ORDER TO SECURE TRANSPORTATION TO THE POINT OF DESTINATION.  WE
SAID, PAGE 411-412: 

"THE LEGISLATURE MAY READILY HAVE CONCLUDED, AS DID THE TRIAL COURT,
THAT THE DRIVERS HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS OR THE VEHICLES
THEY DRIVE AND LESS REGARD THAN DRIVERS OF STATE LICENSED CARS FOR THE
SAFETY AND CONVENIENCE OF OTHERS USING THE HIGHWAYS.  THE EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE INFERENCE THAT CARS THUS COUPLED AND CONTROLLED FREQUENTLY
SKID, ESPECIALLY ON CURVES, CAUSING MORE THAN THE USUAL WEAR AND TEAR
ON THE ROAD; THAT THIS AND OTHER INCREASED DIFFICULTIES IN THE
OPERATION OF THE COUPLED CARS, AND THE LENGTH OF THE CARAVANS, INCREASE
THE INCONVENIENCE AND HAZARD TO PASSING TRAFFIC.  ..  THHERE IS AMPLE
SUPPORT FOR A LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF
THIS TRAFFIC INVOLVES A SPECIAL TYPE OF USE OF THE HIGHWAYS, WITH
ENHANCED WEAR AND TEAR ON THE ROADS AND AUGMENTED HAZARDS TO OTHER
TRAFFIC, WHICH IMPOSES ON THE STATE A HEAVIER FINANCIAL BURDEN FOR
HIGHWAY MAINTENANCE AND POLICING THAN DO OTHER TYPES OF MOTOR CAR
TRAFFIC.  WE CANNOT SAY THAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES DO NOT AFFORD AN
ADEQUATE BASIS FOR SPECIAL LICENSING AND TAXING PROVISIONS, WHOSE ONLY
EFFECT, EVEN WHEN APPLIED TO INTERSTATE TRAFFIC, IS TO ENABLE THE STATE
TO POLICE IT, AND TO IMPOSE UPON IT A REASONABLE CHARGE, TO DEFRAY THE
BURDEN OF THIS STATE EXPENSE, AND FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF USING THE STATE
HIGHWAYS." 

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA HAS FOUND IT EXPEDIENT TO ADOPT LICENSING
PROVISIONS FOR THIS CLASS OF TRAFFIC AND TO EXACT THE FEES SPECIFIED IN
THE STATUTE FOR THE USE OF ITS HIGHWAYS AND THE EXPENSE OF POLICING. 
THAT THIS PECULIAR TYPE OF TRAFFIC OCCURS IN LARGE VOLUME BETWEEN
EASTERN POINTS AND POINTS IN CALIFORNIA, AND THAT THERE IS BASIS FOR
THE LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT THAT THE TRAFFIC IMPOSES SPECIAL BURDENS ON
THE USE OF THE STATE HIGHWAYS FOR WHICH A SPECIAL CHARGE MAY BE MADE,
ARE ABUNDANTLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.  THE PARTIES HAVE STIPULATED
THAT FIFTEEN THOUSAND AUTOMOBILES ARE BROUGHT INTO THE STATE FOR SALE
ANNUALLY.  OF THESE, FROM 80 TO 90 PER CENT. COME IN CARAVANS OR
CONVOYS, AND OF THE CARS SO MOVING ONE-HALF ARE COUPLED TOGETHER IN
TWOS.  IT FURTHER APPEARS BY STIPULATION THAT THE CARAVANS OR CONVOYS
ARE MADE UP OF FROM NINETEEN TO TWENTY-FIVE CARS.    THERE IS MUCH
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD INDICATING THAT IT IS THE LONG HAUL TRAFFIC IN
CARS FOR SALE IN CALIFORNIA WHICH TENDS TO PRODUCE THE MOVEMENT IN
LARGE CARAVANS OR CONVOYS IN ORDER TO SAVE EXPENSE OF TRANSPORTATION,
AND WHICH IN TURN TENDS TO IMPOSE SPECIAL BURDENS ON THE STATE IN
CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF ITS HIGHWAYS, CALLING FOR THE IMPOSITION OF
REGULATIONS AND FEES DIFFERENT FROM THOSE APPLIED TO OTHER TYPES OF
MOTOR CAR MOVEMENT.  WITHOUT REPEATING WHAT WAS SAID MORE AT LENGTH OF
LIKE TRAFFIC IN MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA, THE EVIDENCE IN THE PRESENT
CASE SHOWS THAT COUPLED CARS, UNDER CONTROL OF A SINGLE DRIVER, SUBJECT
THE HIGHWAYS TO INCREASED WEAR AND TEAR BECAUSE OF THEIR TENDENCY TO
SKID AND SWAY ON CURVES AND IN PASSING OTHER TRAFFIC, AND THAT THE
LENGTH OF THE CARAVANS AND THE INEFFICIENCY AND IRRESPONSIBILITY OF THE
DRIVERS, CASUALLY EMPLOYED, INCREASE TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE
INCONVENIENCES AND HAZARDS OF AUTOMOBILE TRAFFIC.  THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
HAVE CAUSED THE STATE TO MAKE INCREASED PROVISION FOR THE POLICING OF
THE TRAFFIC.  IT IS TRUE THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT THE
PRACTICE OF CARAVANING CREATES NO ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC HAZARD, NOR ANY
UNDUE WEAR AND TEAR ON THE HIGHWAYS.  BUT IN THIS WE THINK THAT ITS
DETERMINATION WAS NOT ONLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE, BUT WENT BEYOND
THE JUDICIAL PROVINCE. 

IT IS NO LONGER OPEN TO QUESTION THAT THE STATES HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AUTHORITY TO EXACT REASONABLE FEES FOR THE USE OF THEIR HIGHWAYS BY
VEHICLES MOVING INTERSTATE, HENDRICK V. MARYLAND, 235 U.S. 610; KANE V.
NEW JERSEY, 242 U.S. 160; CLARK V. POOR, 274 U.S. 554; SPROUT V. SOUTH
BEND, 277 U.S. 163; MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA; DIXIE OHIO EXPRESS CO. V.
STATE REVENUE COMM'N, ANTE, P. 72, AND THAT FOR THAT PURPOSE THEY MAY
CLASSIFY THE VEHICLES ACCORDING TO THE CHARACTER OF THE TRAFFIC AND THE
BURDEN IT IMPOSES ON THE STATE BY THAT USE, AND CHARGE FOR THE USE A
FEE NOT SHOWN TO BE UNREASONABLE OR EXCESSIVE.  CONTINENTAL BAKING CO.
V. WOODRING, 286 U.S. 352, 370-371; HICKLIN V. CONEY, 290 U.S. 169;
MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA, 413; DIXIE OHIO EXPRESS CO. V. STATE REVENUE
COMM'N, SUPRA. 

THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE TRAFFIC FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION AND
FIXING FEES IS A LEGISLATIVE, NOT A JUDICIAL, FUNCTION.  ITS MERITS ARE
NOT TO BE WEIGHED IN THE JUDICIAL BALANCE AND THE CLASSIFICATION
REJECTED MERELY BECAUSE THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN COURT APPEARS TO
FAVOR A DIFFERENT STANDARD.  CF. WORCESTER COUNTY TRUST CO. V. RILEY,
302 U.S. 292, 299.  THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO
BE SUPPORTED BY FACTS KNOWN TO IT, UNLESS FACTS JUDICIALLY KNOWN OR
PROVED PRECLUDE THAT POSSIBILITY.  STANDARD OIL CO. V. MARYSVILLE, 279
U.S. 582, 584; BORDEN'S FARM PRODUCTS CO. V. TEN EYCK, 297 U.S. 251,
263; S.C. 11 F.SUPP.  599, 600; SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V.
BARNWELL BROS., 303 U.S. 177, 191-192; UNITED STATES V. CAROLENE
PRODUCTS CO., 304 U.S. 144, 153-154.  HENCE, IN PASSING ON THE VALIDITY
OF THE PRESENT CLASSIFICATION, IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE OF A COURT TO
HEAR AND EXAMINE EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DECIDING AGAIN A QUESTION
WHICH THE LEGISLATURE HAS ALREADY DECIDED.  ITS FUNCTION IS ONLY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO SAY THAT THE LEGISLATIVE DECISION
IS WITHOUT RATIONAL BASIS.  THIS IS EQUALLY THE CASE WHERE THE
CLASSIFICATION, WHICH IS ONE WHICH THE LEGISLATURE WAS COMPETENT TO
MAKE, IS APPLIED TO VEHICLES USING THE STATE HIGHWAYS IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.  SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V. BARNWELL BROS., SUPRA, 187
ET SEQ. THE LEGISLATURE MUST BE ASSUMED TO HAVE ACTED ON INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO COURTS, AND WHERE, AS HERE, THE EVIDENCE, LIKE THAT
DISCUSSED IN MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA, SHOWS THAT IT IS AT LEAST A
DEBATABLE QUESTION WHETHER THE TRAFFIC IN CARAVANS INVOLVES SPECIAL
WEAR AND TEAR OF THE HIGHWAYS AND INCREASED TRAFFIC HAZARDS REQUIRING
SPECIAL POLICE CONTROL, DECISION IS FOR THE LEGISLATURE AND NOT THE
COURTS.  STANDARD OIL CO. V. MARYSVILLE, SUPRA; SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY
DEPT. V. BARNWELL BROS., SUPRA. 

APPELLEE PAUL GRAY, INC., SO FAR AS APPEARS, CARAVANS ITS CARS FOR
SALE IN CALIFORNIA FROM DETROIT, MICHIGAN, AND ST. JOSEPH, MISSOURI. 
ITS CARS, LIKE THOSE OF THE OTHER APPELLEES, MOVE IN CARAVANS OF FROM
NINETEEN TO TWENTY-FIVE CARS.  IT DOES NOT APPEAR, NOR IS IT CONTENDED,
THAT THIS APPELLEE TRANSPORTS ANY CARS SINGLY.  FROM WHAT HAS BEEN SAID
IT IS EVIDENT, AS WAS DECIDED IN MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA, THAT CARS
MOVING IN CARAVANS OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL CLASS OF
TRAFFIC WHICH MAY BE TAXED OR CHARGED FOR DIFFERENTLY FROM OTHER
CLASSES WITHOUT INFRINGING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. 

THE ARGUMENT THAT THE STATUTE DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION TO APPELLEES
BECAUSE IT EXACTS FEES FOR CARS TRANSPORTED INTO THE STATE FOR SALE
SINGLY BUT NONE FOR CARS WHICH MOVE SIMILARLY INTRAZONE OR FOR THOSE
WHICH ENTER THE STATE NOT FOR THE PURPOSES OF SALE, IGNORES THE ACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE STATUTE IS APPLIED TO APPELLEES, AS SHOWN BY
THE RECORD, AND SEEKS TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AN ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION
WHICH, IF IT EXISTS, DOES APPELLEES NO HARM.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DOES NOT REQUIRE CLASSIFICATION FOR FEES, MORE THAN FOR TAXATION, TO
FOLLOW ANY PARTICULAR FORM OF WORDS.  IF THAT ADOPTED RESULTS IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE EXACTION TO A CLASS WHICH MAY BE SEPARATELY CHARGED
WITHOUT A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION, THOSE WITHIN THE CLASS CANNOT
COMPLAIN THAT IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MORE APTLY DEFINED OR THAT THE STATUTE
MAY TAX OTHERS WHO ARE NOT WITHIN THE CLASS.  SEE PATSONE V.
PENNSYLVANIA, 232 U.S. 138, 144; SILVER V. SILVER, 280 U.S. 117, 123;
MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA, 413. 

IT IS THE PRACTICE OF TRANSPORTING AUTOMOBILES FOR LONG DISTANCES
OVER THE HIGHWAY FOR PURPOSE OF SALE WHICH HAS GIVEN RISE TO THE
PRACTICE OF MOVING THEM IN CARAVANS.  THE USE OF AUTOMOBILES FOR OTHER
PURPOSES, OR FOR PLEASURE, DOES NOT HAVE THAT RESULT.  THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE STATUTE, IN ITS PRACTICAL APPLICATION, EMBRACES
AND IS CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLICABLE TO CARS MOVING IN CARAVANS, THE
CLASS OF TRAFFIC IN WHICH APPELLEE PAUL GRAY, INC., ENGAGES AND ON
WHICH IT IS ALONE TAXED.  ONE FORM OF DISCRIMINATION OF WHICH IT
COMPLAINS IS THAT FEES ARE EXACTED FOR CARS DRIVEN INTO THE STATE
SINGLY FOR SALE BUT NOT FOR THOSE DRIVEN SINGLY TO MARKET INTRAZONE OR
SINGLY FROM WITHOUT THE STATE FOR OTHER PURPOSES.  APPELLEE DOES NOT
SHOW THAT IT BELONGS TO EITHER CLASS, AND SO FAR AS THE TRAFFIC IN
WHICH IT PARTICIPATES IS PROPERLY TAXED, IT CANNOT COMPLAIN OF THE
IMPOSITION OF THE CHARGE ON A BUSINESS WHICH IT DOES NOT DO. 

SO FAR AS APPELLEES COMPLAIN THAT NO FEE IS EXACTED FOR CARS WHICH
MOVE FOR SALE INTRAZONE IN CARAVANS, DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS APPLY. 
AS WE HAVE SAID, IT IS THE LONG HAUL OF CARS FOR SALE WHICH HAS
PRODUCED MOTOR VEHICLE CARAVANS AND HAS MADE THEM A SPECIAL CLASS FOR
THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION AND IMPOSITION OF FEES.  IT WAS FOR THE
LEGISLATURE TO CONSIDER AND DECIDE WHETHER THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS WHICH
PREVAIL IN THE STATE, AFFECTING MOVEMENT OF CARS FOR SALE, ELIMINATE OR
SO REDUCE THE BURDEN OF THE CARAVAN TRAFFIC ON THE HIGHWAYS AS TO CALL
FOR A DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION OF THE SHORT HAUL TRAFFIC FOR THE
PURPOSES OF REGULATION AND FEES.  THE LEGISLATURE HAVING MADE ITS
CLASSIFICATION BY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES, IN THE LIGHT OF SPECIAL
CONDITIONS IN THE STATE, COURTS ARE NOT FREE TO SET ASIDE ITS
DETERMINATION UNLESS THEY CAN SAY THAT IT IS WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANTIAL
BASIS.  CARLEY & HAMILTON V. SNOOK, 281 U.S. 66, 73; CONTINENTAL BAKING
CO. V. WOODRING, SUPRA; SPROLES V. BINFORD, 286 U.S. 374; HICKLIN V.
CONEY, SUPRA; AERO MAYFLOWER TRANSIT CO. V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMM'N, 295
U.S. 285. 

THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT CARS ARE OFTEN MOVED IN CONVOYS IN ZONE 1,
WHICH INCLUDES THE METROPOLITAN AREA OF LOS ANGELES, AND IT THOUGHT
THIS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AN UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION WITHOUT
CONSIDERATION OF THE OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE INTRAZONE TRAFFIC. 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES, BEYOND ANY REASONABLE DOUBT, THAT THE
MOVEMENT INTRAZONE OF CARS FOR SALE IN CONVOYS SIMILAR TO THAT OF
APPELLEES IS NEGLIGIBLE AND THAT THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF CARS FOR SALE
MOVING INTRAZONE ARE THE ASSEMBLY PLANTS OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
LOCATED IN OR NEAR THE METROPOLITAN AREAS OF LOS ANGELES AND SAN
FRANCISCO.  BEING NEW CARS, THE BULK OF THEM, SHIPPED INTERSTATE OR TO
DISTANT POINTS INTRASTATE, MOVE BY RAIL, WATER, OR TRUCK.  MOST OF
THOSE WHICH MOVE ON THEIR OWN WHEELS ARE DRIVEN RELATIVELY SHORT
DISTANCES, SEVENTY-FIVE MILES OR LESS, IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA OVER
HIGHWAYS OF MORE THAN TWO LANES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CARAVANS COMING
FROM WITHOUT THE STATE, WHICH MOVE FOR LONG DISTANCES OVER TWOLANE
HIGHWAYS IN MOUNTAIN DISTRICTS.  THE PROPORTION DRIVEN SINGLY DOES NOT
APPEAR.  SUCH CONVOYS OR CARAVANS AS THERE ARE USUALLY CONSIST OF TWO
OR THREE CARS.  THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES NO CASE OF MORE THAN FOUR. 
COUPLING IS NEGLIGIBLE.  EACH CAR IS IN CHARGE OF A REGULARLY EMPLOYED
AND LICENSED DRIVER.  THE INTRAZONE MOVEMENT IS SUBJECT TO OTHER
LICENSING AND TAXING PROVISIONS OF THE STATE LAW, AND NO SHOWING IS
MADE THAT THE DIFFERENCES IN FEES OR TAXES EXACTED FROM THE TWO CLASSES
OF TRAFFIC DO NOT BEAR A FAIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE DIFFERENCES IN THE
BURDEN OF THE TRAFFIC FOR WHICH THE STATE MUST PROVIDE. 

THE LEGISLATURE COULD REASONABLY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE WEAR AND
TEAR AND INJURY TO THE HIGHWAYS FROM DRIVING COUPLED CARS INTRAZONE WAS
NEGLIGIBLE, AND THAT THE RELATIVELY SHORT DISTANCES WHICH CARS ARE
DRIVEN IN TWOS OR THREES, THE CHARACTER OF THE HIGHWAYS USED, AND THE
DIFFERENCE IN THE CLASS OF DRIVERS, TAKEN TOGETHER, ELIMINATE FROM THE
INTRAZONE TRAFFIC OR SO SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE BURDEN IMPOSED BY
TRAFFIC LIKE THAT OF APPELLEES MOVING INTERSTATE OR INTERZONE AS TO
REQUIRE, IN FAIRNESS, A DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF
FEES CHARGED FOR THE USE OF THE HIGHWAYS.  WE CANNOT SAY THAT THAT
CONCLUSION IS WITHOUT SUPPORT OR INFRINGES THE PRINCIPLES WHICH WE HAVE
REPEATEDLY RECOGNIZED AS DEFINING THE POWER OF THE STATES, IN THE
ABSENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, TO CLASSIFY VEHICLES OR TRAFFIC FOR
THE PURPOSES OF REGULATING USE OF THE HIGHWAYS BY VEHICLES MOVING
INTERSTATE.  IF THE CLASSIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO A MATTER REMAINING
WITHIN STATE CONTROL, DESPITE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, IS OTHERWISE VALID,
IT IS NOT ANY THE LESS SO BECAUSE IT AFFECTS INTERSTATE COMMERCE.  SEE
SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY DEPT. V. BARNWELL BROS., SUPRA, 191-192, AND
CASES CITED.  AS THE STATE HAS AUTHORITY TO CHARGE A REASONABLE FEE FOR
THE USE OF ITS HIGHWAYS, AND AS THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE TRAFFIC WHICH
THE STATE HAS MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF FIXING THE FEES IS VALID, THE
ONLY REMAINING QUESTION IS WHETHER THE FEES WHICH IT HAS FIXED MUST BE
DEEMED EXCESSIVE. 

REASONABLENESS OF THE FEES. 

IN INGELS V. MORF, SUPRA, THE $15 FEE CHARGED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
ACT OF 1935 FOR DRIVING A CAR INTO THE STATE FOR PURPOSE OF SALE WAS
CONTESTED AS EXCESSIVE.  THERE THE STATUTE DECLARED THAT THE FEE WAS
"INTENDED TO REIMBURSE THE STATE TREASURY FOR THE ADDED EXPENSE WHICH
THE STATE MAY INCUR IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ACT,
AND THE ADDED EXPENSE OF POLICING THE HIGHWAYS OVER WHICH SUCH
CARAVANING MAY BE CONDUCTED,  ..  "  AND THE AUTOMOBILE OWNER ASSUMED
AND BY PROOF SUSTAINED THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE CHARGE MADE FOR
THE PRECISE PURPOSES DEFINED BY THE STATUTE WAS EXCESSIVE.  WE ACCEPTED
THE EVIDENCE AS ESTABLISHING THAT THE COST OF ISSUING CARAVAN PERMITS
WAS ABOUT $5 PER CAR AND AS SUPPORTING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT
THAT THE COST OF POLICING DID NOT EXCEED $5 A CAR.  AND WE CONCLUDED
THAT THE TOTAL COST OF ADMINISTRATION AND POLICING WAS SUBSTANTIALLY
LESS THAN THE $15 FEE CHARGED. 

HERE A FEE OF $7.50 IS COLLECTED FOR ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ACT AND A FEE OF LIKE AMOUNT IS CHARGED FOR THE USE OF THE
HIGHWAYS.  APPELLEES HAVE OFFERED NO PROOF THAT EITHER OF THE FEES IS
TOO LARGE, ALTHOUGH THE BURDEN RESTED UPON THEM TO SHOW THAT THE FEES
WERE EXCESSIVE FOR THE DECLARED PURPOSES.  HENDRICK V. MARYLAND, SUPRA,
624; INTERSTATE BUSSES CORP. V. BLODGETT, 276 U.S. 245, 251; MORF.  V.
BINGAMAN, SUPRA, 410; INGELS V. MORF, SUPRA, 296.  GREAT NORTHERN RY.
CO. V. WASHINGTON, 300 U.S. 154, IS NOT TO THE CONTRARY. 

APPELLANTS, WITHOUT ABANDONING THEIR POSITION THAT THE BURDEN OF
PROOF RESTS ON APPELLEES, OFFERED EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE COSTS OF
ADMINISTRATION AND POLICING PROVED IN INGELS V. MORF, SUPRA, WERE
INCOMPLETE.  DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE CASE MUCH OF THE PROOF IS INEXACT
AND SPECULATIVE.  BUT THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THIRTY-NINE OFFICERS
DEVOTED PART OR ALL OF THEIR TIME TO ENFORCING THE 1937 ACT.  THE
EXPENSE OF OPERATING THEIR AUTOMOBILES AND MOTORCYCLES IS CONSIDERABLE;
AN INCREASED BURDEN IS IMPOSED UPON THE PERSONNEL OF THE BORDER POLICE
STATIONS; AND SOME INCREASE IN CLERICAL FORCE AND IN EXPENDITURES FOR
STATIONERY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS HAS BEEN REQUIRED.  INVESTIGATIONS
OF ATTEMPTED EVASIONS INCREASE THE UNIT COST ABOVE THAT OF OTHER TYPES
OF TRAFFIC.  THE TOTAL OF THESE ADDED EXPENSES, AS COMPUTED BY
APPELLANTS AT ABOUT $133,000 ANNUALLY, CERTAINLY APPROXIMATES THE
AMOUNT OF THE REVENUE DERIVED FROM THE FEES.  THE AGGREGATE OF THE FEES
COLLECTED DURING ELEVEN MONTHS FOR 14,000 CARS AT $7.50 EACH IS
$105,000.  APPELLEES DO NOTHING TO CHALLENGE THIS EVIDENCE, AND THEY
POINT TO NO SPECIFIC ERRORS IN THE ESTIMATES OR COMPUTATION UPON WHICH
APPELLANTS CALCULATE THE COSTS.    THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED TO COMPUTE
WITH MATHEMATICAL PRECISION THE COST TO IT OF THE SERVICES NECESSITATED
BY THE CARAVAN TRAFFIC.  IF THE FEES CHARGED DO NOT APPEAR TO BE
MANIFESTLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE SERVICES RENDERED, WE CANNOT SAY
FROM OUR OWN KNOWLEDGE OR EXPERIENCE THAT THEY ARE EXCESSIVE.  KANE V.
NEW JERSEY, SUPRA, 168; INTERSTATE BUSSES CORP. V. BLODGETT, SUPRA,
251, 252; MORF V. BINGAMAN, SUPRA; DIXIE OHIO EXPRESS CO. V. STATE
REVENUE COMM'N, SUPRA; SEE PATAPSCO GUANO CO. V. NORTH CAROLINA, 171
U.S. 345, 354; MCLEAN & CO. V. DENVER & RIO GRANDE R. CO., 203 U.S. 38,
55; INTERSTATE TRANSIT, INC. V. LINDSEY, 283 U.S. 183, 186.  APPELLEES
HAVE FAILED TO SUSTAIN THE BURDEN OF PROOF THAT EITHER OF THE FEES IS
EXCESSIVE FOR THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH IT IS COLLECTED. 

THE TRIAL COURT SEEMS TO HAVE THOUGHT AS APPELLEES ARGUE, THAT
UNREASONABLENESS OF THE FEES WAS ESTABLISHED BY PROOF THAT THE SAME
FEES ARE NOT IMPOSED ON OTHER CLASSES OF TRAFFIC.  BUT SINCE, AS WE
HAVE SEEN, THERE IS BASIS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE TRAFFIC, THERE
IS BASIS FOR A DIFFERENCE IN FEES CHARGED THE DIFFERENT CLASSES. 
HENDRICK V. MARYLAND, SUPRA; INTERSTATE BUSSES CORP. V. BLODGETT,
SUPRA.  APPELLEES HAVE LAID NO FOUNDATION FOR ANY CONTENTION THAT THERE
ARE NOT COMPENSATING DIFFERENCES IN THE TRAFFIC COMPARABLE TO THE
DIFFERENCE IN FEES, OR FOR IMPEACHING THE LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENT THAT
THOSE SPECIFIED ARE FAIRLY RELATED TO THE TRAFFIC TO WHICH THEY ARE
APPLIED. 

THE CAUSE WILL BE REVERSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DISTRICT COURT TO
DISMISS THE CASE AS TO APPELLEE PAUL GRAY, INC., ON THE MERITS, AND TO
DISMISS AS TO THE OTHER APPELLEES FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION.  REVERSED. 

FN1  THE SUIT WAS BEGUN JULY 14, 1937, BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF THE
AMENDMENT TO SEC. 24 OF THE JUDICIAL CODE; ACT AUGUST 21, 1937, C. 726,
50 STAT. 738, PROVIDING THAT "NO DISTRICT COURT SHALL HAVE JURISDICTION
OF ANY SUIT TO ENJOIN, SUSPEND, OR RESTRAIN THE ASSESSMENT, LEVY, OR
COLLECTION OF ANY TAX IMPOSED BY OR PURSUANT TO THE LAWS OF ANY STATE
WHERE A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND EFFICIENT REMEDY MAY BE HAD AT LAW OR IN
EQUITY IN THE COURTS OF SUCH STATE."  SECTION 2 OF THE ACT EXCLUDES
FROM ITS OPERATION SUITS BEGUN IN THE DISTRICT COURTS BEFORE ITS
ENACTMENT. 

FN2  A DIFFERENT QUESTION IS INVOLVED IN THE CASE OF A CREDITOR'S
BILL TO LIQUIDATE AN INSOLVENT CORPORATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL
CREDITORS.  THERE HIS CLAIM MUST EXCEED THE JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT. 
LION BONDING CO. V. KARATZ, 262 U.S. 77.  BUT CREDITORS WHOSE CLAIMS
ARE LESS MAY BE MADE PARTIES BECAUSE OF THEIR INTEREST IN A FUND
BROUGHT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT.  GIBSON V. SHUFELDT, 122
U.S. 27; HANDLEY V. STUTZ, 137 U.S. 366; NATIONAL BANK OF COMMERCE V.
ALLEN, 90 F. 545, 555-556. 

MR. JUSTICE BLACK IS OF THE OPINION THAT THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION AS TO ALL THE APPELLEES.