Emich Motors v. General Motors, 340 U.S. 558 (1951)

Topics:  Emich Motors, General Motors

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
 
Case:   EMICH MOTORS V. GENERAL MOTORS

Case #: 340US558


NO. 209.  ARGUED JANUARY 3-4, 1951.  - DECIDED FEBRUARY 26, 1951.  - 181
F.2D 70, MODIFIED. 


1.  IN THIS SUIT UNDER SEC. 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO RECOVER TREBLE
DAMAGES FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY REASON OF A CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT
OF TRADE, PLAINTIFFS WERE ENTITLED UNDER SEC. 5 TO INTRODUCE A PRIOR
CRIMINAL JUDGMENT BASED ON A CONVICTION OF DEFENDANTS FOR THE SAME
CONSPIRACY, IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PRIMA FACIE ALL MATTERS OF FACT AND
LAW NECESSARILY DECIDED BY THE CONVICTION AND THE VERDICT ON WHICH IT
WAS BASED.  PP. 566-569. 

2.  WHERE THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT RESTS ON A GENERAL VERDICT OF THE
JURY, WHAT WAS DECIDED BY THAT JUDGMENT MUST BE DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL
JUDGE HEARING THE TREBLE DAMAGE SUIT, UPON AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RECORD, INCLUDING THE PLEADINGS, THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, THE
INSTRUCTIONS UNDER WHICH THE JURY ARRIVED AT ITS VERDICT, AND ANY
OPINIONS OF THE COURT.  P. 569. 

3.  THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT INVOLVED IN THIS CASE WAS PRIMA FACIE
EVIDENCE OF A GENERAL CONSPIRACY FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONOPOLIZING THE
FINANCING OF GENERAL MOTORS CARS, AND ALSO OF THE EFFECTUATION OF THAT
CONSPIRACY BY COERCING GENERAL MOTORS DEALERS TO USE ITS SUBSIDIARY
FINANCE COMPANY'S SERVICES.  PP. 570-571. 

4.  IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THEIR PRIMA FACIE CASE, IT THEREFORE WAS
ONLY NECESSARY FOR PLAINTIFFS TO INTRODUCE, IN ADDITION TO THE CRIMINAL
JUDGMENT, EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF THE CONSPIRACY ON THEM AND EVIDENCE
OF ANY RESULTING DAMAGES.  P. 571. 

5.  WHAT ISSUES WERE DECIDED BY THE CRIMINAL CONVICTION IS A QUESTION
OF LAW ON WHICH THE JUDGE MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY.  HE SHOULD (1)
EXAMINE THE RECORD TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES DECIDED BY THAT JUDGMENT;
(2) IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RECONSTRUCT THAT CASE IN THE MANNER
AND TO THE EXTENT HE DEEMS NECESSARY TO ACQUAINT THE JURY FULLY WITH
THE ISSUES DETERMINED THEREIN; AND (3) EXPLAIN THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF
THE FORMER JUDGMENT ON THE CASE AT TRIAL.  PP. 571-572. 

EMICH MOTORS CORP. ET AL. V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT. 

THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO
MODIFY ITS JUDGMENT, P. 572. 

MR. JUSTICE CLARK DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 

THIS ACTION WAS BROUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS UNDER SEC. 4 OF THE CLAYTON ACT  FN1  TO
RECOVER TREBLE DAMAGES FOR INJURIES ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SUFFERED BY
REASON OF A CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN VIOLATION OF THE
SHERMAN ACT, SEC. 1.  FN22  PLAINTIFFS, PETITIONERS HERE, ARE EMICH
MOTORS CORPORATION, A FORMER DEALER IN CHEVROLET CARS, AND ITS RELATED
FINANCE COMPANY, U.S. ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION.  RESPONDENTS ARE GENERAL
MOTORS CORPORATION AND ITS WHOLLY OWNED SUBSIDIARY FINANCE COMPANY,
GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION (GMAC). 

PRIOR TO THIS ACTION RESPONDENTS HAD BEEN CONVICTED IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA ON AN INDICTMENT
CHARGING THEM, AND CERTAIN OF THEIR OFFICERS AND AGENTS WHO WERE
ACQUITTED, WITH A CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE TRADE IN
GENERAL MOTORS CARS.  AT TRIAL IN THE INSTANT CASE PETITIONERS WERE
PERMITTED TO INTRODUCE THE ANTECEDENT CRIMINAL INDICTMENT, VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE UNDER SEC. 5 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, WHICH PROVIDES IN
PART THAT 

"A FINAL JUDGMENT OR DECREE RENDERED IN ANY CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OR
IN ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING IN EQUITY BROUGHT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE
UNITED STATES UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS TO THE EFFECT THAT A DEFENDANT
HAS VIOLATED SAID LAWS SHALL BE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE AGAINST SUCH
DEFENDANT IN ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING BROUGHT BY ANY OTHER PARTY AGAINST
SUCH DEFENDANT UNDER SAID LAWS AS TO ALL MATTERS RESPECTING WHICH SAID
JUDGMENT OR DECREE WOULD BE AN ESTOPPEL AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES THERETO
.. "   FN3 

A JUDGMENT FOR PETITIONERS WAS REVERSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PARTLY ON THE GROUND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
THE USE IT PERMITTED THE JURY TO MAKE OF EVIDENCE DERIVED FROM THE
PRIOR CRIMINAL PROCEEDING.  181 F.2D 70(1950).  WE GRANTED CERTIORARI,
LIMITING REVIEW TO IMPORTANT QUESTIONS AS TO THE SCOPE OF SEC. 5 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT.  340 U.S. 808(1950), REHEARING DENIED 340 U.S. 894(1950). 

              I. 

THE RELEVANT FACTS AS TO THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AGAINST RESPONDENTS
MAY BE STATED BRIEFLY.  THE CHARGE OF THE INDICTMENT WAS SUMMARIZED ON
APPEAL AS FOLLOWS: 

"  ..  PAARAGRAPH 34 CHARGES  ..  A  CONSPIRACY TO RESTRAIN UNDULY
THE INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE IN GENERAL MOTORS AUTOMOBILES. 
PARAGRAPH 35 STATES THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE DEFENDANTS WAS TO
MONOPOLIZE AND CONTROL THE BUSINESS OF FINANCING THE TRADE AND COMMERCE
IN NEW AND USED GENERAL MOTORS AUTOMOBILES.  PARAGRAPH 70 ALLEGES THAT
DEALERS HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE DEFENDANTS' COERCIVE PLAN IN ORDER TO
SAVE SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENTS IN THEIR BUSINESSES, PARAGRAPH 71 STATES
THAT THE EFFECT OF THE CONSPIRACY HAS BEEN TO RESTRAIN AND BURDEN
UNREASONABLY THE INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE IN GENERAL MOTORS
AUTOMOBILES, AND PARAGRAPH 72 IS A RESTATEMENT OF PARAGRAPH 34. 

"THE SPECIFIC CONDUCT EMBRACED WITHIN THE ILLEGAL CONCERT OF ACTION
IS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 36 TO 67 OF THE INDICTMENT  ..  :   (1)
REQUIRING DEALERS TO PROMISE TO USE GMAC EXCLUSIVELY AS A CONDITION TO
OBTAINING A FRANCHISE FOR THE SALE, TRANSPORTATION AND DELIVERY OF
AUTOMOBILES; (2) MAKING CONTRACTS FOR SHORT PERIODS AND CANCELLABLE
WITHOUT CAUSE, CANCELING OR THREATENING TO CANCEL SUCH CONTRACTS UNLESS
GMAC FACILITIES ARE USED; (3) DISCRIMINATING AGAINST DEALERS NOT USING
GMAC BY REFUSING TO DELIVER CARS WHEN ORDERED, DELAYING SHIPMENT AND
SHIPPING CARS OF DIFFERENT NUMBER, MODEL, COLOR AND STYLE; (4)
COMPELLING DEALERS TO DISCLOSE HOW THEY FINANCE THEIR WHOLESALE
PURCHASES AND RETAIL SALES, EXAMINING AND INSPECTING DEALERS' BOOKS AND
ACCOUNTS IN ORDER TO PROCURE THIS INFORMATION, AND REQUIRING DEALERS TO
JUSTIFY THEIR USING OTHER FINANCING MEDIA; (5) GIVING SPECIAL FAVORS TO
DEALERS USING THE WHOLESALE AND RETAIL FACILITIES OF GMAC; (6) GRANTING
SPECIAL FAVORS TO GMAC WHICH ARE DENIED TO OTHER DISCOUNT COMPANIES;
(7) GIVING DEALERS A REBATE FROM THE GMAC FINANCE CHARGE PAID BY THE
RETAIL PURCHASER, IN ORDER TO INDUCE USE OF GMAC FINANCING FACILITIES;
AND (8) COMPELLING DEALERS TO REFRAIN FROM USING OTHER FINANCE
COMPANIES BY ALL OTHER NECESSARY, APPROPRIATE OR EFFECTIVE MEANS."  FN4
THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS SUBMITTED TO THE JURY WITH INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE
GOVERNMENT NEED NOT PROVE ALL OF SOME TWENTY-SIX ACTS ALLEGED IN THE
INDICTMENT AS THE MEANS OF EFFECTING THE CONSPIRACY.  THE JURY RENDERED
A GENERAL VERDICT FINDING THE CORPORATE DEFENDANTS GUILTY AND
ACQUITTING ALL INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS.  MAXIMUM FINES WERE ASSESSED
AGAINST EACH OF THE CORPORATIONS.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMED.  UNITED STATES V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 121 F.2D 376(1941). 
THIS COURT DENIED CERTIORARI, 314 U.S. 618(1941), REHEARING DENIED 314
U.S. 710(1941). 

AMONG THE ALMOST 50 DEALERS AND FORMER DEALERS WHOSE TESTIMONY THE
GOVERNMENT INTRODUCED IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS FRED EMICH, WHO OWNED
OR CONTROLLED THE CORPORATIONS WHICH ARE PETITIONERS HERE.  ON THE
CRIMINAL APPEAL THE COURT OF APPEALS THUS REVIEWED HIS TESTIMONY: 

"FRED EMICH WAS A CHEVROLET DEALER AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, FROM 1932 TO
1936 AND HE OWNED HIS OWN FINANCE COMPANY TO FACILITATE HIS PURCHASES
AND SALES, A COURSE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT WHICH DISPLEASED GMAC.  HE
RECEIVED UNORDERED CARS AND TRUCKS IN 1933, AND THE CITY MANAGER OF
CHEVROLET INFORMED HIM THAT SHIPMENT OF UNORDERED CARS WOULD CEASE AS
SOON AS HE WOULD GIVE SOME OF HIS TIME SALES FINANCE PAPER TO GMAC.  HE
GAVE GMAC AROUND 10% OF HIS BUSINESS IN 1934 AND BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH
THE VISITS OF GMAC AND CHEVROLET REPRESENTATIVES.  THE ZONE MANAGER
WARNED HIM AT THE 1935 CONTRACT RENEWAL MEETING TO THE EFFECT THAT IF
HE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE AS A CHEVROLET DEALER HE HAD BETTER USE GMAC AT
LEAST 50%.  AGAIN HE EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES WITH CHEVROLET.  THIS
TIME CARS OF WRONG COLORS AND MODELS WERE SHIPPED TO HIM AND UNORDERED
ACCESSORIES IN GREAT QUANTITIES WERE FORCED UPON HIM.  IN ADDITION HE
WAS REQUIRED TO SEND BLANK CHECKS TO THE FACTORY BEFORE CARS WERE
SHIPPED TO HIM.  HE WAS TOLD BY THE GMAC REPRESENTATIVE THAT THESE
PROBLEMS WOULD DISAPPEAR IF HE USED GMAC.  IN 1936 EMICH WAS GIVEN HIS
'LAST WARNING,' THE ZONE MANAGER TELLING HIM THAT HE WAS GOING TO MAKE
AN EXAMPLE OF EMICH FOR HIS FAILURE TO USE GMAC.  NOT LONG THEREAFTER
EMICH WAS CANCELLED AS A DEALER, AND HE APPEALED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
GENERAL MOTORS WHERE HE PLEADED THAT IN A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS HE HAD
DONE A GROSS BUSINESS OF AROUND $3,000,000.  THE PRESIDENT OF GENERAL
MOTORS TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD BEEN CANCELLED BECAUSE HE DID NOT USE GMAC,
THAT IT WAS THE POLICY OF THE CORPORATION TO REQUIRE DEALERS TO USE
GMAC, AND THAT IF EMICH WOULD NOT AGREE TO USE GMAC IT WOULD BE USELESS
FOR THE PRESIDENT OF GENERAL MOTORS TO DISCUSS HIS REINSTATEMENT  ..
"   FN5

                          II. 

IN THEIR COMPLAINT PETITIONERS ALLEGE THAT RESPONDENTS UNLAWFULLY
CONSPIRED IN RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE TRADE IN GENERAL MOTORS CARS; THAT
THE CONSPIRACY SO ALLEGED IS THE SAME AS THAT CHARGED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS AND OF WHICH THEY WERE CONVICTED IN THE ANTECEDENT CRIMINAL
ACTION, A COPY OF THE INDICTMENT THEREIN BEING ATTACHED AS AN EXHIBIT;
THAT PURSUANT TO THIS CONSPIRACY RESPONDENTS INJURED PETITIONERS'
BUSINESSES BY ONE OR MORE OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTS SET FORTH IN SAID
INDICTMENT, MORE PARTICULARLY BY TERMINATING OR CANCELLING OR
THREATENING TO TERMINATE OR CANCEL THE DEALER FRANCHISE CONTRACTS OF
EMICH MOTORS, WHICH HAD FINANCED THE PURCHASE OR SALE OF CARS THROUGH
U.S. ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION RATHER THAN THROUGH GMAC.  RESPONDENTS DENY
ANY CONSPIRACY; THEY ADMIT CANCELLATION OF THE FRANCHISES BUT ASSERT
THAT SUCH ACTION WAS JUSTIFIED BY EMICH MOTORS' FAILURE TO PERFORM
CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS THEREUNDER, AS WELL AS ITS PERSISTENCE IN A COURSE
OF CONDUCT INIMICAL TO THE INTEREST OF GENERAL MOTORS IN PROMOTING THE
SALE OF CHEVROLET CARS. 

IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH THEIR PRIMA FACIE CASE UNDER SEC. 5,
PETITIONERS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE THE SIX-VOLUME RECORD OF TESTIMONY AND
EXHIBITS IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.  THE COURT HELD IT INADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE FOR THE JURY, WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS NOT IMPORTANT HERE. 
HOWEVER, OVER RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION, THE COURT ADMITTED, AS EXHIBITS
TO GO TO THE JURY, THE INDICTMENT, VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
IN THE CRIMINAL CASE. 

IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS THE TRIAL JUDGE SUMMARIZED THE CRIMINAL
INDICTMENT, THE COMPLAINT OF PETITIONERS, AND RESPONDENTS' ANSWER.  HE
THEN INSTRUCTED THAT THE 

"  ..  JUUDGMENT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS  ..  ISS ADMITTED AS
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT (RESPONDENTS) DID
ENTER INTO AN UNLAWFUL CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
..  INN THE MANNER DESCRIBED IN THE INDICTMENT  ..  "  

AFTER EXPLAINING THE TERM "PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE," THE COURT THEN
SUMMARIZED SEC. 5 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AND CHARGED THAT 

"  ..  ITT WAS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE ALL OF THE
ACTS ALLEGED IN THE SEPARATE SECTIONS OF THE INDICTMENT.  ..  NOOR IS
IT NECESSARY FOR THE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE ALL THE ACTS CHARGED IN THE
INDICTMENT FOR YOU TO FIND THAT THE CONSPIRACY ALLEGED DID EXIST. 

"THE JUDGMENT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE IN THIS
CASE, PURSUANT TO THE LAW TO WHICH I HAVE JUST REFERRED, FOR THE
PURPOSE OF THE PLAINTIFF MAKING A PRIMA FACIE CASE AGAINST THE
DEFENDANTS AS TO ONE OF THE ISSUES OF THIS CASE AND ONLY AND SOLELY FOR
THE PURPOSE OF DEFINING, DESCRIBING, AND LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE
JUDGMENT ON THE VERDICT WHICH WAS ENTERED IN THAT CASE, NAMELY, THE
CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS. 

"THE BURDEN IS ON THE PLAINTIFFS OF ESTABLISHING BY A PREPONDERANCE
OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE INJURED BY THE DEFENDANTS PURSUANT TO OR
IN THE COURSE OF A CONSPIRACY AND IN ORDER TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF THE CHEVROLET FRANCHISES THEY MUST PROVE BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE INCLUDING THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT THAT THE
DEFENDANTS ENTERED INTO A CONSPIRACY TO COMPEL THE USE OF GENERAL
MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION BY AGREEING AMONG THEMSELVES, AMONG OTHER
THINGS, TO CANCEL DEALERS WHO FAILED OR REFUSED TO USE GENERAL MOTORS
ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION TO A SATISFACTORY EXTENT AND THAT THE FRANCHISE
OF EMICH MOTORS CORPORATION WAS CANCELLED BY REASON OF AND PURSUANT TO
SAID CONSPIRACY AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE THINGS ALLEGED BY DEFENDANTS AS
THE REASONS FOR SUCH CANCELLATION, AND TO RECOVER ANY DAMAGES FOR THE
FAILURE OF DEFENDANTS TO DELIVER ANY CHEVROLET AUTOMOBILES, PLAINTIFFS
MUST ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS AS PART OF THE CONSPIRACY AGREED AMONG
THEMSELVES TO WITHHOLD OR DELAY DELIVERY OF AUTOMOBILES TO DEALERS WHO
REFUSED OR FAILED TO USE THE SERVICES OF GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION TO A SATISFACTORY EXTENT AND THAT THE DEFENDANTS ACTIVELY
FAILED TO DELIVER OR DELAYED SHIPMENTS OF CARS TO PLAINTIFFS PURSUANT
TO AND AS A PART OF SAID ALLEGED CONSPIRACY." 

THE JURY RETURNED A VERDICT FOR PETITIONERS WHICH RESULTED IN
JUDGMENTS FOR $1,236,000 TREBLE DAMAGES.  THE COURT ASSESSED
$257,358.10 AS COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. 

THE COURT OF APPEALS CONCLUDED THAT UNDER SEC. 5 THE CRIMINAL
JUDGMENT WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE "THAT DEFENDANTS HAD BEEN GUILTY OF A
CONSPIRACY TO RESTRAIN DEALERS' INTERSTATE TRADE AND COMMERCE IN
GENERAL MOTORS CARS FOR THE PURPOSE OF MONOPOLIZING THE FINANCING
ESSENTIAL TO THE MOVEMENT OF THOSE CARS."  181 F.2D AT 75.  IT APPROVED
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING AS TO THE INADMISSIBILITY IN EVIDENCE OF THE
ENTIRE RECORD OF THE CRIMINAL CASE, BUT CRITICIZED THE USE OF THE
INDICTMENT AS AN EXHIBIT TO THE COMPLAINT, AS WELL AS CERTAIN
REFERENCES TO THE INDICTMENT IN THE OPENING STATEMENT AND CLOSING
ARGUMENT OF PETITIONERS' COUNSEL TO THE JURY.  IT HELD THAT SERIOUS
ERROR WAS COMMITTED WHEN THE INDICTMENT WAS SENT TO THE JURY AS AN
EXHIBIT AND THE TRIAL COURT "TOLD THE JURY THAT IT COULD LOOK TO IT
(THE INDICTMENT) TO ASCERTAIN THE MEANS AND THE ACTS COMMITTED IN
FURTHERANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY  ..  "   THE COURT OBSERVED THAT "IT WAS
UNNECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVE  ..  ANNY OF THE ACTS OR MEANS,
EXCEPT FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING VENUE, IN ORDER FOR THE JURY IN
THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING TO FIND DEFENDANTS GUILTY," AND THAT "SUCH ACTS
AND MEANS ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS ESTABLISHED BY THE FINDING OF
GUILT."  IT CONCLUDED THAT THE USE OF THE INDICTMENT AS EVIDENCE WAS
AGGRAVATED BY THE INSTRUCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE LAST QUOTED AND
ITALICIZED IN PART, SUPRA, P. 565. 

                          III. 

THE ISSUE WE MUST DETERMINE, AS DEFINED IN OUR ORDER GRANTING REVIEW,
IS "WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSTRUING SEC. 5 OF THE
CLAYTON ACT  ..  ASS NOT PERMITTING:  (A) THE ADMISSION IN THE INSTANT
CASE OF THE INDICTMENT IN THE ANTECEDENT CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST
RESPONDENTS, NOR (B) THE JUDGMENT THEREIN TO BE USED AS EVIDENCE THAT
THE CONSPIRACY OF WHICH RESPONDENTS HAD BEEN CONVICTED OCCASIONED EMICH
MOTORS' CANCELLATION."    IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF SEC. 5 IN
THIS CASE WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH FIVE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS.  THE
BROADEST CONSTRUCTION IS URGED BY PETITIONERS WHO CONTEND THAT THE
CRIMINAL JUDGMENT IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE THAT EMICH MOTORS' FRANCHISES
WERE CANCELLED PURSUANT TO THE UNLAWFUL CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE ENTIRE
RECORD IN THE CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE ADMISSIBLE IN THIS ACTION.  THE
VIEW OF THE TRIAL JUDGE DIFFERS ONLY IN THAT HE WOULD NOT PERMIT THE
RECORD IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, BEYOND THE INDICTMENT, VERDICT AND
JUDGMENT, TO GO TO THE JURY.  THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE TAKES
A MORE CONTRACTED POSITION, URGING IN ITS BRIEF THAT THE JUDGMENT IS
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE CONSPIRACY AND ALSO OF THE PERFORMANCE OF
SUCH ACTS IN ACCOMPLISHING IT AS THE JURY IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, IN
RENDERING A VERDICT OF GUILTY, NECESSARILY FOUND TO HAVE OCCURRED, THE
LATTER TO BE DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN THE TREBLE-DAMAGE SUIT
FROM THE ENTIRE RECORD IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.  IN ITS VIEW THE TRIAL
COURT UNDER APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS MAY SUBMIT THE CRIMINAL PLEADINGS
TO THE JURY IN ORDER TO ASSIST IT IN UNDERSTANDING THE CHARGE AS TO
WHAT WAS DETERMINED BY THE CRIMINAL CONVICTION.  THE COURT OF APPEALS
CONSTRUES THE SECTION STILL MORE NARROWLY, HOLDING THE JUDGMENT PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE ONLY OF CONSPIRACY BY RESPONDENTS.  IT CONCLUDES THAT
NONE OF THE RECORD IN THE CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE EXHIBITED TO THE
JURY, ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL JUDGE MAY EXAMINE IT "AS AN AID IN DETERMINING
OR DEFINING THE ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE EARLIER CASE  ..  "   181 F.2D
AT 76.  FINALLY, RESPONDENTS CONTEND THAT THE INDICTMENT CHARGED A
SINGLE CONSPIRACY TO PERFORM SOME TWENTY-SIX DIFFERENT ACTS; THAT SINCE
THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT OFFER EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ALL OF THE ACTS AND
WAS REQUIRED TO PROVE ONLY ONE OF THEM, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE UPON A GENERAL
VERDICT OF GUILTY TO DETERMINE ON WHICH OF THE VARIOUS ACTS THE JURY
BASED ITS VERDICT; THAT CONSEQUENTLY THE JUDGMENT HAS NO RELEVANCE
HERE. 

               IV. 

RECOMMENDATION BY PRESIDENT WILSON THAT CONGRESS "AGREE IN GIVING
PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS  ..  THHE RIGHT TO FOUND THEIR (ANTITRUST) SUITS
FOR REDRESS UPON THE FACTS AND JUDGMENTS PROVED AND ENTERED IN SUITS BY
THE GOVERNMENT WHERE THE GOVERNMENT HAS  ..  SUUED THE COMBINATIONS
COMPLAINED OF AND WON ITS SUIT  ..  "   51 CONG. REC. 1964. 
CONGRESSIONAL REPORTS AND DEBATES ON THE PROPOSAL WHICH ULTIMATELY
BECAME SEC. 5 REFLECT A PURPOSE TO MINIMIZE THE BURDENS OF LITIGATION
FOR INJURED PRIVATE SUITORS BY MAKING AVAILABLE TO THEM ALL MATTERS
PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ANTITRUST ACTIONS.  SEE
H.R. REP. NO. 627, 63D CONG., 2D SESS. 14; S. REP. NO. 698, 63D CONG.,
2D SESS. 45; 51 CONG. REC. 9270, 9490, 13851.  THE INTENDED APPLICATION
AND EXTENT OF SUCH EVIDENTIARY BENEFITS IS NOT REVEALED BY LEGISLATIVE
MATERIALS, EXCEPT THAT THEY SHOULD FOLLOW EQUALLY FROM PRIOR CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS AND EQUITY PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT.  BY ITS TERMS,
HOWEVER, SEC. 5 MAKES A PRIOR FINAL JUDGMENT OR DECREE IN FAVOR OF THE
UNITED STATES AVAILABLE TO A PRIVATE SUITOR AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF
"ALL MATTERS RESPECTING WHICH" THE JUDGMENT "WOULD BE AN ESTOPPEL"
BETWEEN THE DEFENDANTS AND THE UNITED STATES.  WE THINK THAT CONGRESS
INTENDED TO CONFER, SUBJECT ONLY TO A DEFENDANT'S ENJOYMENT OF ITS DAY
IN COURT AGAINST A NEW PARTY, AS LARGE AN ADVANTAGE AS THE ESTOPPEL
DOCTRINE WOULD AFFORD HAD THE GOVERNMENT BROUGHT SUIT. 

THE EVIDENTIARY USE WHICH MAY BE MADE UNDER SEC. 5 OF THE PRIOR
CONVICTION OF RESPONDENTS IS THUS TO BE DETERMINED BY REFERENCE TO THE
GENERAL DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL.  AS THIS COURT HAS OBSERVED, THAT
"PRINCIPLE IS AS APPLICABLE TO THE DECISIONS OF CRIMINAL COURTS AS TO
THOSE OF CIVIL JURISDICTION."  FRANK V. MANGUM, 237 U.S. 309,
334(1915); SEALFON V. UNITED STATES, 332 U.S. 575, 578(1948).  IT IS
WELL ESTABLISHED THAT A PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION MAY WORK AN ESTOPPEL
IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT IN A SUBSEQUENT CIVIL PROCEEDING.  UNITED
STATES V. GREATER NEW YORK LIVE POULTRY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, 53 F.2D
518(S.D.N.Y. 1931), AFFIRMED SUB NOM. LOCAL 167 V. UNITED STATES, 291
U.S. 293(1934); FARLEY V. PATTERSON, 166 APP. DIV. 358, 152 N.Y. SUPP.
59(1915); SEE STATE V. ADAMS, 72 VT. 253, 47 A. 779(1900); 2 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS (5TH ED. 1925), SEC. 657.  SUCH ESTOPPEL EXTENDS ONLY TO
QUESTIONS "DISTINCTLY PUT IN ISSUE AND DIRECTLY DETERMINED" IN THE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.  SEE FRANK V. MANGUM, SUPRA, AT 334; UNITED
STATES V. MEYERSON, 24 F.2D 855, 856(S.D.N.Y. 1928).  IN THE CASE OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION BASED ON A JURY VERDICT OF GUILTY, ISSUES WHICH
WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE VERDICT MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN
DETERMINED BY THE JUDGMENT.  CF. COMMONWEALTH V. EVANS, 101 MASS.
25(1869).  ACCORDINGLY, WE THINK PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO INTRODUCE
THE PRIOR JUDGMENT TO ESTABLISH PRIMA FACIE ALL MATTERS OF FACT AND LAW
NECESSARILY DECIDED BY THE CONVICTION AND THE VERDICT ON WHICH IT WAS
BASED. 

THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IS TO DETERMINE WHAT MATTERS WERE
ADJUDICATED IN THE ANTECEDENT SUIT.  A GENERAL VERDICT OF THE JURY OR
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT WITHOUT SPECIAL FINDINGS DOES NOT INDICATE WHICH
OF THE MEANS CHARGED IN THE INDICTMENT WERE FOUND TO HAVE BEEN USED IN
EFFECTUATING THE CONSPIRACY.  AND SINCE ALL OF THE ACTS CHARGED NEED
NOT BE PROVED FOR CONVICTION, UNITED STATES V. SOCONY-VACUUM OIL CO.,
310 U.S. 150(1940), SUCH A VERDICT DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS
USED ALL OF THE MEANS CHARGED OR ANY PARTICULAR ONE.  UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHAT WAS DECIDED BY THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT MUST BE
DETERMINED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE HEARING THE TREBLEDAMAGE SUIT, UPON AN
EXAMINATION OF THE RECORD, INCLUDING THE PLEADINGS, THE EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED, THE INSTRUCTIONS UNDER WHICH THE JURY ARRIVED AT ITS
VERDICT, AND ANY OPINIONS OF THE COURTS.  SEALFON V. UNITED STATES,
SUPRA; CF. OKLAHOMA V. TEXAS, 256 U.S. 70(1921).  FN6 

IN THE CRIMINAL CASE IT WAS THE COURT OF APPEALS' UNDISTURBED
DETERMINATION, WHICH WE ACCEPT HERE, THAT THE JURY VERDICT WAS FIRMLY
ROOTED IN A FINDING OF COERCIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF RESPONDENTS
TOWARD GENERAL MOTORS DEALERS TO FORCE THE USE OF GMAC FACILITIES. 
THAT COURT, IN COMMENTING ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE, SAID THAT
"THE JURY FINDING OF COERCION IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.  THE
COERCIVE PRACTICES WERE MANY AND VARIED  ..  ANND DIRECTLY AIMED TO
COMPEL DEALER-PURCHASERS TO USE GMAC IN FINANCING THE WHOLESALE
PURCHASE AND RETAIL SALE OF GENERAL MOTORS CARS.  ..  UNNDOUBTEDLY THE
JURY WAS WARRANTED IN ATTACHING THE COERCION LABEL TO THE ACTION THUS
ADOPTED BY THE APPELLANTS."  UNITED STATES V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 121
F.2D 376, 397(C.A.7TH CIR. 1941).  THE SAME CONCLUSION WAS REACHED BY
THIS COURT IN FORD MOTOR CO. V. UNITED STATES, 335 U.S. 303(1948),
WHERE IT WAS REQUIRED FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE TO DETERMINE WHAT WAS
NECESSARILY FOUND BY THE JURY VERDICT IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS AND GMAC.  FN7 

WE ARE, THEREFORE, OF OPINION THAT THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT WAS PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE GENERAL CONSPIRACY FOR THE PURPOSE OF
MONOPOLIZING THE FINANCING OF GENERAL MOTORS CARS, AND ALSO OF ITS
EFFECTUATION BY COERCING GENERAL MOTORS DEALERS TO USE GMAC.  TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PRIMA FACIE CASE IT THEREFORE WAS NECESSARY FOR
PETITIONERS ONLY TO INTRODUCE, IN ADDITION TO THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT,
EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF THE CONSPIRACY ON THEM, SUCH AS THE
CANCELLATION OF THEIR FRANCHISES AND THE PURPOSE OF GENERAL MOTORS IN
CANCELLING THEM, AND EVIDENCE OF ANY RESULTING DAMAGES.  FN8  FROM THIS
IT FOLLOWS THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS IN ERROR WHEN IT HELD THAT THE
JUDGMENT WAS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE ONLY OF A CONSPIRACY BY RESPONDENTS. 

WHAT ISSUES WERE DECIDED BY THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LITIGATION IS, OF
COURSE, A QUESTION OF LAW AS TO WHICH THE COURT MUST INSTRUCT THE
JURY.  IT IS THE TASK OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE JURY THE
ISSUES THAT WERE DETERMINED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN THE PRIOR SUIT,
AND TO LIMIT TO THOSE ISSUES THE EFFECT OF THAT JUDGMENT AS EVIDENCE IN
THE PRESENT ACTION.  AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH SUCH EXPLANATION SHOULD
BE MADE, NO MECHANICAL RULE CAN BE LAID DOWN TO CONTROL THE TRIAL
JUDGE, WHO MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE.  HE
MUST BE FREE TO EXERCISE "A WELL-ESTABLISHED RANGE OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION."  NARDONE V. UNITED STATES, 308 U.S. 338, 342(1939).  HE IS
NOT PRECLUDED FROM RESORTING TO SUCH PORTIONS OF THE RECORD, INCLUDING
THE PLEADINGS AND JUDGMENT, IN THE ANTECEDENT CASE AS HE MAY FIND
NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE TO USE IN PRESENTING TO THE JURY A CLEAR
PICTURE OF THE ISSUES DECIDED THERE AND RELEVANT TO THE CASE ON TRIAL. 
CF. EASTMAN KODAK CO. V. SOUTHERN PHOTO MATERIAL CO., 295 F. 98,
101(C.A.5TH CIR. 1923), AFFIRMED 273 U.S. 359(1927).  A SIMILAR
DISCRETION MUST BE EXERCISED IN APPROVING THE ATTACHMENT OF A COPY OF
THE INDICTMENT AS AN EXHIBIT TO THE COMPLAINT. 

IN SUMMARY THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD (1) EXAMINE THE RECORD OF THE
ANTECEDENT CASE TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES DECIDED BY THE JUDGMENT; (2) IN
HIS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY RECONSTRUCT THAT CASE IN THE MANNER AND TO
THE EXTENT HE DEEMS NECESSARY TO ACQUAINT THE JURY FULLY WITH THE
ISSUES DETERMINED THEREIN; AND (3) EXPLAIN THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF THE
FORMER JUDGMENT ON THE CASE AT TRIAL.  THE COURT MAY, IN THE INTEREST
OF CLARITY, SO INFORM THE JURY AT THE TIME THE JUDGMENT IN THE PRIOR
ACTION IS OFFERED IN EVIDENCE; OR HE MAY SO INSTRUCT AT A LATER TIME
IF, IN HIS DISCRETION, THE ENDS OF JUSTICE WILL BE SERVED. 

THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO
MODIFY ITS JUDGMENT TO CONFORM WITH THIS OPINION.  IT IS SO ORDERED. 

FN1  38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. SEC. 15. 

FN2  26 STAT. 209, 15 U.S.C. SEC. 1. 

FN3  38 STAT. 731, 15 U.S.C. SEC. 16. 

FN4  UNITED STATES V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 121 F.2D 376, 383(C.A.7TH
CIR. 1941). 

FN5  UNITED STATES V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 121 F.2D 376, 396(C.A.7TH
CIR. 1941). 

FN6  SEE ALSO MCLAREN, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AS APPLIED TO THE
TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES, 10 WASH. L. REV. 198, 200(1935). 

FN7  IN THE FORD CASE IT WAS STATED THAT THE "PLAIN EFFECT" OF THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL ACTION AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS AND GMAC WAS
"TO DRAW A LINE BETWEEN SUCH PRACTICES AS CANCELLATION OF A DEALER'S
CONTRACT, OR REFUSAL TO RENEW IT, OR DISCRIMINATION IN THE SHIPMENT OF
AUTOMOBILES, AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCING DEALERS TO USE GMAC, ALL OF
WHICH FALL WITHIN THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF 'COERCION,' AND OTHER
PRACTICES FOR WHICH 'PERSUASION,' 'EXPOSITION' OR 'ARGUMENT' ARE FAIR
CHARACTERIZATIONS.  ..  THHE TRIAL JUDGE USED THE WORD 'COERCION' TO
SUMMARIZE PRACTICES WHICH, IF THE JURY FOUND THEM TO EXIST, WOULD CALL
FOR A VERDICT AGAINST GENERAL MOTORS.  HE USED THE WORDS 'PERSUASION,'
'EXPOSITION' AND 'ARGUMENT' TO DESCRIBE CONDUCT WHICH, IN COMMON USAGE,
IS NOT 'COERCION' AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH A VERDICT. 
NOTHING IN OTHER PORTIONS OF THE JUDGE'S CHARGE ERASES OR BLURS THIS
LINE OF DISTINCTION."  335 U.S. AT 316-319.  RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE
INSTRUCTIONS ARE SET FORTH AT P. 316, N. 3. 

FN8 IN DECIDING THAT UNDER SEC. 5 THE CRIMINAL JUDGMENT AGAINST
RESPONDENTS MAY BE ADMITTED AS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE ONLY OF THE FACT OF
CONSPIRACY AND OF THE USE OF COERCIVE METHODS IN CARRYING IT OUT, WE DO
NOT INTEND TO PRECLUDE ITS ADMISSION FOR SUCH OTHER PURPOSES, APART
FROM SEC. 5, AS THE GENERAL LAW OF EVIDENCE MAY PERMIT.  PETITIONERS
CONTEND THAT THE JUDGMENT MAY BE CONSIDERED BY THE JURY AS EVIDENCE OF
RESPONDENTS' INTENTION IN CANCELLING THE EMICHS' FRANCHISES.  CF.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3D ED. 1940), SECS. 302-304; AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION V. UNITED STATES, 76 U.S. APP. D.C. 70, 87-89, 130 F.2D
233, 250-252(C.A.D.C. CIR. 1942), AFFIRMED 317 U.S. 519(1943).  WHETHER
THIS CONTENTION IS CORRECT AND, IF SO, WHETHER SUCH EVIDENCE WOULD
ESTABLISH PRIMA FACIE AN ILLEGAL MOTIVE ARE QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE
OF OUR PRESENT REVIEW. 

MR. JUSTICE MINTON TOOK NO PART IN THE CONSIDERATION OR DECISION OF
THIS CASE.