United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958)

Topics:  A&P Trucking Co.

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
 
Case:   UNITED STATES V. A & P TRUCKING CO. 

Case #: 358US121


NO. 32.  ARGUED OCTOBER 20, 1958.  - DECIDED DECEMBER 8, 1958.  -
REVERSED. 


A PARTNERSHIP MAY BE PROSECUTED AS AN ENTITY UNDER SEC. 222(A) OF THE
MOTOR CARRIER ACT FOR "KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY" VIOLATING CERTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS AND MOTOR CARRIER REGULATIONS OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE
COMMISSION AND UNDER 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 FOR "KNOWINGLY" VIOLATING
REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORTATION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF
EXPLOSIVES AND OTHER DANGEROUS ARTICLES.  PP. 121-127. 

(A)  THE WORDS "KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY" IN SEC. 222(A) AND THE WORD
"KNOWINGLY" IN SEC. 835 DOE NOT ELIMINATE PARTNERSHIPS FROM THE
COVERAGE OF THESE STATUTES.  PP. 125-126. 

(B)  A PARTNERSHIP CAN VIOLATE EACH OF THESE STATUTES QUITE APART
FROM THE PARTICIPATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTNERS AS INDIVIDUALS. 
PP. 126-127. 

UNITED STATES V. A & P TRUCKING CO. ET AL. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY. 

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 

THIS CASE RAISES ISSUES SIMILAR TO THOSE INVOLVED IN UNITED STATES V.
AMERICAN FREIGHTWAYS CO., 352 U.S. 1020, WHERE A DISMISSAL OF AN
INFORMATION CHARGING A PARTNERSHIP ENTITY WITH VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C.
SEC. 835 WAS AFFIRMED BY AN EQUALLY DIVIDED COURT. 

APPELLEES, TWO PARTNERSHIPS, WERE CHARGED, AS ENTITIES, IN SEPARATE
INFORMATIONS WITH VIOLATIONS OF 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835, WHICH MAKES IT
CRIMINAL KNOWINGLY TO VIOLATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSON REGULATIONS
FOR THE SAFE TRANSPORTATION IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF "EXPLOSIVES AND
OTHER DANGEROUS ARTICLES."  APPELLEE A & P TRUCKING COMPANY WAS ALSO
CHARGED WITH NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF 49 U.S.C. SEC. 322(A)(SEC.  222(A)
OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT OF 1935).  (FN1)  THE DISTRICT COURT
DISMISSED, ON MOTION, THE INFORMATIONS ON THE GROUND THAT A PARTNERSHIP
ENTITY CANNOT BE GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE STATUTES INVOLVED.  THE
GOVERNMENT APPEALED DIRECTLY TO THIS COURT UNDER THE CRIMINAL APPEALS
ACT, 18 U.S.C.  SEC. 3731, AND WE NOTED PROBABLE JURISDICTION.  356
U.S. 917.  FOR REASONS SET FORTH BELOW WE HOLD THAT THE INFORMATIONS
WERE ERRONEOUSLY DISMISSED. 

49 U.S.C. SEC. 322(A), THE COMPREHENSIVE MISDEMEANOR PROVISION OF THE
MOTOR CARRIER ACT, PROVIDES THAT "ANY PERSON KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY
VIOLATING ANY PROVISION OF THIS CHAPTER (PART II OF THE INTERSTATE
COMMERCE ACT), OR ANY RULE, REGULATION, REQUIREMENT, OR ORDER (OF THE
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION) THEREUNDER, OR ANY TERM OR CONDITION OF
ANY CERTIFICATE, PERMIT, OR LICENSE, FOR WHICH A PENALTY IS NOT
OTHERWISE HEREIN PROVIDED, SHALL, UPON CONVICTION THEREOF, BE FINED
..  .""  THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT ALSO CONTAINS ITS OWN DEFINITION OF THE
WORD "PERSON":  "THE TERM 'PERSON' MEANS ANY INDIVIDUAL, FIRM,
COPARTNERSHIP, CORPORATION, COMPANY, ASSOCIATION, OR JOINT-STOCK
ASSOCIATION; ..  .""  49 U.S.C. SEC. 303(A). 

18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 PROVIDES THAT "WHOEVER KNOWINGLY VIOLATES ANY SUCH
REGULATION (ICC REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE SAFE TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS ARTICLES) SHALL BE FINED NOT MORE THAN $1,000 OR IMPRISONED
NOT MORE THAN ONE YEAR, OR BOTH; ..  .""  THE SECTION MAKES SUCH
REGULATIONS BINDING ON "ALL COMMON CARRIERS" ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.  AND 1 U.S.C. SEC. 1, PART OF A CHAPTER ENTITLED "RULES OF
CONSTRUCTION" AND IN LIGHT OF WHICH SEC. 835 MUST BE READ, PROVIDES
THAT "IN DETERMINING THE MEANING OF ANY ACT OF CONGRESS, UNLESS THE
CONTEXT INDICATES OTHERWISE -  ..  THHE WORDS 'PERSON' AND 'WHOEVER'
INCLUDE CORPORATIONS, COMPANIES, ASSOCIATIONS, FIRMS, PARTNERSHIPS,
SOCIETIES, AND JOINT STOCK COMPANIES, AS WELL AS INDIVIDUALS; ..  ."" 
THE WORD "WHOEVER" IN 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 MUST, THEREFORE, BE CONSTRUED
TO INCLUDE PARTNERSHIPS "UNLESS THE CONTEXT INDICATES OTHERWISE." 
(FN2) 

WE THINK THAT PARTNERSHIPS AS ENTITIES MAY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST UNDER
BOTH SEC. 322(A) AND SEC. 835.  THE PURPOSE OF BOTH STATUTES IS CLEAR:
TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE BY MOTOR CARRIERS, AMONG OTHERS, WITH SAFETY AND
OTHER REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION IN
THE EXERCISE OF ITS STATUTORY DUTY TO REGULATE THE OPERATIONS OF
INTERSTATE CARRIERS FOR HIRE.  IN THE EFFECTUATION OF THIS POLICY IT
CERTAINLY MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WHETHER THE CARRIER WHICH COMMITS THE
INFRACTION IS ORGANIZED AS A CORPORATION, A JOINT STOCK COMPANY, A
PARTNERSHIP, OR AN INDIVIDUAL PROPRIETORSHIP.  THE MISCHIEF IS THE
SAME, AND WE THINK THAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO MAKE THE CONSEQUENCES OF
INFRACTION THE SAME. 

TRUE, THE COMMON LAW MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A CORPORATION AND A
PARTNERSHIP, DEEMING THE LATTER NOT A SEPARATE ENTITY FOR PURPOSES OF
SUIT.  BUT THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO CHANGE THE COMMON-LAW RULE IS NOT
TO BE DOUBTED.  SEE UNITED STATES V. ADAMS EXPRESS CO., 229 U.S. 381. 
WE THINK IT BEYOND DISPUTE THAT IT HAS DONE SO IN SEC. 322(A) FOR, AS
WE HAVE SEEN, "PERSON" IN THAT SECTION IS EXPRESSLY DEFINED IN THE
MOTOR CARRIER ACT TO INCLUDE PARTNERSHIPS.  WE THINK IT LIKEWISE HAS
DONE SO IN SEC. 835, SINCE WE FIND NOTHING IN THAT SECTION WHICH WOULD
JUSTIFY OUR NOT APPLYING TO THE WORD "WHOEVER" THE DEFINITION GIVEN IT
IN 1 U.S.C. SEC. 1, WHICH INCLUDES PARTNERSHIPS.  SECTION 835 MAKES
REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE ICC FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS
ARTICLES BINDING ON ALL COMMON CARRIERS.  IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT MANY
MOTOR CARRIERS ARE ORGANIZED AS PARTNERSHIPS RATHER THAN AS
CORPORATIONS, THE CONCLUSION IS NOT LIGHTLY TO BE REACHED THAT CONGRESS
INTENDED THAT SOME CARRIERS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE FULL GAMUT OF
SANCTIONS PROVIDED FOR INFRACTIONS OF ICC REGULATIONS MERELY BECAUSE OF
THE FORM UNDER WHICH THEY WERE ORGANIZED TO DO BUSINESS.  (FN3)  MORE
PARTICULARLY, WE PERCEIVE NO REASON WHY CONGRESS SHOULD HAVE INTENDED
TO MAKE PARTNERSHIP MOTOR CARRIERS CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR INFRACTIONS OF
SEC. 322(A), BUT NOT FOR VIOLATIONS OF SEC. 835.  (FN4) 

IT IS ARGUED THAT THE WORDS "KNOWINGLY" (SEC. 835) AND "KNOWINGLY AND
WILLFULLY" (SEC. 322(A)) BY IMPLICATION ELIMINATE PARTNERSHIPS FROM THE
COVERAGE OF THE STATUTES, BECAUSE A PARTNERSHIP, AS OPPOSED TO ITS
INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS, CANNOT SO ACT.  BUT THE SAME INABILITY SO TO ACT
IN FACT IS TRUE, OF COURSE, WITH REGARD TO CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
ASSOCIATIONS; YET IT IS ELEMENTARY THAT SUCH IMPERSONAL ENTITIES CAN BE
GUILTY OF "KNOWING" OR "WILLFUL" VIOLATIONS OF REGULATORY STATUTES
THROUGH THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDANT SUPERIOR.  THUS IN UNITED STATES V.
ADAMS EXPRESS CO., SUPRA, IN WHICH THE ADAMS EXPRESS CO., A JOINT STOCK
ASSOCIATION, WAS INDICTED FOR "WILLFULLY" RECEIVING SUMS FOR EXPRESSAGE
IN EXCESS OF ITS SCHEDULED RATES, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES SAID, AT PP. 389
390: 

"IT HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR MANY YEARS THAT SOME OF THE GREAT EXPRESS
COMPANIES ARE ORGANIZED AS JOINT STOCK ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE REASON FOR
THE AMENDMENT HARDLY COULD BE SEEN UNLESS IT WAS INTENDED TO BRING
THOSE ASSOCIATIONS UNDER THE ACT.  AS SUGGESTED IN THE ARGUMENT FOR THE
GOVERNMENT, NO ONE, CERTAINLY NOT THE DEFENDANT, SEEMS TO HAVE DOUBTED
THAT THE STATUTE NOW IMPOSES UPON THEM THE DUTY TO FILE SCHEDULES OF
RATES  .. .   BUT IF IT IMPOSES UPON THEM THE DUTIES UNDER THE WORDS
COMMON CARRIER AS INTERPRETED, IT IS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT THE
SAME WORDS ARE INTENDED TO IMPOSE UPON THEM THE PENALTY INFLICTED ON
COMMON CARRIERS IN CASE THOSE DUTIES ARE NOT PERFORMED  ..  .  

"THE POWER OF CONGRESS HARDLY IS DENIED.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE STATUTE AS AGAINST CORPORATIONS IS ESTABLISHED, NEW YORK CENTRAL &
HUDSON RIVER R.R. CO. V. UNITED STATES, 212 U.S. 481, 492, AND NO
REASON IS SUGGESTED WHY CONGRESS HAS NOT EQUAL POWER TO CHARGE THE
PARTNERSHIP ASSETS WITH A LIABILITY AND TO PERSONIFY THE COMPANY SO FAR
AS TO COLLECT A FINE BY PROCEEDING AGAINST IT BY THE COMPANY NAME. 
THAT IS WHAT WE BELIEVE THAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO DO  ..  ."" 

THE POLICY TO BE SERVED IN THIS CASE IS THE SAME.  THE BUSINESS
ENTITY CANNOT BE LEFT FREE TO BREAK THE LAW MERELY BECAUSE ITS OWNERS,
STOCKHOLDERS IN THE ADAMS CASE, PARTNERS IN THE PRESENT ONE, DO NOT
PERSONALLY PARTICIPATE IN THE INFRACTION.  THE TREASURY OF THE BUSINESS
MAY NOT WITH IMPUNITY OBTAIN THE FRUITS OF VIOLATIONS WHICH ARE
COMMITTED KNOWINGLY BY AGENTS OF THE ENTITY IN THE SCOPE OF THEIR
EMPLOYMENT.  (FN5)  THUS PRESSURE IS BROUGHT ON THOSE WHO OWN THE
ENTITY TO SEE TO IT THAT THEIR AGENTS ABIDE BY THE LAW.  (FN6) 

WE HOLD, THEREFORE, THAT A PARTNERSHIP CAN VIOLATE EACH OF THE
STATUTES HERE IN QUESTION QUITE APART FROM THE PARTICIPATION AND
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PARTNERS AS INDIVIDUALS.  THE COROLLARY IS, OF COURSE,
THAT THE CONVICTION OF A PARTNERSHIP CANNOT BE USED TO PUNISH THE
INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS, WHO MIGHT BE COMPLETELY FREE OF PERSONAL GUILT. 
AS IN THE CASE OF CORPORATIONS, THE CONVICTION OF THE ENTITY CAN LEAD
ONLY TO A FINE LEVIED ON THE FIRM'S ASSETS.  REVERSED. 

FN1  THE INFORMATION AS TO APPELLEE A & P TRUCKING COMPANY CHARGED IN
ONE COUNT AN OFFENSE UNDER 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 THROUGH THE
TRANSPORTATION BY TRUCK OF CHROMIC ACID WITHOUT THE MARKINGS OR
PLACARDINGS PRESCRIBED BY 49 CFR SEC. 77.823(A).  IT CHARGED IN 34
OTHER COUNTS OFFENSES UNDER 40 U.S.C. SEC. 322(A), CONSISTING OF
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 40 CFR SEC. 191.8, WHICH PRESCRIBES PHYSICAL
EXAMINATIONS AND CERTIFICATES FOR DRIVERS OF TRUCKS (ONE COUNT),
VIOLATION OF 49 CFR, 1958 CUM. POCKET SUPP., SEC. 193.95(A), WHICH
REQUIRES THAT COMMON-CARRIER TRUCKS BE EQUIPPED WITH FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
(ONE COUNT), AND VIOLATION OF 49 U.S.C. SEC. 306(A), WHICH FORBIDS THE
OPERATION OF A COMMON-CARRIER TRUCK IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATE OF CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY (32 COUNTS).  THE INFORMATION
AS TO APPELLEE HOPLA TRUCKING COMPANY CHARGED TWO VIOLATIONS OF 18
U.S.C. SEC. 835, IN THAT HOPLA SHIPPED METHANOL, A FLAMMABLE LIQUID,
WITHOUT PROPERLY MARKING OR PLACARDING THE TRUCK AS REQUIRED BY 49 CFR
SEC. 77.823(A), AND WITHOUT ITS DRIVER HAVING IN HIS POSSESSION A PAPER
SHOWING THE PRESCRIBED LABELS REQUIRED FOR THE OUTSIDE CONTAINERS OF
THE METHANOL AS REQUIRED BY 49 CFR SEC. 77.817. 

SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST A & P TRUCKING
COMPANY, 49 U.S.C.  SEC. 322(A) WAS AMENDED TO INCREASE THE FINES
PROVIDED FOR ITS VIOLATION.  SEE 49 U.S.C.  (SUPP. V) SEC. 322(A). 

FN2  IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THE DEFINITION OF "WHOEVER" IN 1 U.S.C.
SEC. 1 WAS FIRST ENACTED INTO LAW AS PART OF THE VERY SAME STATUTE
WHICH ENACTED INTO POSITIVE LAW THE REVISED CRIMINAL CODE.  62 STAT.
683, 859 (1948).  THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 1 U.S.C. SEC. 1 AND THE
CRIMINAL CODE, WHICH INCLUDES SEC. 835, IS THUS MORE THAN A TOKEN ONE,
THE VERY SAME STATUTE WHICH CREATES THE CRIME ADMONISHING THAT
"WHOEVER" IS TO BE LIBERALLY INTERPRETED. 

FN3  CONGRESS HAS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE
DEFINITION OF "PERSON" IN A LARGE NUMBER OF REGULATORY ACTS, THUS
SHOWING ITS INTENT TO TREAT PARTNERSHIPS AS ENTITIES.  SEE, E.G., CIVIL
AERONAUTICS ACT, 52 STAT. 979, 49 U.S.C. SEC. 401 (27); FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS ACT, 48 STAT. 1066, 47 U.S.C. SEC. 153(I); SHIPPING ACT,
39 STAT. 729, 46 U.S.C. SEC. 801; TARIFF ACT, 46 STAT. 708, 19 U.S.C.
SEC. 1401(D). 

FN4  THE FACT THAT SEC. 835 PROVIDES FOR IMPRISONMENT, AS WELL AS
FINE, FOR ITS VIOLATION, WHEREAS SEC. 322(A) PROVIDES ONLY FOR FINES,
DOES NOT LEAD TO A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.  CF. UNITED STATES V. UNION
SUPPLY CO., 215 U.S. 50. 

FN5  SINCE THE TWO INFORMATIONS WERE HELD INSUFFICIENT ON THEIR FACE,
WE MUST, FOR PRESENT PURPOSES, ACCEPT AS TRUE THEIR ALLEGATIONS THAT
THE OFFENSES CHARGED WERE NOT INADVERTENTLY COMMITTED. 

FN6  GORDON V. UNITED STATES, 347 U.S. 909, RELIED ON BY APPELLEES,
IS NOT TO THE CONTRARY.  THAT CASE HELD MERELY THAT INDIVIDUAL PARTNERS
COULD NOT BE CONVICTED OF "WILLFULLY" VIOLATING THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION
ACT OF 1950 WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT THEY HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIMINAL
ACTS OF THEIR AGENTS.  CF.  UNITED STATES V. DOTTERWEICH, 320 U.S.
277.  HERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT SEEK TO HOLD THE INDIVIDUAL
PARTNERS, BUT ONLY THE PARTNERSHIPS AS ENTITIES. 

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, WITH WHOM MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
FRANKFURTER, AND MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER CONCUR, DISSENTING IN PART. 

18 U.S.C. SEC. 835, UNLIKE THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT, HAS NOT EXPLICITLY
SUBJECTED PARTNERSHIPS TO CRIMINAL LIABILITY, AND I DO NOT THINK THAT
SUCH LIABILITY SHOULD BE IMPLIED, FOR WE ARE DEALING WITH A PENAL
STATUTE WHICH SHOULD BE NARROWLY CONSTRUED. 

AS CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL WROTE IN UNITED STATES V. WILTBERGER, 5
WHEAT.  76, 95, "THE RULE THAT PENAL LAWS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY,
IS PERHAPS NOT MUCH LESS OLD THAN CONSTRUCTION ITSELF.  IT IS FOUNDED
ON THE TENDERNESS OF THE LAW FOR THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS; AND ON THE
PLAIN PRINCIPLE THAT THE POWER OF PUNISHMENT IS VESTED IN THE
LEGISLATIVE, NOT IN THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT." 

WITH THAT APPROACH WE WOULD NOT ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL SANCTION TO
ATTACH UNDER 18 U.S.C.  SEC. 835.  A CORPORATION IS AN ARTIFICIAL,
LEGALLY CREATED ENTITY THAT CAN HAVE NO "KNOWLEDGE" ITSELF AND IS SAID
TO HAVE "KNOWLEDGE" ONLY THROUGH ITS EMPLOYEES.  ON THE OTHER HAND A
PARTNERSHIP MEANS A, B, AND C - THE INDIVIDUALS WHO COMPOSE IT.  IN
THIS COUNTRY THE ENTITY THEORY HAS NOT IN GENERAL BEEN EXTENDED TO THE
PARTNERSHIP.  JUDGE LEARNED HAND SUMMARIZED THE HISTORY IN HELVERING V.
SMITH, 90 F.2D 590, 591-592.  IF DEAN AMES HAD HAD HIS WAY, THE
MERCANTILE OR ENTITY THEORY OF THE PARTNERSHIP WOULD HAVE PREVAILED. 
BUT THOSE WHO TOOK UP THE DRAFTING OF THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT AFTER
HIS DEATH ADHERED TO THE COMMON-LAW ATTITUDE TOWARD A PARTNERSHIP -
THAT IT IS AN AGGREGATION OF INDIVIDUALS.  THAT IS TO SAY, THE ACT
ADOPTED THE AGGREGATE RATHER THAN THE ENTITY THEORY.  AND THAT ACT IS
IN FORCE IN ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS OF THE STATES.  ONE WHO COMBS THE
REPORTS TODAY CAN FIND CASES ESPOUSING THE ENTITY THEORY.  BUT THEY ARE
IN THE MINORITY AND CONSCIOUSLY REJECT THE OTHER THEORY.  AS PROFESSOR
WILLISTON HAS SHOWN, THE MAIN STREAM OF AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP LAW
FOLLOWS THE BRITISH COURSE OF TREATING THE PARTNERSHIP IN THE
PLURALISTIC SENSE.  THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, 63 U. OF PA. L. REV.
196, 208.  WE SHOULD THEREFORE ASSUME THAT THIS CRIMINAL STATUTE,
WRITTEN AGAINST THAT BACKGROUND, REFLECTS THE CONVENTIONAL AGGREGATE,
NOT THE EXCEPTIONAL ENTITY, THEORY OF THE PARTNERSHIP.    WE ARE
DEALING WITH A STATUTE WHERE LIABILITY DEPENDS ON "CULPABLE INTENT," AS
STATED IN BOYCE MOTOR LINES, INC., V. UNITED STATES, 342 U.S. 337,
342.  THE PARTNERS COULD NOT BE HELD CRIMINALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
ACTS OF THEIR EMPLOYEES.  GORDON V. UNITED STATES, 347 U.S. 909.  THE
PARTNERSHIP, BEING NO MORE THAN THE AGGREGATE OF THE PARTNERS, SHOULD
STAND ON THE SAME FOOTING, UNLESS CONGRESS EXPLICITLY PROVIDES
OTHERWISE.  TITLE 1 U.S.C.  SEC. 1 DEFINES "PERSON" IN ANY ACT OF
CONGRESS TO INCLUDE A PARTNERSHIP, "UNLESS THE CONTEXT INDICATES
OTHERWISE."  THE CONTEXT OF 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 DOES INDICATE OTHERWISE
FOR THE ACT PUNISHES ONLY THOSE WHO KNOWINGLY VIOLATE IT. THE AGGREGATE
THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP LAW TEACHES THAT THERE CAN BE NO VICARIOUS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHERE NO PARTNER IS CULPABLE. 

IF THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF A CRIMINAL STATUTE IS TO
OBTAIN, 18 U.S.C. SEC. 835 MUST BE READ NARROWLY TO REFLECT THE
PREVAILING VIEW OF PARTNERSHIP LAW.  IF THE ENTITY THEORY IS TO BE
APPLIED FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPOSING CRIMINAL PENALTIES ON PARTNERSHIP
ASSETS, WHERE THE PARTNERS ARE WHOLLY INNOCENT OF ANY WRONGFUL ACT, IT
SHOULD BE DONE ONLY ON THE UNEQUIVOCAL COMMAND OF CONGRESS, AS IS THE
CASE UNDER THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT.