Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972)

Topics:  General Motors

From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access
 
Case:   WASHINGTON V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP.

Case #: 406US109


       WASHINGTON ET AL. V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP. ET AL.

        ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT

    NO. 45, ORIG.  ARGUED FEBRUARY 28-29, 1972-- DECIDED APRIL

           24, 1972 


EIGHTEEN STATES HAVE FILED A MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF
COMPLAINT AGAINST THE NATION'S FOUR MAJOR AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND
THEIR TRADE ASSOCIATION, ALLEGING A CONSPIRACY IN VIOLATION OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, A COMMON-LAW CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
TO RESTRAIN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
EQUIPMENT, AND A PUBLIC NUISANCE IN VIOLATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL
COMMON LAW.  THOSE STATES SEEK AN INJUNCTION, INTER ALIA, REQUIRING THE
DEFENDANTS TO ACCELERATE A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM TO PRODUCE
EFFECTIVE POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICES AND POLLUTION-FREE ENGINES AND TO
INSTALL ANTI-POLLUTION EQUIPMENT IN ALL VEHICLES THEY MANUFACTURED
DURING THE ALLEGED CONSPIRACY.  HELD:  THOUGH THE COURT HAS ORIGINAL
BUT NOT EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION, IT EXERCISES DISCRETION TO AVOID
IMPAIRING ITS ABILITY TO ADMINISTER ITS APPELLATE DOCKET.  IN VIEW OF
THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF REQUESTED AND THE AVAILABILITY OF THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM, THE COURT DECLINES TO ASSUME
JURISDICTION.  AS A MATTER OF LAW AS WELL AS OF PRACTICAL NECESSITY,
REMEDIES FOR AIR POLLUTION MUST BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL
SITUATIONS, MAKING IT ADVISABLE THAT THIS CONTROVERSY BE RESOLVED IN
THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS.  PP. 113-116. 

MOTIONS OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WEST VIRGINIA TO BE JOINED AS PARTIES
PLAINTIFF GRANTED.  MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF COMPLAINT DENIED
AND PARTIES REMITTED TO OTHER FEDERAL FORUM. 

DOUGLAS, J., DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT, IN WHICH ALL
MEMBERS JOINED EXCEPT POWELL, J., WHO TOOK NO PART IN THE CONSIDERATION
OR DECISION OF THE CASE. 

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. 

PLAINTIFFS ARE 18 STATES WHO, BY THIS MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL
OF COMPLAINT, SEEK TO INVOKE THIS COURG'S ORIGINAL JURISDICTION UNDER
ART. III, SEC. 2, CL. 2, OF THE CONSTITUTION.  /1/  NAMED AS DEFENDANTS
ARE THE NATION'S FOUR MAJOR AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR TRADE
ASSOCIATION. 

PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE A CONSPIRACY AMONG THE DEFENDANTS TO RESTRAIN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EQUIPMENT.  THEY
ALLEGE THAT THE CONSPIRACY BEGAN AS EARLY AS 1953 BUT WAS CONCEALED
UNTIL JANUARY 1969.  COUNT I OF THE PROPOSED COMPLAINT CHARGES A
VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS.  COUNT II CHARGES A COMMON-LAW
CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE INDEPENDENTLY OF THE SHERMAN AND
CLAYTON ACTS.  /2/  IN THEIR PRAYER FOR RELIEF, PLAINTIFFS SEEK AN
INJUNCTION REQUIRING THE DEFENDANTS TO UNDERTAKE "AN ACCELERATED
PROGRAM OF SPENDING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT DESIGNED TO PRODUCE A
FULLY EFFECTIVE POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICE OR DEVICES AND/OR POLLUTION
FREE ENGINE AT THE EARLIEST FEASIBLE DATE" AND ALSO ORDERING DEFENDANTS
TO INSTALL EFFECTIVE POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICES IN ALL MOTOR VEHICLES
THEY MANUFACTURED DURING THE CONSPIRACY AND AS STANDARD EQUIPMENT IN
ALL FUTURE MOTOR VEHICLES WHICH THEY MANUFACTURE.  OTHER PROPHYLACTIC
RELIEF IS ALSO SOUGHT. 

THE PROPOSED COMPLAINT PLAINLY PRESENTS IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF VITAL
NATIONAL IMPORTANCE.  SEE, E.G., HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AIR AND WATER POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 90TH
CONG., 1ST SESS. (1967).  OUR JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTROVERSY CANNOT
BE DISPUTED.  GEORGIA V. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO., 234 U.S. 439; GEORGIA V.
TENNESSEE COPPER CO., 206 U.S. 230.  FOR REASONS WHICH WILL APPEAR,
HOWEVER, WE DENY LEAVE TO FILE THE BILL OF COMPLAINT. 

THE GRAVAMEN OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS IS A HORIZONTAL CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE MAJOR AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS TO IMPEDE THE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT OF AUTOMOTIVE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL DEVICES.  SEE GENERALLY
L. JAFFE & L. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 141-180 (1971).  IT IS
ARGUED THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED IN SUPPORT OF THE STATUTORY AND COMMON
LAW CLAIMS ARE IDENTICAL AND THAT THEY COULD BE ELICITED AS WELL BY A
SPECIAL MASTER APPOINTED BY THIS COURT AS BY A FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
JUDGE, AND THAT RESORT TO A SPECIAL MASTER WOULD NOT PLACE A BURDEN ON
THIS COURT'S TIME AND RESOURCES SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN WHEN WE HEAR
AN ANTITRUST CASE ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM A DISTRICT COURT UNDER THE
EXPEDITING ACT, 32 STAT. 823, AS AMENDED, 15 U.S.C. 29.  AND IT IS
ARGUED THAT THE SHEER NUMBER OF STATES THAT SEEK TO INVOKE OUR ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION IN THIS MOTION IS REASON ENOUGH FOR US TO GRANT LEAVE TO
FILE.  /3/ 

THE BREADTH OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANT OF THIS COURT'S ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION DICTATES THAT WE BE ABLE TO EXERCISE DISCRETION OVER THE
CASES WE HEAR UNDER THIS JURISDICTIONAL HEAD, LEST OUR ABILITY TO
ADMINISTER OUR APPELLATE DOCKET BE IMPAIRED.  MASSACHUSETTS V.
MISSOURI, 308 U.S. 1, 19; OHIO V. WYANDOTTE CHEMICALS CORP., 401 U.S.
493, 497-499; H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 258-260 (1953); WOODS & REED, THE SUPREME COURT AND INTERSTATE
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SOME NOTES ON THE WYANDOTTE CASE, 12
ARIZ.L.REV.  691; NOTE, 11 STAN.L.REV.  665, 694-700.  IN MASSACHUSETTS
V. MISSOURI, SUPRA, AT 18-19, WHERE MASSACHUSETTS SOUGHT TO INVOKE OUR
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN ORDER TO COLLECT A TAX CLAIM, WE SAID: 

"IN THE EXERCISE OF OUR ORIGINAL JURISDICTION SO AS TRULY TO FULFILL
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE WE NOT ONLY MUST LOOK TO THE NATURE OF THE
INTEREST OF THE COMPLAINING STATE-- THE ESSENTIAL QUALITY OF THE RIGHT
ASSERTED-- BUT WE MUST ALSO INQUIRE WHETHER RECOURSE TO THAT
JURISDICTION . . . IS NECESSARY FOR THE STATE'S PROTECTION.  . . . TO
OPEN THIS COURT TO ACTIONS BY STATES TO RECOVER TAXES CLAIMED TO BE
PAYABLE BY CITIZENS OF OTHER STATES, IN THE ABSENCE OF FACTS SHOWING
THE NECESSITY FOR SUCH INTERVENTION, WOULD BE TO ASSUME A BURDEN WHICH
THE GRANT OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS COMPELLING
THIS COURT TO ASSUME AND WHICH MIGHT SERIOUSLY INTERFERE WITH THE
DISCHARGE BY THIS COURT OF ITS DUTY IN DECIDING THE CASES AND
CONTROVERSIES APPROPRIATELY BROUGHT BEFORE IT." 

BY THE SAME TOKEN, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE AVAILABILITY OF THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURT AS AN ALTERNATIVE FORUM AND THE NATURE OF THE RELIEF
REQUESTED SUGGEST WE REMIT THE PARTIES TO THE RESOLUTION OF THEIR
CONTROVERSIES IN THE CUSTOMARY FORUM.  THE NATURE OF THE REMEDY WHICH
MAY BE NECESSARY, IF A CASE FOR RELIEF IS MADE OUT, ALSO ARGUES AGAINST
TAKING ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. 

AIR POLLUTION IS, OF COURSE, ONE OF THE MOST NOTORIOUS TYPES OF
PUBLIC NUISANCE IN MODERN EXPERIENCE.  CONGRESS HAS NOT, HOWEVER, FOUND
A UNIFORM, NATIONWIDE SOLUTION TO ALL ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM AND,
INDEED, HAS DECLARED "THAT THE PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AIR POLLUTION
AT ITS SOURCE IS THE PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS."  81 STAT. 485, 42 U.S.C. 1857(A)(3).  TO BE SURE,
CONGRESS HAS LARGELY PREEMPTED THE FIELD WITH REGARD TO "EMISSIONS FROM
NEW MOTOR VEHICLES," 42 U.S.C. 1857F-6AA); 31 FED. REG. 5170 (1966);
AND MOTOR VEHICLE FUELS AND FUEL ADDITIVES, 84 STAT. 1699, 42 U.S.C.
1857F-6CC)(4).  SEE CURRIE, MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION; STATE
AUTHORITY AND FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION, 68 MICH.L.REV.  1083 (1970); HILL,
THE POLITICS OF AIR POLLUTION; PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRESSURE GROUPS, 10
ARIZ.L.REV.  37, 44-45 (1068); STEVENS, AIR POLLUTION AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM; RESPONSES TO FELT NECESSITIES, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 661, 674-676
(1971).  IT HAS ALSO PRE-EMPTED THE FIELD SO FAR AS EMISSIONS FROM
AIRPLANES ARE CONCERNED, 42 U.S.C. 1857F-9 TO 1857F-12.  SO FAR AS
FACTORIES, INCINERATORS, AND OTHER STATIONARY DEVICES ARE IMPLICATED,
THE STATES HAVE BROAD CONTROL TO AN EXTENT NOT NECESSARY TO RELATE
HERE.  /4/  SEE STEVENS, SUPRA, PASSIM; COMMENT, 58 CALIF.L.REV.  1474
(1970).  BUT IN CERTAIN INSTANCES, AS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE FEDERAL
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS HAVE BEEN
ESTABLISHED, /5/  42 U.S.C. 1857C-4 AND 1857C-5, OR WHERE "HAZARDOUS
AIR POLLUTANTS" HAVE BEEN DEFINED, 42 U.S.C. 1857C-7, THERE MAY BE
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION.  SEE 42 U.S.C. 1857C-8 ET SEQ. MOREOVER,
GEOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS WHICH DEFINE LOCAL AND REGIONAL AIRSHEDS
ARE OFTEN SIGNIFICANT TO ABATE AIR POLLUTION.  SEE HEARINGS BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND WATER POLLUTION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
PUBLIC WORKS, 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 130 (1967); COONS, AIR POLLUTION &
GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, 10 ARIZ.L.REV.  48, 60-64 (1968).  THUS, MEASURES
WHICH MIGHT BE ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH POLLUTION IN A CITY SUCH AS SAN
FRANCISCO, MIGHT BE GROSSLY INADEQUATE IN A CITY SUCH AS PHOENIX, WHERE
GEOGRAPHICAL AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS TRAP AEROSOLS AND
PARTICULATES. 

AS A MATTER OF LAW AS WELL AS PRACTICAL NECESSITY CORRECTIVE
REMEDIES FOR AIR POLLUTION, THEREFORE, NECESSARILY MUST BE CONSIDERED
IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCALIZED SITUATIONS.  /6/  WE CONCLUDE THAT THE
CAUSES SHOULD BE HEARD IN THE APPROPRIATE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. 
/7/ 

THE MOTIONS OF THE STATES OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WEST VIRGINIA TO BE
JOINED AS PARTIES PLAINTIFF ARE GRANTED.  THE MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
A BILL OF COMPLAINT IS DENIED AND THE PARTIES ARE REMITTED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER FEDERAL FORUM. 

              IT IS SO ORDERED. 

MR. JUSTICE POWELL TOOK NO PART IN THE CONSIDERATION OR DECISION OF
THESE MOTIONS. 

/1/  FIFTEEN STATES ORIGINALLY MOVED FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF
COMPLAINT.  WE SUBSEQUENTLY GRANTED LEAVE TO THE STATE OF IDAHO TO
INTERVENE AS PLAINTIFF.  403 U.S. 949.  BY TODAY'S DECISION WE ALSO
GRANT LEAVE TO THE STATES OF NORTH DAKOTA AND WEST VIRGINIA TO BE
JOINED AS PARTIES PLAINTIFF. 

/2/  A THIRD COUNT OF PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED COMPLAINT ALSO CHARGED "A
PUBLIC NUISANCE CONTRARY TO THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE PLAINTIFF STATES .
. . (AND) THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT."  MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF
COMPLAINT 12.  IN A MEMORANDUM FILED WITH THIS COURT FEB. 19, 1972,
HOWEVER, PLAINTIFFS STRUCK THIS COUNT FROM THEIR PROPOSED COMPLAINT;
BUT IDAHO, THE INTERVENOR, DID NOT JOIN IN THAT MOTION.  IN LIGHT OF
OUR DISPOSITION OF COUNTS I AND II OF THE BILL OF COMPLAINT, IDAHO'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF COMPLAINT SOLELY FOR COUNT III
SHOULD BE DENIED A FORTIORI.  SHOULD ANY OF THE PLAINTIFFS DESIRE TO
RENEW THE PUBLIC NUISANCE COUNT OF THE BILL OF COMPLAINT IN THE
DISTRICT COURT, THEY ARE FREE TO DO SO UNDER OUR DECISION TODAY IN
ILLINOIS V. CITY OF MILWAUKEE, ANTE, P. 91. 

/3/  IN ADDITION TO THE 18 STATES WHICH ARE PLAINTIFFS, 16 OTHER
STATES AND THE CITY OF NEW YORK HAVE FILED A BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE
SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BILL OF COMPLAINT. 

/4/  BECAUSE FEDERAL MOTOR VEHICLE EMISSION CONTROL STANDARDS APPLY
ONLY TO NEW MOTOR VEHICLES, STATES ALSO RETAIN BROAD RESIDUAL POWER
OVER USED MOTOR VEHICLES.  MOREOVER, CITIZENS, STATES, AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS MAY INITIATE ACTIONS TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL
STANDARDS AND TO ENFORCE OTHER STATUTORY AND COMMON-LAW RIGHTS.  42
U.S.C. 1857H-2. 

/5/  NATIONAL PRIMARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS ARE THOSE "WHICH
IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR (OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY) . . . ARE REQUISITE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC HEALTH.  . . . "  42
U.S.C. 1857C-4(B)(1).  SECONDARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS ARE
THOSE "REQUISITE TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC WELFARE," 42 U.S.C. 1857C
4(B)(2), WHICH "INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, EFFECTS ON SOILS,
WATER, CROPS, VEGETATION, MANMADE MATERIALS, ANIMALS, WILDLIFE,
WEATHER, VISIBILITY, AND CLIMATE, DAMAGE TO AND DETERIORATION OF
PROPERTY, AND HAZARDS TO TRANSPORTATION, AS WELL AS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC
VALUES AND ON PERSONAL COMFORT AND WELL-BEING."  42 U.S.C. 1857HH). 
FOR IMPLEMENTATION PLANS FOR PRIMARY AND SECONDARY AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS, SEE 42 U.S.C. 1857C-5. 

RULES AND REGULATIONS SETTING AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS HAVE
BEEN PROMULGATED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY.  36 FED.REG. 
22384 (1971). 

/6/  IT WAS IN RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT THAT CONGRESS DIRECTED THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY TO "DESIGNATE AS
AN AIR QUALITY CONTROL REGION ANY INTERSTATE AREA OR MAJOR INTRA-STATE
AREA WHICH HE DEEMS NECESSARY OR APPROPRIATE FOR THE ATTAINMENT AND
MAINTENANCE OF AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS."  42 U.S.C. 1857C-2(C). 

/7/  MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION APPARENTLY INVOLVING THE SAME FACTUAL
CLAIMS AS ARE PRESENTED HERE HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA AND PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
ARE ALREADY UNDER WAY.  SEE IN RE MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL
EQUIPMENT, 311 F.SUPP.  1349 (JUD.  PANEL ON MULTIDIST.  LIT.  1970). 

FREDRIC C. TAUSEND, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WASHINGTON, ARGUED THE CAUSE FOR PLAINTIFFS.  WITH HIM ON THE BRIEFS
WERE SLADE GORTON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON, WILLIAM L. DWYER AND
DAVID G. KNIBB, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL; WILLIAM J. SCOTT,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, AND ROBERT S. ATKINS AND DAVID C.
LANDGRAF, ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL; GARY NELSON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ARIZONA, AND MALCOLM P. STROHSON, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; DUKE W.
DUNBAR, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF COLORADO, JOHN MOORE, DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL, AND WILLIAM TUCKER, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; BERTRAM T.
KANBARA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAII, AND GEORGE PAI, DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL W. ANTHONY PARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO, AND RICHARD
GREENER, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL; RICHARD C. TURNER, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF IOWA; KENT FRIZZELL, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS, AND RICHARD HAYSE,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; JAMES S. ERWIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE,
ROBERT H. QUINN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, AND NEAL COLICCHIO,
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; DOUGLAS M. HEAD, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MINNESOTA; JOHN C. DANFORTH, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI; HELGI
JOHANNESON, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH DAKOTA, AND PAUL M. SAND, FIRST
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; PAUL W. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO;
AND DONALD WECKSTEIN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT F. DE SIMONE,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISLAND; JAMES M. JEFFORDS, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF VERMONT, AND JOHN D. HANSEN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL; ANDREW P.
MILLER, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, AND ANTHONY F. TROY, ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL; CHAUNCEY H. BROWNING, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST
VIRGINIA, GENE HAL WILLIAMS, FIRST DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND JAMES
G. ANDERSON III, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL. 

LLOYD N. CUTLER ARGUED THE CAUSE FOR DEFENDANTS.  WITH HIM ON THE
BRIEFS WERE HOWARD P. WILLENS, JAY F. LAPIN, LOUIS F. OBERDORFER, JAMES
S. CAMPBELL, JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, AND PAUL G. BOWER FOR AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS ASSN., INC.; WALTER J. WILLIAMS AND FORREST A. HAINLINE,
JR., FOR AMERICAN MOTORS CORP.; TOM KILLEFER, WILLIAM E. HUTH, G.
WILLIAM SHEA, AND PHILIP K. VERLEGER, FOR CHRYSLER CORP.; ROBERT L.
STERN AND CARL J. SCHUCK FOR FORD MOTOR CO.; ROSS L. MALONE, ROBERT A.
NITSCHKE, HAMMOND E. CHAFFETZ, JOSEPH DUCOEUR, MARCUS MATTSON, AND
RICHARD F. OUTCAULT, JR., FOR GENERAL MOTORS CORP.     BRIEF FOR
ALABAMA ET AL. AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'  MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE BILL OF COMPLAINT WAS FILED BY J. LEE RANKIN, DAVID I.
SHAPIRO, AND JEROME S. WAGSHAL, AND BY THE FOLLOWING ATTORNEYS GENERAL
FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE STATES: WILLIAM J. BAXLEY OF ALABAMA, JOHN E.
HAVELOCK OF ALASKA, EVELLE J. YOUNGER OF CALIFORNIA, ROBERT L. SHEVIN
OF FLORIDA, JACK P. F. GREMILLION OF LOUISIANA, FRANCIS B. BURCH OF
MARYLAND, A. F. SUMMER OF MISSISSIPPI, ROBERT LIST OF NEVADA, DAVID L.
NORVELL OF NEW MEXICO, LOUIS J. LEFKOWITZ OF NEW YORK, LARRY DERRYBERRY
OF OKLAHOMA, J. SHANE CREAMER OF PENNSYLVANIA, DANIEL R. MCLEOD OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, GORDON MYDLAND OF SOUTH DAKOTA, CRAWFORD C. MARTIN OF
TEXAS, AND ROBERT W. WARREN OF WISCONSIN.